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ABSTRACT
BECOMING A PSYCHOTHERAPIST:
APPLICATIONS OF KEGAN'S MODEL FOR
UNDERSTANDING THE DEVELOPMENT OF PSYCHOTHERAPISTS
MAY 1998
LINDA L PRATT, A.B., OBERLIN COLLEGE
Ed.M., HARVARD UNIVERSITY
Ph.D., UNIVERSITY OF MASSACHUSETTS AMHERST
Directed by: Professor John C. Carey, Ph.D.
Becoming a psychotherapist has generally been understood in terms
of a passage through phases of professional development. Recently,
however, structural models of adult development have begun to inform a
new literature on developmental approaches to psychotherapy
supervision. Using a structural developmental lens transforms one's
understanding of psychotherapist development, suggesting that there is
not just one process of becoming a psychotherapist, but many. It shifts
the focus from the phasic tasks of skill development to the
transformations which therapists undergo when development includes a
fundamental shift in one's way of making sense of the world.
How might the experience of key issues in clinical work be
different, depending on the structural developmental lens with which we
view our experience? This research explores the applications of Robert
Kegan's (1994, 1982) model to this question. Twelve female
psychologists were interviewed using a semi-structured format
focused
on six areas of clinical practice. Data was analyzed according
to the
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coding scheme for Kegan's model and a qualitative analysis of emergent
themes.
The results of this study generally support the utility of Kegan's
model for explaining differences in therapists' understandings of their
clinical work. Developmental differences were found for four of the six
areas studied. Therapists at Kegan's stage four were contrasted with
those in transition from stage three to stage four in the following areas:
responses to manipulative clients, dealing with the termination of
psychotherapy, changes experienced as a therapist and perceptions of
therapeutic challenges. Developmental differences were not apparent in
therapists' manner of dealing with dual relationships or in their
perceptions about clinical supervision.
Kegan's model has significant implications for psychotherapy
supervision. It can address the complexity involved in becoming a
psychotherapist, while providing an organized schema for
understanding the challenges therapists are likely to face at each
stage of development. Kegan's model adds another dimension to Carl
Rogers' person centered approach by illuminating the particular
structures of meaning by which people understand their experience.
For clinical supervisors, this new understanding might serve to
deepen one's empathy for the different experiences of becoming a
psychotherapist.
ix
TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS iv
ABSTRACT viii
LIST OF TABLES xiv
LIST OF FIGURES xv
CHAPTER
1. INTRODUCTION 1
Statement of the Problem 2
Significance of the Research 4
Research Questions 6
Client Manipulation 7
Termination of Psychotherapy 8
Dual Relationships 8
Challenges of Psychotherapeutic Work 8
Supervisory Relationship 8
Change in the Psychotherapist 9
Theoretical Framework Guiding the Study 9
2. REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 14
Metaphors for Development 14
Paradigm Shifts as a Model for Development 1
4
Two Irreconcilable Metaphors for
Development ^
Phasic Verses Structural Models of
Development ^ ^
The Structural Developmental Paradigm 16
What Is Structural Development? 16
"Measuring" Structural Development 17
Structural Development in Kegan's Model 18
Structural Stages 22
Approaches to a Developmental Understanding of
Psychotherapists 28
Phasic Approaches and Mixed Models 29
The Stoltenberg & Dellworth Model 35 1
The Holloway Verses Stoltenberg &
Dellworth Debate 40 '
Structural Models 44
I
Blocher 44
Borders 45
Carey 49
Benack 52
Psychodynamic Supervision and
Psychotherapist Development 56
'
Ekstein & Wallerstein 57
Doehrman 59
Ralph 61
Applications of Kegan's Model to Adult Leadership
with Implications for Clinical Supervision 65
3. METHODOLOGY 69
Design Decisions 69
Sample ^5
Data Gathering 80
Development of the Interview 84
Question #1: Client Manipulation 88
Question #2: Termination 89
Question #3: Dual Relationships 91
Question #4: Challenge 93
Question #5: Supervisory Relationship 93
Question #6: Change 94
Data Analysis
The Subject-Object Interview and General
Principles of Analysis 97
Distinguishing Structure and Content 100
Researcher Role 101
Soundness 105
Limitations 1 06
4. RESULTS AND DISCUSSION 109
Overview 109
Research Questions and Results 110
Manipulation 1 1
0
Summary 1 1 9
Termination 121
Summary 1 33
Dual relationships 135
Summary 1 43
Challenges of psychotherapeutic work 145
Treatment Related Questions 147
Limit Setting and Confrontation 156
Questions of Values 158
Working with Abusers 162
Dealing with the Impact of the Therapist's Own
Issues •-• ^ 6^
Summary ^
Supervision ^
Summary ^
xii
1i
Changes in the Therapist 173 !
Summary 188 '
5. SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPLICATIONS 190
Conclusions and Significance of the Study 190
Implications for Practice 194
Limitations of the Study 202
1
Directions for Future Research 208 '
Summary 21
0
I
APPENDICES
A. TABLES SUMMARIZING RESULTS 21
4
B. INTERVIEW QUESTIONS 222
BIBLIOGRAPHY 223
xiv
LIST OF TABLES
Table
1
.
Balance of Subject and Object as the Common Ground of
Several Development Theories 20 '
2. Structural Abilities 214
3. Key Changes 21 5
4. Central Challenges 21
9
I
I
XV
I
LIST OF FIGURES
FIGURE
1. A Helix of Kegan's Structural Stages
XV
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
The process of becoming a psychotherapist, and developing
one's expertise in this enterprise, has been described variously by
theorists interested in applying a developmental approach to
psychotherapy supervision. A common theme has been a description
of the process as though it were the same one for all therapists --
that we each begin at the beginning (so to speak), proceed through
the middle and arrive at the finish, an accomplished therapist or
counselor. This kind of description seems to overlook the
foundational insight of the developmental thinking which has
followed from Piaget's (1967) work: that our structural
developmental level shapes our very experience of our experience.
The practice of psychotherapy is one in which, hopefully,
learning is ongoing and, as Goldberg (1986) suggests, the
"apprenticeship" never ends (p. 4). Thus the idea of becoming a
psychotherapist refers to experienced practitioners as well as
beginners. I will argue that there is not one process of becoming a
psychotherapist, but many. From first practicum trainee to
seasoned psychotherapy supervisor, the experience of various phases
of professional development will be different depending on one's
developmental level. These different experiences of becoming a
therapist might be better understood using Kegan's (1994, 1982) i
structural model of adult development. <
!
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Statement of the Problem
As "developmental models have become the Zeitgeist of
supervision thinking and research" (Holloway, 1987, 209), there has
been an interest in finding models to describe psychotherapist
development. Despite Carey's (1988) suggestion that supervision be
viewed as a form of applied adult development, there has been
surprisingly little integration of recent research in adult
development with the literature on psychotherapy supervision.
Instead, a number of new and different models have been generated
to describe psychotherapist development. Most often, this
development has been conceptualized in terms of learning tasks or
phases of professional growth. Although these are important, they
do not represent the whole picture of development, nor perhaps even
the key one. Missing is an understanding of the nature and shape of
the developmental transformations of adulthood and their impact on
the way in which psychotherapists make meaning of their clinical
experience.
The study of adult development, particularly from a structural
developmental perspective, is a relatively new field of interest.
Even the recognition that development continues past adolescence is
relatively recent. The realization that most people do not reach the
stage of Piaget's "formal operations" by adolescence (Kuhn et al.,
1977; Neimark, 1975, 1979) sparked an interest in the continuing
process of development that occurs in adulthood. As Kegan has
suggested:
... if in the last few hundred years we have succeeded in
recognizing the qualitative distinction between the mind of
2
the child and the mind of the adult, it may still remain for us
to discover that adulthood itself is not an end state but a vast
evolutionary expanse encompassing a variety of capacities of
mind (p. 5).
Noam, too, has noted that ".
. . the cognitive developmental
theories have introduced a conceptual road map of the continued
developmental transformations throughout life" (1990, p. 361). An
understanding of the nature and shape of these transformations in
adulthood is important to our conceptualization of development in
psychotherapists.
Use of a structural developmental lens allows us to see new
and important features in the development of psychotherapists. I
will argue that Kegan's model is particularly well suited for this
task. The most encompassing of the structural developmental
models, Kegan's theory incorporates and/or identifies the structural
underpinnings for perspective taking (Selman, 1980), intellectual
development (Perry, 1970), moral development (Kohlberg, 1969,
1976,1984) and ego development (Loevinger, 1976).
The field of structural development has been built on the
foundation laid by Piaget. However, as Kegan suggests, in Piaget "we
discover a genius who exceeded himself and found more than he was
looking for" (26). Kegan's genius has been in uncovering that
"something more" in Piaget's work: an underlying structure for
development throughout the lifespan. Just as Piaget's studies of
children's perceptions about the physical world provide us with
concrete illustrations of the developmental process, Kegan's model
3 I
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offers an illumination of the structures of meaning-making in
adults.
Building on Piaget's work, Kegan took the idea of qualitatively
distinct and systematically evolving ways of looking at the world,
and constructed a framework for understanding the development of
people's self-conception and capacity for relating to others. This
framework, applied to the domain of psychotherapist development,
may be a valuable one for understanding developmental differences
in the experience of becoming a psychotherapist.
Significance of the Research
The significance of this work is theoretical and
methodological as well as practical. First, this research challenges
much of the current work in developmental supervision by offering
an alternative to the phasic conceptualization of psychotherapist
development. Second, by providing an in-depth, qualitative study of
psychotherapists' structural development, it fills a methodological
gap in the research noted by Holloway (1988, p.139). Third, this
work has the potential for improving practice in the fields of
clinical supervision and counselor education.
An understanding of psychotherapist development is
fundamental to the new field of developmental supervision. In
particular, the model by which psychotherapist development is
understood is central to the strength and viability of a
developmental approach. By focusing on differences in the very
construction of meaning, structural developmental models
illuminate what may be the most crucial aspect of the differences
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which psychotherapist trainees bring to the training process.
Structural developmental differences may be the defining factor in
what is experienced as challenging in the practice of psychotherapy.
To date, there has been little integration of structural models of
adult development in the supervision literature. (For a few notable
exceptions, see Blocher, 1983; Borders et al., 1986; Borders, 1989;
Borders & Fong, 1989; Carey, 1988; Carey, In press; Shaughnessey &
Carey, In press.) Kegan's (1994,1982) model offers a new
understanding of human development which has the potential for
illuminating this essential component of psychotherapist
development.
A more complex understanding of psychotherapist development
enhances the capacity of supervisors and counselor educators to
tailor their interventions to the developmental needs of the trainee.
While maintaining the complexity demonstrated by much
psychodynamic work in psychotherapy supervision (See Ekstein &
Wallerstein, 1958; Doehrman, 1976), Kegan's model potentially
offers something in addition -- an organized schema for
understanding the challenges which psychotherapists face at
particular stages of development. A developmental model for
understanding clinical challenges not only normalizes the learning
process but also provides greater "generalizability" than a model
which attributes psychotherapists' "difficulties in learning" solely
to idiosyncratic aspects of personal biography. (Ekstein &
Wallerstein, 1958)
Finally, the theoretical framework which informs this
research, constructive developmental psychology, is a new and vital
field of inquiry, filled with spirited intellectual controversy.
Although the model was originated by Kegan, others have worked to
extend, refine and challenge it. (See Rogers & Kegan, 1990; Rogers,
1987; Noam, 1990, 1988, 1986, 1985, 1984; Kegan, Rogers &
Quinlan, 1981; Goodman, 1983; Henderson, 1 984; Powers et al.,
1983; Selman, 1980; Demorest & Selman, 1 984; Basseches, 1 989;
Hewer, 1983, 1986; Kelley, 1983; Carlsen, 1988; Aardema, 1984;
Higgins, 1983) Constructive developmental psychology represents a
fundamentally new conception of human development. This new
psychology has far-reaching implications for both theory and
practice. This study thus contributes to the small but growing body
of research in a field that is on the cutting edge of human
development theory.
Research Questions
This research began with the aim of testing a hypothesis that
Kegan's model could be applied to the domain of psychotherapist
development. It seemed that the focus of the model, on intra- and
interpersonal relating, was very close to the areas upon which
therapists focus their attention. Thus it seemed that Kegan's model
might be useful in terms of understanding the different ways that
therapists make sense of the work that they do with clients. The
question of applicability, however, is really two-fold: First, is
there a developmental progression in the ways that therapists
understand their work with clients which Kegan's model can
elucidate? Secondly, is there sufficient unity across domains in
Kegan's model so that the aspects of development captured by an
^
overall stage "score" would have predictive value in terms of
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understanding a person's work as a therapist?
The question of unity across domains is an important one. In
particular, questions have been raised regarding possible
discrepancies between a person's ability to make sense of their
experience in various domains such as the professional versus the
personal and under particular circumstances (Basseches, 1989;
Carey, personal communication, 1990; Goodman, 1983; Lahey, 1986;
Noam, 1990). Although the model does assume a certain degree of
consistency between personal and professional selves, this is an
area that warrants further research. In designing this research, I
have focused specifically on psychotherapists' meaning making about
their clinical work, and do not explore the consistency question.
However, rather than assuming consistency, I have adapted the
standard Subject-Object clinical research interview based on
Kegan's theory to the domain of psychotherapy.
Thus, while recognizing that the two parts of the question are
not completely separable in practice, I have designed this study to
explore the first aspect: Do counselors' understandings of key
issues in therapy differ according to developmental level as defined
in Kegan's model? Can Kegan's model inform psychotherapy
supervision by enhancing our understanding of the development of
counselors and therapists?
This study will look at developmental differences in
psychotherapists' meaning making about the following issues:
Client Manipulation
• Are there developmental differences in the ways in which
psychotherapists understand and respond to manipulative clients?
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• Are there developmental differences in the kinds of manipulative
behaviors by clients that are most difficult for
psychotherapists?
• Are there developmental differences in therapists' willingness
and/or ability to acknowledge difficult feelings in regard to
clients?
Termination of Psychotherapy
• Are there developmental differences in the ways in which
therapists make meaning of the termination of psychotherapy?
Dual Relationships
• Are there developmental differences in the ways in which
therapists understand the issue of dual relationships with
clients?
Challenges of Psychotherapeutic Work
• How is what is experienced as most challenging about therapeutic
work potentially a function of the developmental level of the
psychotherapist?
• What kinds of issues or experiences are perceived as challenging
to therapists at different stages of development?
Supervisory Relationship
• How might psychotherapist development affect the therapist's
perceptions of their needs for and experience of the supervisory
relationship?
8
Change in the Psychotherapist
• Do therapists see themselves as changing over time in ways
which support or challenge the hierarchical and invariant
sequence of Kegan's model?
Theoretical Framework Guiding the Study
Constructive developmental psychology (Kegan, 1994, 1982)
provides the theoretical framework guiding this study. Kegan talks
about "construction" and "development" as the two key ideas
underlying his theory. With the idea of "construction," Kegan places
his theory within the constructivist philosophical tradition,
emphasizing that meaning is created rather than given. This idea of
construction, in Kegan's words, "directs us ... to that most human of
'regions' between an event and a reaction to it -- the place where
the event is privately composed, made sense of, the place where it
actually becomes an event for that person" (2).
With the idea of development, Kegan adds the notion that there
are regularities to the process by which meaning systems evolve.
Development in this view is unidirectional and results in a
hierarchical sequence of stages, with each succeeding stage more
adequate in terms of understanding oneself and others. Kegan's
model uses the foundational insight of Piaget's work, that there are
structural regularities to development, to construct a theory about
the evolution of meaning-making across the life-span.
In Kegan's view (as in Piaget's), development takes place as a
result of the interaction between the person and the environment,
through a process of assimilation and accommodation. A "structure"
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may be viewed as a kind of framework by which one understands the
world. A person's structure both defines and limits their view of
the world, including their self-awareness and perceptions of others.
These structures are transformed through a process of assimilation
and accommodation. As new information is taken in, the person
attempts to fit the new information into the existing frame
(assimilation). When confronted with too much divergent
information to fit the existing frame, conflict results and the frame
may be broken and eventually replaced with one that is more
encompassing.
Constructive developmental psychology offers a new paradigm
to the field of human development. This "third psychological
tradition," as Kegan has described it, presents a fundamentally new
understanding of human development which both reconstructs and
elaborates but also "ends up doing honor ... to the deepest
convictions of both existential and dynamic personality
psychologies." (1982, 4)
One of the central tenets of Rogerian existential psychology is
a belief in the self-actualizing tendency, an assumption that human
beings are innately oriented toward growth. Kegan's notion that
human beings are engaged in a continual process of meaning-making
is similar. Although there is a recognition that the meaning-making
process may become so attenuated that it becomes difficult to make
one's world cohere, Kegan is clear in his belief that the drive toward
meaning, like Rogers movement toward growth, continues:
My most fundamental orientation toward the person I address
derives from my convictions about an activity or process
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which I share with the client right at this moment -- not a
process alien to me, like "psychosis", not an activity I "once"
underwent, back at a time when I was in pain, but one I share
right at this moment. That activity is not presumed to be
suspended for a category of people, or for periods in our life of
great confusion or radical change in the way others know us.
We neither escape from our fate as lifelong meaning-makers
nor escape from our lifelong community with those who may be
finding that fate a greater burden. (Kegan, 1982, 265)
Rogers (1951) is well known for his understanding of empathy
as a prime facilitating condition for growth. The crux of empathy in
client centered therapy is in attending to the client's construction
of meaning. What Kegan's theory might add to the client centered
approach is a more elaborated theoretical basis for understanding
the developing person. The idea that there are a number of distinct
frameworks by which people make meaning of their experience
potentially adds another dimension to Rogerian psychology. By
understanding the particular developmental framework by which the
client interprets his experience, the therapist is better able to
attain the kind of empathic stance which Rogers believed central to
therapeutic growth: that the therapist can understand the client's
experience in the way that the client himself experiences it.
Similarly, the ability of the clinical supervisor to attain that kind of
empathic understanding of the experience of the supervisee may also
be a prime facilitator of growth in the psychotherapist.
Kegan's work is also grounded in psychoanalytic thinking. It
has less in common, however, with traditional Freudian drive theory
than with the Object Relations branch of psychoanalytic thinking. In
line with this view, Kegan sees object-relating as a primary motive
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of personality and mode by which personality develops. The
progressive development of object relating is, in fact, the central
theme in Kegan's theory of personality development.
In contrast to psychoanalytic thinking, Kegan's is a theory of
developmental progression throughout the life span, in which early
development has an important but not deterministic influence on
later development. In Kegan's view, the yearning for connection and
the yearning for autonomy exist in lifelong tension. With each
succeeding stage of development, the balance alternates between
each of these poles. To capture this tension, Kegan (1982)
conceptualized his model in terms of a helix, in which the movement
is upward as well as recursive. (See figure 1 on the following page,
from Kegan 1982, p. 109.) Although Kegan later questioned the
gender related implications of this image (to be discussed in chapter
3), the helix is a graphic representation of the way in which Kegan's
work reconstructs the notion of psychological "regression." In this
view, what could be seen as regression may be less a literal return
to an earlier stage of development, than a reworking of issues
related to the autonomy-inclusion tension at a new level of
complexity.
12
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CHAPTER 2
REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
Metaphors for Development
Paradigm Shifts as a Model for Development
Thomas Kuhn's (1970) notion of paradigm shifts changed our
thinking about the way scientific theory evolves. Rather than being
an additive process, by which new discoveries incrementally
increase a static body of knowledge about what is true in the
physical world, Kuhn saw the process as a more transformative one.
In his view, as discrepant information joins the existing body of
knowledge, it is assimilated (or ignored) until such assimilation is
no longer possible. The accumulation of discrepant information
precipitates a shift in the underlying paradigm, so that a new, more
encompassing model for understanding the world is generated.
Recent thinking in the field of clinical supervision has focused
on developmental approaches to the supervision of counselors and
therapists. For the most part, this literature has understood
development as an additive process; that therapists add new skills
and knowledge as they gain experience. While this view is not
incorrect, it may be as limited in understanding the process by
which therapists develop as was the pre-Kuhnian view of scientific
thinking. It is missing a sense of the transformations which
therapists undergo when development includes a fundamental shift
in one's way of making sense of the world.
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Two Irreconcilable Metaphors for Development
Loevinger (1976) discusses different ways in which
development may be understood and identifies two irreconcilable
metaphors for development: the mechanistic and the organismic. In
the mechanistic view, development is seen as "a neat and continuous
succession of changes" (38). The mechanistic metaphor parallels the
pre-Kuhnian notion of the development of scientific thinking. It is
also the metaphor by which psychotherapist development is
understood in most of the body of literature on developmental
supervision. In contrast, the organismic view, in which development
is seen as "a series of upheavals and discontinuities" (38)
represents a very different conception of the process by which
change and growth occur. It is this dynamic, transformative aspect
of development which characterizes Kegan's model.
Phasic Versus Structural Models of Development
The mechanistic and organismic metaphors can also be seen in
terms of two models of development which they underlie: the phasic
and the structural. Noam (1985) makes the distinction between
phase as the "task organizations at different points in the life span"
and stage as "organizations of meaning in the structural tradition"
(322). Following Noam's definitions, it seems clear that the term
stage is frequently used in the developmental supervision literature
when what is described is actually a phase of professional
development. Thus, what are described as stage models of
psychotherapist development are most often phasic models, which
fail to account for the therapist's level of structural development.
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The Structural Developmental Paradigm
What is Structural Development?
In advocating the importance of a structural model for
understanding psychotherapist development, it would seem
important to define structural development. If a structure is viewed
as a kind of framework by which one understands the world, then
Loevinger's notion of development as the "acquisition or change of
the basic rules governing the relations among the elements" (1976,
33) provides a good working definition of structural development. A
change in the "basic rules" results in a new configuration or
structure. Loevinger further distinguishes additive change from
structural development when she notes that "if development
consists in structural changes, any new structure constitutes a
break from the old one. It cannot be obtained by adding and
subtracting, but only by establishing a new principle governing the
relations among the parts" (38).
Selman discusses three factors which may be added to this
definition of structural development: qualitative difference,
invariant sequence and structured wholeness (1980, 76). In order
for development to be considered structural it must have these
features: 1) There must be a fundamental, qualitative change in
one's way of viewing the world. 2) Development must proceed
according to a hierarchical and invariant sequence, from least
developed to most developed. 3) These qualitative changes must be
generalizable to a range of functioning.
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"Measuring" Structural Development
Piaget's studies of children's perceptions about the physical
world provide us with concrete illustrations of the developmental
process. The classic beaker experiment is a visual representation of
how children at a certain stage (preoperational) are subject to their
perceptions, seeing more in the taller, thinner beaker than was there
before it was poured from a shorter, wider container. Another
feature of preoperational thinking is the inability to distinguish
between a group and its parts. This concept was given concrete
representation in a 1 969 study by Jonas Langer which Kegan
describes (1982, 40-41). Langer gave children a group of black
beads and white beads, all wooden, and asked them to separate the
black beads from the wooden beads. For the children who were
either firmly preoperational or who had already moved into concrete
operations this request presented no conflict. The preoperational
children separated the black beads from the white beads. The
concrete operational children recognized the impossibility of the
task. But the children who were in transition struggled with the
task in a way that Kegan describes well:
These children were in an awful spot, a confusion no less
profound than the inability to make the physical world cohere.
Shifting the beads madly, they may move them endlessly back
and forth, in a vacillation we will come to recognize as typical
of transition ... (Kegan, 1982, p. 41)
Kegan goes on to discuss this as a moment of the kind of
"crisis" in one's ability to make meaning which can eventually
precipitate developmental movement:
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Clearly the nature of their "crisis" is structural; the crisis is
not the seemingly unresolvable problem, but the way this
particular problem is precisely suited to informing the
preoperational balance that something is fundamentally wrong
about the way one is being in the world. Any real resolution of
the crisis must ultimately involve a new way of being in the
world. (Kegan, 1982, p. 41)
These studies illustrate in a concrete way what is meant by
structural development. Adulthood also presents such opportunities
for development. The practice of psychotherapy, in particular, may
present such opportunities in the form of challenges to the
therapist's ability to make meaning. By presenting situations and
problems as seemingly insoluble as the bead task was to the
preoperational children in transition, the practice of therapy may
create this kind of developmental "crisis" for the psychotherapist; a
crisis which may only be resolved by a fundamental shift in one's
way of making meaning. It is this structural process of development
for psychotherapists which may be illuminated with Kegan's model.
Structural Development in Kegan's Model
Having discussed structural development as a general concept,
I would like to describe it specifically in relation to Kegan's theory.
Kegan uses the constructs of "subject" and "object" to delineate the
structural elements of development. He discovered this organizing
principle, which he calls subject-object structures, underlying
Piaget's work on children's cognitive development. Stern (1985) has
suggested that "how we experience ourselves in relation to others
provides a basic organizing principle for all interpersonal events"
(p.6). Kegan's subject-object theory has just this purpose: to define
18
in structural terms the different ways (or stages) in which we
experience ourselves in relation to others.
The subject-object perspective is also implicit in a number of
other structural stage theories which have been based on Piaget's
work (Perry, 1970; Kohlberg, 1969, 1976, 1984; Loevinger, 1976;
Selman, 1980). What has been implicit in these works has been
developed conceptually by Kegan as a key framework which serves to
organize, clarify and deepen our understanding of development
across the lifespan. In this way, Kegan seems to have identified the
structure underlying a number of important models of human
development. While other models have offered important new ways
to understand development in particular domains, such as moral
development (Kohlberg, 1984, 1976, 1969), intellectual
development (Perry, 1970) and interpersonal understanding (Selman,
1 980) or even in ways that cross domains, as does ego development
(Loevinger, 1976), Kegan's model identifies the common
denominator underlying structural development in this group of
theories.
Table 1 on the following page (from Kegan, 1 982, p. 86-87)
summarizes the evolution of the subject-object perspective across
the life span and shows the corresponding stages in a variety of
theories which this perspective underlies.
In order to understand this conception of object, Kegan's
discussion of the etymology of the word may be helpful:
The root Qect) speaks first of all to a motion, an activity
rather than a thing - more particularly, to throwing. Taken
with the prefix, the word suggests the motion or consequence
of "thrown from" or "thrown away from." "Object" speaks to
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that which some motion has made distinct from, or to the
motion itself. "Object relations" by this line of reasoning,
might be expected to have to do with our relations to that
which some motion has made separate or distinct from us, our
relations to that which has been thrown from us, or the
experience of this throwing itself. Now I know this
preliminary definition sounds peculiar, but it has more in its
favor than a Latin pedigree: it is the underlying conception of
object relations to be found in neo-Piagetian theory (Kegan,
1982, p. 76).
More simply put, object can be said to refer to "those
elements of our knowing or organizing that we can reflect on,
handle, look at, be responsible for, relate to each other, take control
of, internalize, assimilate, or otherwise operate on" (Kegan, 1994, p.
32).
Subject "refers to those elements of our knowing that we are
identified with, tied to, fused with or embedded in" (Kegan, 1 994, p.
32). The process of development involves increasing differentiation
(emergence from embeddedness with) as well as integration, so that
what one was previously "subject to" (or embedded in) becomes an
"object" of reflection. This developmental process involves
qualitative, structural changes in the subject-object balancing:
Subject-object relations emerge out of a lifelong process of
development: a succession of qualitative differentiations of
the self from the world, with a qualitatively more extensive
object with which to be in relation created each time; a
natural history of better guarantees to the world of its
distinctness; successive triumphs of "relationship to" rather
than "embeddedness in" (77).
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The ability to relate to separate objects implies an emergence
from embeddedness with those objects. In this way, Kegan's notion
of subject is related to the psychodynamic conception of the
"observing ego" as "that aspect of the person that can reflect on, or
observe, the person's own psychological processes. The 'observing
ego' ... is a way of talking about the subject-object boundary,
specifically what is there to be 'observed,' i.e., what is object"
(Kegan, 1985, in Modgil, p.173-174).
With Subject-Object theory, Kegan seems to have found the
structural underpinning of the basic organizing principle Stern
described (i.e., how we experience ourselves in relation to others).
In so doing, I believe that he has effectively disproven Loevinger's
assertion that self-awareness is an aspect of personality which
"resist[s] a structural treatment" (30). Kegan's model thus seems
better suited for understanding the development of psychotherapists
than other structural models of development for two reasons: 1) It
has identified a more basic structural foundation of human
development than other models to date; and 2) The focus of the
model, on intra- inter-personal relating, seems closest to the
domain in which psychotherapists work.
Structural Stages
Having described the subject-object stage terminology in
general terms, I would like to describe the stages in Kegan's model
relevant to this research. As Kegan (1994) has suggested,
development in adulthood generally consists of an (often lengthy)
process of transition from stage three to stage four. There are
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exceptions, of course. Some people may plateau at a given stage for
years. Also, several researchers with samples including a broad
range of socioeconomic status have found approximately one-third
of adults at stage two or in the developmental transition from stage
two to stage three (Doyle, 1993. Osgood, 1991, Greenwald, 1991,
Dixon, 1986), suggesting that "normal" adulthood may involve this
developmental transformation as well. With samples of highly
educated professionals, development levels have generally been in
the stage three to stage four range. Rarely have people been scored
at a full stage five. Among highly educated samples, approximately
1 0% (or less) have been found in the transition from stage four to
stage five. Given these developmental expectations, I would like to
focus on stages three and four as most relevant to this research. I
will also describe their intersection with the adjacent stages (two
and five).
Kegan's 1 982 work described the stages largely in terms of the
person's developing perspective-taking ability. At stage three, the
person has a new ability to reflect on the needs and wants he was
"subject to" (identified with) at stage two. At stage four, there is a
new ability to reflect on one's relationships in a way that was not
possible at stage three. Kegan's stages thus form a pattern in terms
of perspective-taking ability: what was subject at the previous
stage becomes object at the next stage, and a new subjectivity
emerges.
At stage three, there is an ability to take another's point of
view internally and to understand oneself and others
psychologically. This is an important development from stage two.
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in which others are viewed instrumentaliy, as suppliers of what I
need or want. While the person at stage two clearly understands
that others have a distinct point of view, the other's point of view is
not held internally or experienced as a mutual concern. Mutuality is
the benchmark of stage three, the capacity to include another's point
of view in one's own. The person at stage three has the capacity to
be loyal to a group of which he is a part (rather than to an abstract
ideal) and to be responsive to social expectations.
The ability, at stage three, to understand oneself and others
psychologically suggests that there is a capacity for some kind of
reflection on relationships. But how it this different from the
capacity to reflect on relationships that is the hallmark of stage
four? At stage three, the person cannot reflect on relationships (or
issues or systems) from an independently generated perspective.
Therefore the way in which a person holds their relationships or
their point of view is an important source of developmental data. A
crucial consideration is the source of authority for the person's
point of view. It is only with a full stage four that the person can
reflect on relationships or hold an opinion derived from some
independently generated perspective. A person at stage three
typically locates the source of authority in others, in experts or
other authorities. Because the source of authority is not internal, a
prototypic stage three dilemma would be to be torn between
completing interpersonal contexts, i.e., between the demands of one
significant relationship and another.
The issue of psychological responsibility is also important in
making this stage discrimination. At stage three, the person may
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understand another person psychologically, but be unable to see
himself as having a hand in what he experiences. He may
inappropriately hold the other person responsible for his own
feelings. The ability to take psychological responsibility is a
benchmark of stage four. This factor is one which distinguishes the
kind of reflecting on relationships that becomes possible at stage
four from the psychological understanding about relationships which
occurs at stage three. This difference, Kegan suggests, explains why
not all of those who are capable of psychological insight are able to
profit from that insight. Taking responsibility for one's emotional
responses would mean that the person not only has insight into his
emotions, as one might at stage three (i.e., in order to understand,
for instance, how his past history has shaped his feelings in
particular areas), but also takes current responsibility for his
emotional life (Kegan, 1994, p. 132).
Stage four, then, is marked by self-authorship. The source of
psychological responsibility and authority is internal. The person
can construct a theory independent of other's points of view. The
stage four capacity to take a perspective on one's relationships
allows for a systemic view of relationships. The person at stage
four can set limits and manage boundaries. He can be self-
evaluating, rather than dependent on the feedback of others. He can
take a stand based on abstract principles, even when it is contrary
to the wishes of significant others.
Kegan (1994) acknowledges that his original stage terminology
led to some confusion between structures and content. Calling stage
three "Interpersonal" led to the idea that interpersonal concerns
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were the focus at this stage. It also seemed to suggest that people
at stage four had moved beyond having a deep concern with
interpersonal relationships. Neither of these is true, of course, but
they do illustrate how Kegan's original stage terminology might lead
to a confounding of structures and content.
Rather than naming the focus of concern, the original
terminology defined the limits of the person's perspective-taking
ability at a particular stage. A person at stage three, then, is not
able to take a perspective on the interpersonal. They are "embedded
in" the interpersonal. They relate to their interpersonal
relationships in such a way that they cannot view them from an
autonomous perspective.
At stage four, the person has now gained the capacity to take a
perspective on his relationships and make autonomous decisions.
However, he is not necessarily less involved in or committed to his
interpersonal relationships than he was at stage three. The
orientation toward greater autonomy or connection with others is a
stylistic issue rather than one of structural stage. In some ways,
the person at stage four may have a greater relational capacity
because they may be more able to accept and manage interpersonal
differences.
The strength of stage four is this capacity for psychological
self-regulation, which includes the ability to take a perspective on
(rather than being "embedded in) one's interpersonal relationships.
What the person at stage four cannot take a perspective on is this
very process of regulating his own self-system. In his original
terminology, Kegan called this the "Institutional" stage because at
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stage four one is unable to reflect on one's own psychic institution,
or construction of the self.
Being embedded in one's psychological institution at stage four
means that the person cannot really question their own basic
operating principles. They have a strong allegiance to their current
construction of the self. Lahey et al. (1988) describe the abilities
and limitations of this stage:
The stage four self constructs a system, or psychological
organization, which generates its own values, administers
itself by regulating and evaluating its values in accordance
with its own standard. The stage four self is identified with
("subject to") the system which generated its values and goals.
It cannot consult itself or others about that system in ways
that could lead to its modification or transformation because
it cannot take its fundamental organizational principles as an
object of reflection (p. 79).
The person moving beyond stage four is characterized by an
ability to take a perspective on their own psychological functioning
in a way that was not possible previously. As Lahey et al. (1988)
describe it:
The (post) stage four self gradually takes as object its own
and others' self-systems and thus brings other whole systems
and forms inside the new self. The new self becomes a context
for the interaction of whole psychological self-systems both
within others and within the self. Because the stage five self
is no longer ultimately invested in any one system or form as
it is, interaction among forms and systems can result in
modifying such systems or creating new forms (p. 80).
The developmental distinctions which comprise Kegan's theory
are not easy ones to make or to describe. (For a fuller description of
27
these structural stages, with examples, please see Kegan & Lahey,
1984; Kegan, 1982; Kegan, 1994.) However, the model does address
the broad domain of ego development, and thus seems to capture the
intra- and interpersonal relating which is central to the work of
psychotherapy.
Approaches to a Developmental Understanding of
Psychotherapists
Recently, the field of psychotherapy supervision has
recognized the importance of developmental factors, and has begun
to see supervision as a form of applied adult development (Carey,
1 988). This new literature has generated a number of models by
which counselor development may be understood. However, little
use has been made of adult development theory in the formulation of
these models. A few authors have begun to apply structural models
of adult development to their understanding of the development and
supervision needs of therapists (See Benack, 1984, 1988; Blocher,
1983; Borders et al., 1986; Borders, 1989; Borders & Fong, 1989;
Carey, 1988).
In general, however, the developmental supervision literature
has suffered from a number of methodological problems and has not
been able to address issues of psychotherapist development in their
complexity. The psychodynamic literature on supervision, on the
other hand, has been able to offer a much fuller description of the
processes involved in becoming a psychotherapist. However, this
literature has paid less attention to the issue of development, and
tends to give the impression that therapists' "difficulties in
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learning" (Ekstein & Wallerstein, 1958) are primarily the result of
idiosyncratic aspects of personal biography. An alternate
explanation for psychotherapists difficulties in learning might be a
developmental one, i.e., that particular issues in psychotherapeutic
work might call for a level of development which the therapist has
not yet attained.
Although phasic models can illuminate general patterns in the
professional development of psychotherapists, I will argue that
structural models of adult development are most useful for
generating a complex understanding of psychotherapist development.
I will argue that Kegan's model is particularly well suited for
generating such a full and rich understanding, as well as providing a
framework by which supervisors can make sense of this complexity.
Phasic Approaches and Mixed Models
Models of developmental supervision have tended to equate
counselors' developmental level with level of experience or to
confound structural developmental level with phasic factors (See
Cross & Brown, 1983; Flapan,1984; Friedlander et ai., 1984;
Friedlander & Snyder, 1983; Friedman & Kasiow, 1986; Heppner &
Roehike, 1984; Hess, 1986; Krause & Allen, 1988; Littrell et al.,
1979; Lofaro, 1982; Loganbill et al., 1982; McNeill et al., 1985;
Stoltenberg, 1981, 1988; Stoltenberg & Dellworth, 1987, 1988;
Stoltenberg & Holmes, 1988; Stoltenberg et al., 1986, 1987). The
problematic nature of this equation has been addressed previously
(Holloway, 1987; Holloway & Wolleat, 1980) and appears to stem
from the confounding of structural and phasic models of
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development. Thus, much of the literature has focused on
identifying regular phases in the process of professional identity
development and has ascribed stage terminology to these
differences.
An understanding of structural theories of human development
(Kegan, 1982; Kohlberg, 1969, 1976, 1984; Loevinger, 1976; Perry,
1970; Selman, 1980) undercuts the equation of experience level with
developmental level, introducing the concept that one's experience
of a particular phase of development may be qualitatively different
depending on one's structural developmental level. As Loevinger has
indicated, "ego [structural] development ... is a major dimension of
individual differences in any age cohort, at least beyond the
youngest" (1976, 5). Therefore, a therapist's phase of professional
development may be a less useful index of the capacity for
understanding or responding effectively to clients than structural
stage perspective. Knowledge of therapists' structural levels of
development allows supervisors to understand the framework
through which therapists experience their work with clients as well
as their relationships with supervisors. Holloway's (1987) critique
of developmental models of supervision is in line with this view
when she notes that "sufficient attention [has not been] given to the
influence of previously established cognitive structures" on the
process of counselors' professional development (210).
The premise underlying use of a structural model is that
people don't begin the process of professional development from
exactly the same starting place, and that the differences they do
bring will have an impact on the practice of psychotherapy. This
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idea is borne out in the study by Holloway and Wolleai (1980) which
found that conceptual level but not level of experience was rekuod
to clinical hypothesis formation. Their research thus supports the
idea of using structural developmental level as a way of
conceptualizing how therapists understand their work with clients.
Holloway (1987) has articulated the most cogent critique of
the literature on developmental supervision to date. In addition to
the question of structural versus phasic models of development, she
has identified a number of significant problems, both theoretical and
methodological, which lead her to question the usefulness of the
developmental paradigm for understanding psychotherapists.
A primary problem which Holloway identifies concerns the way
in which the development of psychotherapists has been studied:
Investigations have been restricted to the context of the
supervisory relationship. Specifically, researchers have
examined trainees' perceptions of their needs in supervision
(Heppner & Roehike, 1984; Hill et al., 1981; Reisling & Daniels,
1983; Worthington, 1984; Worthington & Stern, 1985),
supervisors' perceptions of their supervisory practice with
different levels of trainees (Miars et al., 1983; Wiley & Ray,
1986; Worthington & Stern, 1985), trainees' judgments of
supervisors' behaviors in supervision (Heppner & Roehike,
1984; Worthington, 1984; Worthington & Stern, 1985), and
supervisors' judgments of trainees behaviors (Wiley & Ray.
1986; Worthington & Stern, 1985) (Holloway, 1987, 213).
Holloway argues that studying counselor development in the
context of the supervisory relationship confounds a number of
variables and makes the assessment of psychotherapist development
problematic. Factors other than developmental ones will contribute
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to satisfaction or dissatisfaction in the relationship or to
perceptions that there is a good match between the supervisee's
needs and the type of supervision offered. Instead, Holloway argues,
"investigators need to tap the trainee's changes as a counselor more
directly, but not by assuming that changes as a supervisee
necessarily represent those changes as a counselor" (Holloway,
1987, 214).
A related problem which Holloway notes is the reliance on
self-report techniques for assessing psychotherapist development.
As a research tool, self-report techniques are clearly problematic
and may be particularly so insofar as developmental level is
concerned. Any assessment of structural developmental level
involves understanding and placing a particular level in the context
of what has preceded and what will (hopefully) follow it. If we look
again at Loevinger's notion of structural development as the
"acquisition or change [in] the basic rules governing the relations
among the elements", we are faced with the dilemma that a person
doesn't understand the "rules" of each stage until the next stage has
been reached. The nature of structural development, then, makes
self-assessment quite problematic, if not impossible.
Holloway also critiques the use of cross-sectional designs and
the underlying assumption that developmental change is linked to
progress through an academic program. While one might like to
assume that counselor development is enhanced through academic
and experiential training which occurs in this context, comparisons
of groups of trainees at different phases in their academic programs
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fail to account for cohort effects or changes in training programs
(Holloway, 1987, 213).
Laci< of parsimony in so-called "developmental" models,
Holloway suggests, ultimately calls into question the usefulness of
a developmental model over a descriptive one. She cites Loganbill,
Hardy & Dellworth's (1982) model as an example of this problem:
"The model's five stages (including two transition stages) and eight
issues allow for 40 different developmental permutations which
may exist simultaneously in the same individual." As Holloway
suggests, this results in a situation in which "any behavioral change
is equated with a developmental change [and] thus the value of the
developmental paradigm has been lost" (1987, 211). The Friedlander,
et al. (1984) model also suffers from this lack of parsimony. As in
the Loganbill, et al. model above, it is also possible to cycle back
through earlier "stages". In both cases, these stage models "fail to
predict unidirectional progress through discrete sequential stages"
(Friedlander et al., 1984).
Holloway also questions the separation of professional
identity from other aspects of a person's functioning in the
assessment of development. "If CL [conceptual level] is a central
construct in personality development, what renders the experience
of being a counselor so powerful that a graduate student abandons
previously acquired cognitive structures and resorts to elementary
levels of information processing on entry into counselor training?",
she asks (210). Holloway argues that "changes [which] are seen as
qualitative shifts central to a counselor's growing professional
identity . . . must also be influencing other contexts of life" (215).
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Finally, Holloway critiques the overall usefulness of the
general findings which have come out of this literature and suggests
an alternate explanation:
The empirical discovery that more support may be needed early
on in training and that more sophisticated skills are the focus
of later learning is easily understood from a task mastery
perspective.
. . .
The question at issue is whether elaborate
developmental models are needed in order to explain the
research findings (Holloway, 1987, 214) .... Alternative
explanations for trainee change may be that the supervisory
relationship itself creates a trainee's initial vulnerability and
final independence (Holloway, 1987, 21 5).
Based on this critique of the literature, Holloway makes a
number of suggestions for future research. She suggests that there
is a need to distinguish between models of counselor training and
models of counselor development (1988, 138). She stresses the need
to identify and understand the changes involved in the process of
becoming a psychotherapist and "not only the perceived needs of
supervisors and trainees as they emerge within the context of a
certain supervision structure" (1988, 139). A focus on
understanding the development of the trainee, she suggests, is an
important first step toward the aim of being able to match the
supervisee's training needs with an appropriate supervisory
environment. She suggests that qualitative studies, particularly
using a clinical interview method, would be important for generating
this kind of understanding.
This research has been designed to circumvent the difficulties
Holloway has so well described. Although the supervisory
relationship is one aspect of consideration, the development of the
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psychotherapist is studied independently of that context. The use of
Kegan's theoretical model and the Lahey et al. (1988) developmental
scoring system allows an assessment of development without the
use of either self-report or report by supervisors.
The Stoltenberq & Dellworth (1987) Model
Holloway's cogent critique of the developmental supervision
literature sparked a response from two prominent authors whose
work she critiqued. Stoltenberg and Dellworth (1987) joined forces
to offer a model which synthesizes and expands upon each of their
earlier works, capturing many of the strengths and weaknesses in
the literature.
The Stoltenberg & Dellworth model consists of three levels
plus a "Level three Integrated." Psychotherapists are seen as
progressing through the levels in "amoeboid" fashion (with "islands"
of higher functioning) in terms of three "overriding structures" and
in eight specific domains (Stoltenberg & Dellworth, 1987, 35). The
three structures are: 1) self- and other- awareness, 2) motivation
and 3) autonomy. The eight domains consist of: 1) intervention
skills competence, 2) assessment techniques, 3) interpersonal
assessment, 4) client conceptualization, 5) individual differences,
6) theoretical orientation, 7) treatment goals and plans and 8)
professional ethics.
Their description of the final stage (Level three Integrated)
suggests that one becomes a master counselor and reaches a point at
which supervision is no longer needed. Given the difficulties in
counseling which the authors describe for their first three stages, it
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is hard to imagine that at the very next stage, the psychotherapist
has so little left to learn. Even if one believes that one can ever
master the art of practicing psychotherapy, positing Level three
Integrated as a kind of master counselor seems like a premature
foreclosure of learning.
They claim that their model is a structural one, but that Level
three Integrated "results from a natural unfolding from within
rather than structural change per se" (Stoltenberg & Dellworth,
1987, 35). They cite Piaget as a source for their model. However,
Piaget's model is clear that structural change results from the
interaction of maturational processes and environmental
interaction. It is unclear, then, what Stoltenberg & Dellworth
understand by a "natural unfolding from within," or how this kind of
change might be distinguished from structural change.
As a structural model of development, the Stoltenberg &
Dellworth model falls short in a number of ways. The idea of
development proceeding in amoeboid fashion may make sense in
terms of a structural model, if we understand this to mean that
development proceeds with a slight movement forward in one area,
with subsequent development in other domains to catch-up. The
Stoltenberg & Dellworth model becomes problematic in this regard,
however, when they say without qualification that "any trainee can
be at different levels for various domains" (48). Selman's criterion
of structured wholeness (that structural development must be
relatively consistent across a range of functioning) is lost if
trainees can be at any level for any domain.
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If we look at what Stoltenberg & Dellworth call the overriding
structures (self- and other- awareness, motivation and autonomy),
it becomes more apparent that they have not really created a
structural model. One of the most difficult aspects of talking about
structural development lies in separating structural features from
the context in which the structures operate and the content which
they operate upon. This seems to have been a difficulty for
Stoltenberg & Dellworth. What they call structures are actually
context driven. This can be seen most clearly in terms of
motivation, but is also true for autonomy and self- and other-
awareness. In describing how these structures operate at each of
the levels, Stoltenberg & Dellworth describe behaviors and beliefs
which they seem to believe imply the structures they posit. For
instance, they describe motivation as high at level one, fluctuating
at level two and more consistent at level three. In fact, a trainee's
motivation may be high, low or fluctuating at any level of
development, for a variety of reasons. Level of motivation itself is
not indicative of a structure. It is only by understanding the
reasoning underlying a behavior that we can hypothesize about
structure.
Self- and other- awareness is probably the closest to a
structural factor which Stoltenberg & Dellworth have identified. As
discussed earlier, it is the subject-object structure underlying this
awareness which Kegan's model has identified. What is structural
about self- and other- awareness pertains to the increasing capacity
to recognize the distinctness of the other, to be self-reflective and
to reflect on one's relationships. However, whether or not one is
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focused more self-consciously on one's own behavior as a beginning
therapist isn't a structural indicator, as Stoltenberg & Dellworth
would suggest. Again, it is a behavior which may be reflective of a
number of different structures, depending on the underlying
reasoning.
Stoltenberg & Dellworth's positing a structure for autonomy,
based on what they perceive as autonomous behavior, suffers from
the same problems described above. Like self- and other-
awareness, it is not difficult to see how autonomy might have
structural aspects. However, as will be discussed later in relation
to methodology, autonomy is not a concept which necessarily
follows a linear developmental progression. In line with Holloway's
argument that "the supervisory relationship itself creates a
trainee's initial vulnerability and final independence" (1987, 21 5),
increased autonomous behavior by the therapist in relation to the
supervisor could be evidence for phasic as well as structural
development.
Stoltenberg & Dellworth's claim to have created a structural
model is also undermined by the way in which they describe
trainees' progression through the stages. They claim that all
trainees begin at level one, acknowledging that progression through
the levels may be faster for trainees with higher levels of
development (Stoltenberg & Dellworth, 1987, 47). This would imply
that Stoltenberg & Dellworth see another kind of developmental
progression interacting with the one their model describes. If this
is their view, it would seem important to explain the interaction of
these two different developmental lines. If they are suggesting,
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instead, that beginning the practice of psychotherapy leads to a
developmental regression in this new content area, this too is
problematic.
A number of Stoltenberg & Dellworth's assumptions about level
one counselors, for instance, seem to match the "dualism" stage in
Perry's model of intellectual development. According to Stoltenberg
& Dellworth, level one therapists have "a strong desire to know the
right way to counsel" (39), "view learning as coming from an outside
source" (53), and have difficulty integrating assessment results,
which "will mostly be cookbook at this stage, with a focus on
consistency among results and a tendency to ignore discrepancies"
(53).
Similarly, Stoltenberg & Dellworth's level two seems to
parallel Perry's stage of "relativism." Their description of the level
two therapist's fluctuating motivation centers around the idea that
there is a new recognition that there are no clear-cut answers and
that one begins to see psychotherapy as an uncertain process.
Clearly, these characterizations of counseling trainees don't make
sense unless we assume that all beginning counselors are at the
same stage of intellectual development or that there is something
about the practice of psychotherapy that causes otherwise more
advanced thinkers to regress in this content area. (Although
Stoltenberg & Dellworth don't use Perry's model, they use key
constructs from the model, which should function in the same
fashion as they did in Perry's original study as well as in later
studies using the Perry model.) For instance, Benack's (1984, 1988)
work, discussed later in this chapter, also contradicts this notion of
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development as fluctuating according to content area. Benack
studied development in counseling trainees according to Perry's
structural model, and found Perry's stages to be consistent in
capturing fairly global aspects of development.
The Hollowav Versus Stoltenberq & Dellworth Debate
The debate between Holloway (1987, 1988), on the one side,
and Stoltenberg & Dellworth (1988), on the other, captures some key
issues and controversies in the field of developmental supervision. I
will focus here on those aspects of the debate which relate to the
way in which the development of psychotherapists is understood.
There are two key areas of disagreement in this regard.
First, Stoltenberg & Dellworth defend the use of analogies of
development (which Holloway critiqued) with an argument against
absolute "truth" in favor of useful frameworks for understanding
development. This is an important argument which, however, seems
ill-applied in this case. Assuming there is no absolute "truth," and
that models are constructs, models should still be internally
consistent. Analogies may be more or less useful, depending on how
well they illuminate the characteristics of one thing by comparison
with another. Stoltenberg & Dellworth say they "drew parallels" to
more general models of development, but that these cannot be
"literally translated to the domain of counselor and psychotherapist
development" (1988, 134). The problem with Stoltenberg &
Dellworth's work is not in the drawing of analogies, but in the
weakness of the analogies and the lack of a more robust model.
40
which could be applied to the development of psychotherapists with
no loss of explanatory power.
Stoltenberg & Dellworth's next argument to Holloway,
however, is an important one. In contrast to Holloway's view of
development as a global construct, they imply that counselor
development is domain specific, and see the process of becoming a
therapist as sufficiently novel that people may resort to the use of
earlier cognitive structures. In terms of both psychotherapist
development and adult development in general, the question of
consistency versus domain specificity is an important one, for
which debate is ongoing (See Basseches, 1989; Fischer, 1980;
Lahey, 1986; Noam, 1990; Rogers & Kegan, 1990). If psychotherapist
development is a domain specific process, then beginning
psychotherapists might be expected to resort to earlier forms of
meaning making in their construction of psychotherapy related tasks
and issues.
Holloway argued against this view and for a more global
understanding of development. Holloway's measure for development
is an assessment of conceptual level (CL) according to the Paragraph
Completion Method (Hunt, Butler, Noy & Rosser, 1 978). She bases her
argument on the following: First, that conceptual level has a
demonstrated strong relationship to counseling related tasks
(Holloway & Wampold, 1986). Second, that conceptual level is
related to the domain of social functioning and therefore
corresponds to the domain in which counselors function, "a stimulus
domain in which social perception and interpersonal behavior are
paramount" (Holloway, 1988, 140). In essence, she challenges
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theorists like Stoltenberg & Dellworth to demonstrate that their
conception of development is a structural one specific to the domain
of psychotherapist development:
Because the weight of empirical evidence to date is that CL is
a potent variable in predicting a person's performance on
counseling tasks, those who claim that all counselors-in-
training begin at the same level of cognitive complexity must
first identify this content-specific CL construct that
mitigates the effect of the more globally measured CL (social)
and, second, demonstrate that the content-specific construct
has the characteristics of a developmental progression
(Holloway, 1988, 140).
Holloway's argument for consistency of development across
domains finds support in the dissertation research of Lahey (1986),
who studied this question in terms of the domains of love and work.
Lahey conducted a qualitative study of 22 professional, college-
educated men and women in their thirties, comparing the way in
which they structured experiences of conflict in these two diverse
domains. Lahey assessed consistency by comparing the use of
systems of meaning making according to Kegan's (1982) model and
developmental scoring system.
Based on the view of development in Kegan's model as a
continual and gradual process, Lahey defined consistency in terms of
the following criteria: 1 ) A perfect match between scores from the
domains of love and work, using the finest stage distinctions which
the system makes (i.e., a 21 point scale in which each stage is
subdivided into five steps) or 2) scores which were no more than one
step apart (i.e., no more than 1/5 of a stage) or 3) scores more than
one step apart if the person commented on the inconsistency.
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Lahey's results, which generally showed consistency across
domains, led her to conclude that "however different a person thinks
he or she is in domains as different as love and work, his or her
underlying subject-object structures are likely to be remarkably
consistent" (Lahey, 1986, 82-83).
Rather than conclusively demonstrating that there are no
significant domain differences in development, I believe that Lahey's
work effectively challenges the assumption of developmental
inconsistency in apparently diverse domains. This calls into
question the intuitive assumption in Stoltenberg & Dellworth that
counselor development must be distinguished from a more global
assessment of development.
It may be that there are domain differences in development
which Lahey's research did not address. Cognitive and ego
development, for instance, may follow somewhat distinct
developmental pathways, although this too is controversial (See
Kegan, Noam & Rogers, 1983; Kohlberg, 1984, p. 9; Loevinger, 1976,
p. 41-45). However, one might well wonder how many different
domains exist which follow their own developmental pathways. It
seems unlikely, and certainly inconsistent with a structural
developmental paradigm, that every different kind of situation or
experience should indicate a different structural developmental
process. Holloway effectively questions whether there is any
evidence to suggest that the process of becoming a psychotherapist
involves a developmental progression which is distinct from a more
global measure of development. Perhaps the question would be
better framed in terms of assessing the match between the
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domain(s) involved in psychotherapist development compared to
specific models in which adult developmental level is viewed as a
more global construct. In designing this research. I have chosen
Kegan's theory not only for its robust explanatory power but also for
the match between Kegan's model and its focus on intra- and
interpersonal relating and the domain in which psychotherapists
work.
Structural Models
The application of structural models to the understanding of
psychotherapist development has been an important advance in the
field of psychotherapy supervision and the newer area of
developmental supervision. Structural models provide a way of
taking into account the differences which psychotherapist trainees
bring with them as they enter a training program. These
developmental differences, which have important implications for
supervision and training, have largely been overlooked in most of the
literature on developmental supervision. To date, few researchers
have applied a structural model to understanding counselor
development (For notable exceptions, see Benack, 1984, 1988;
Blocher, 1983; Borders et al., 1986; Borders, 1989; Borders & Fong,
1989; Carey, 1988).
Blocher
Blocher (1983) was among the first to consider counseling
supervision from a structural developmental perspective. His work
brings to supervision theory a key insight of cognitive
developmental thinking, "that an individual's perceptions of others
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tend to develop in the direction of greater complexity, decreasing
stereotypy, and greater ability to integrate discordant or
inconsistent information about the behavior of others" (27).
Although Blocher discusses the concept of a developmental learning
environment, he does not propose a model of psychotherapist
development or draw upon a particular model of adult cognitive
development. For instance, he points to the research finding that
"cognitive growth is most likely to occur in situations in which
there is an optimal mismatch between the demands of a problematic
situation in which the learner is ego-involved and the level of
developmental history" (28). This seems an important aspect of
creating a developmental learning environment. What is missing,
however, is a model of the structural stages of development which
psychotherapists undergo. Such a model is key to assessing what
the challenges might be for psychotherapists at each stage of
development.
Borders
Borders' work in the area of developmental supervision
(Borders, 1989; Borders & Fong, 1989; Borders et al., 1986) has
consistently integrated adult development theory by using
Loevinger's model of ego development (Loevinger, 1976) and
Sentence Completion Test (Loevinger & Wessler, 1970) as a measure
of development with counselor trainees. In general, Borders work
has supported the developmental hypothesis discussed by Blocher, of
more advanced development corresponding with greater complexity
in one's understanding of self and others. In a study using first
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practicum trainees, Borders (1989) found that higher levels of ego
development corresponded with fewer negative thoughts about
clients or themselves. In another study, Borders, Fong & Neimeyer
(1986) found that higher levels of ego development in counselor
trainees led to more "sophisticated and interactive" ways of
describing clients. In a study using more advanced students. Borders
and Fong (1989) found tentative support for the idea that higher
levels of ego development in the counselor are related to greater
effectiveness in counseling.
Borders' use of ego development is important for two reasons.
It subsumes a number of other traits which have been studied
separately in relation to counselor training. It also encompasses
both affective and cognitive functioning. Borders describes ego
development level as a "frame of reference for perceiving and
interpreting the self, others, and the environment and as a
behavioral frame of reference for guiding the individual's
relationships with others and the environment" (Borders & Fong,
1989, p. 72). She suggests that this "perceptual framework"
becomes "increasingly differentiated and integrated" with increased
development. She also asserts (Borders & Fong, 1989) that this
more comprehensive construct should have a greater relation to
counseling effectiveness than the specific traits of sex-role
orientation (Fong & Borders, 1985), self-disclosure flexibility
(Neimeyer & Fong, 1983), dogmatism (Brown & Smith, 1984) or
conceptual level (Fuqua, Johnson, Anderson & Newman, 1984;
Holloway & Wampold, 1986).
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Borders' use of ego development and her foundation in adult
development theory represent an important advance over previous
work in the field. Borders' work recognizes the need for a
theoretical framework for understanding psychotherapist
development. However, the choice of Loevinger's model to provide
such a framework has a number of limitations.
First, the assessment of ego development through the Sentence
Completion technique may be problematic because there is an
absence of probing for developmental capacity. Without this,
particular varieties of sentence completions may be a reflection of
educational levels, writing style or idiosyncratic factors operating
at the time of the test. As Goodman (1983) has suggested, "the
problem remains that the Sentence Completion Test may not
measure a subject's underlying meaning-making but rather his or her
ability to produce semantically complex statements" (15).
Secondly, although Loevinger asserts that her levels of ego
development are structural, they in fact contain a fair amount of
content. It would appear that Loevinger has described stages in the
process of adult development but, failing to identify their structural
foundation, has resorted to describing these stages in terms of their
stereotypical content.
The limitations in the Loevinger model must be considered in
terms of their impact on Borders' research results. For instance, in
their 1986 study Borders, Fong & Neimeyer found no significant
developmental differences in the structural complexity of
therapists' perceptions of their clients. This result should be
surprising, given the broad definition of cognitive development as
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involving increasing complexity in one's understanding of self and
others (Blocher, 1983). However, if we look at the study more
closely, these results may potentially be explained in terms of
limitations in the Loevinger model.
The sample used in this study were graduate students in
counseling, who fell primarily into three adjacent stages in
Loevinger's model: the Self-Aware, the Conscientious and the
Individualistic. These stages correspond to the Interpersonal and
the Institutional stages in Kegan's model. In assessing
developmental differences between these two stages in Kegan's
model, one key discriminating feature would be the extent to which
the person's thinking was guided by a self-authored theory.
Distinguishing between these stages in Kegan's model would go
beyond assessing the apparent sophistication of the theories held to
the way in which the theories were held by that individual.
In Borders' study, neither the model used to assess ego
development (Loevinger, 1976) nor the measure used to assess
complexity of perceptions of clients (a pencil and paper Likert-type
scale) allowed for any probing of reasoning. Therefore, neither
measure seemed likely to differentiate between theories about
clients which were self-generated and those which were taken from
an outside authority. In addition, the Likert-type scale used may
have pulled for dichotomous as opposed to more complex views of
clients. Therefore, one possible way to explain the surprising
results in this study would be to suggest that the use of the
Loevinger model may have obscured the developmental differences in
the complexity of counseling students' perceptions of clients.
48
Despite these concerns, however, Borders' work is important
for a nunnber of reasons. She is among the few authors to recognize
the importance of structural developmental factors in the
supervision needs of counseling trainees. She is also among the
very first researchers to systematically apply a consistent
theoretical model of adult development to the understanding of
counselor development. Borders has also made a useful critique of
the state of the research in this area. In her "Pragmatic Agenda for
Developmental Supervision Research", Borders (1989) critiques the
research and suggests a moratorium on three things: 1 ) the
proliferating number of "new and improved" theoretical models, 2)
the use of self-report techniques and 3) research conducted in
academic as opposed to field settings. Borders suggests that what
is needed is more of a pragmatic technology of how to conduct
supervision with particular supervisees.
Carey
Carey (1988) offers just such a pragmatic technology. Carey's
Cognitive Developmental Model (CDM) offers a very useful system for
assessing counselor development within the context of a group
supervision format. Supervisors trained in this model can conduct
an assessment of counselors' cognitive level and design
developmentally appropriate responses without needing to
administer a separate instrument outside of supervision. Carey's
work moves supervision research from theory to practice by
providing a very usable model of both assessment and intervention.
It departs from the legacy of self-report based studies to an on-line
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assessment of counselors' development based on a theoretical
framework which is linked to cognitive development research and to
models of adult development.
Like Borders' work, however, Carey's may also be limited by
problems in its foundational models of development, especially as it
is based in part on the work of Ivey (1987). Although Ivey's model
purports to be a structural one, it doesn't correspond to reasonable
notions of how structural development occurs. (For instance, Ivey
suggests that a person can move through a number of stages in the
course of one interview. The speed of such change should, of course,
suggest a change in focus or content rather than a structural
developmental change.) Borders' injunction against "new and
improved" models seems particularly apt in regard to Ivey's model,
which uses Piagetian terms but gives them different meanings,
adding more confusion than insight to the concept of developmental
change. In fact, Ivey manages to violate all three of Selman's
criteria for structural development, ie., qualitative difference,
invariant sequence and structured wholeness. (For discussion of
these factors see pp. 81-82.) Although Carey seems to ignore the
more problematic aspects of Ivey's model, the foundation for his
Cognitive Developmental Model (CDM) is not as strong as it might be
if it rested on a more robust model of adult development.
Although Carey's CDM is conceptualized as a three dimensional
grid which includes a consideration of affectivity in the client, the
counselor and in the relations between client and counselor or
counselor and supervisor, in practice the focus on affective issues
seems less developed. In terms of the two poles in supervision
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approaches which Alonso (1983, p. 26) discusses (i.e., supervision as
teaching versus supervision as meta-therapy) Carey's CDM is much
closer to the cognitive view of supervision as teaching, with
relatively less emphasis on the emotional growth and development
of the supervisee.
Clearly, the practice of psychotherapy is an affective as well
as a cognitive process, and most models of supervision are
somewhere between the two poles. A focus which is more cognitive
risks losing track of those aspects of therapy which are related
more to the ways in which therapists become emotionally engaged in
the process. This is also the area in which therapists most often
encounter difficulty, in the areas of transference and
countertransference.
Alonso suggests that the cognitive view is the one which
predominates in approaches to psychotherapy supervision, and
questions the efficacy of this focus: "While no one would dispute
that supervisors must teach, this seems a surprisingly narrow view
for psychotherapists, whose major emphasis is often on the
importance of non-cognitive, out-of-awareness impediments to
growth, development and learning" (Alonso, 1985, 15). Carey's work
(1988) may be limited to the extent that it emphasizes stages of
cognitive development, rather than using a conception of
development which is simultaneously cognitive and affective.
The on-line assessment of development in the CDM is a
strength in terms of the practical usability of the model. At the
same time, this method of developmental assessment is also a
weakness, in that it may not allow for the kinds of probing for
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meaning which would help the supervisor to make this assessment.
Supervisors may therefore make assumptions about counselors-
development based on insufficient evidence. As with Loevinger's
Sentence Completion Test, Carey's CDM "may not measure a subject's
underlying meaning-making but rather his or her ability to produce
semantically complex statements" (Goodman, 1983, 15). As Selman
(1980, 290) suggests, you can take short excerpts of reasoning from
different people and plot a developmental sequence, but you cannot
then go on to make assumptions about the developmental levels of
individuals based on these small samples.
Given the time limitations imposed by the group supervision
context for which the CDM is designed, the CDM would not seem to
produce enough data on individual trainees to make an accurate
assessment of development. As such, it does not provide an
adequate model of psychotherapist development. However, accuracy
may not be as important as usability in this context, and the CDM
does provide a very useful framework for supervisors and counselor
educators. A strength of the model is its capacity for continuous
on-line assessment of development. Used flexibly, with
developmental level held as a tentative hypothesis about the trainee,
the CDM is an important model for the training of counselors and
psychotherapists.
Benack
Holloway (1987) makes a distinction between training models
and models of counselor development. While Carey's may be an
effective training model, Benack may be the first structural
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developmentalist to study counselor development directly, outside
of the context of supervision and training. She has focused, in
particular, on the development of empathy in counselor trainees. In
several different studies, Benack (1984, 1988) found a strong
relationship between cognitive level in Perry's (1970) model and the
capacity for empathic understanding.
Of particular interest is the study Benack conducted with 20
students, equally divided between men and women, in a graduate
level counseling course. Benack assessed both the level of
epistemological reasoning along the lines of the Perry model and the
level of empathic understanding that these counseling trainees were
able to demonstrate. Based on the assessment of epistemological
reasoning, trainees were divided into two categories: dualists and
relativists. Dualists are characterized by a belief in absolutes of
truth and right and a view that knowledge is a given which exists
apart from the knower. Relativists, on the other hand, have come to
see "all knowledge as embedded in a framework of thought" and
recognize the existence of multiple perspectives on truth, reality
and right (Benack, 1984, p. 341). Benack's results showed a strong
relationship between the capacities for relativist thinking and
empathic understanding, finding greater empathy to be demonstrated
by relativists.
Benack's work supports the notion that structural
developmental level is an important aspect of the differences which
counselor trainees bring to a training program. The implications of
these differences for counselor training are profound. As Benack
suggests:
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This interpretation of the results raises the possibility that a
person's epistemological assumptions may be a powerful
determinant of his or her aptitude for learning to express
empathy as a counseling technique. If this is so, then
attempting to teach client-centered counseling to students
whose epistemology is fundamentally dualistic may be much
like attempting to teach algebra to concrete operational
children: The specific techniques may be imitated, but an
understanding of the whole method depends on an underlying
cognitive structure that is not there (1988, p. 230-231).
Benack suggests that "the development of relativistic thought
transforms [one's] understanding of the nature of experience
[making] possible a more sophisticated and accurate understanding
of other people's experience" (1984, p. 342). This insight is crucial
to understanding the development of empathy. It suggests that a
certain level of cognitive development may be a necessary condition
for the development of empathic understanding. One might wonder
whether cognitive development is a sufficient basis for the
development of empathy, or whether a certain level of emotional
development is also necessary. Benack's delineation of two aspects
of empathy, an affective, identifying component, and a cognitive,
differentiating one, lends support to the notion that neither alone is
a sufficient basis for the development of empathy.
The relationship between these two components of empathy is
an interesting one. Kegan, Noam & Rogers (1983) create a metaphor
for the relationship between affect and cognition using the two
openings of a glass tube to represent affect and cognition: that there
are two openings but that neither exists without the other because
both are part of something larger - a process of meaning making.
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Similarly, it would seem that the relationship exists between the
capacity for empathy and cognitive development because both are
part of a larger transformation in the broader system of meaning
making.
One's understanding of the nature of experience is transformed
by the development of relativistic thought because this cognitive
growth is connected to ego development. As was suggested earlier,
Kegan's work has identified the structural underpinnings for this
related group of structural developmental theories. It would follow,
then, that Perry's model of intellectual development has the same
underlying framework as does Kegan's. Benack herself reminds us
that her study has only demonstrated a strong correlation between
cognitive development and empathic understanding, and that
assumptions cannot be made about causality. In line with Kegan's
theory, I would like to suggest that this correlation exists because
of the common source of each in the evolution of the structures of
meaning making, which profoundly transforms one's understanding of
the nature of experience.
Benack's work is very important to an understanding of the
structural dimensions of psychotherapist development. She has
studied this development directly, apart from the context of the
supervisory relationship and without relying on self-report
techniques. Her research is well grounded in adult development
theory. Using Perry's model, she has demonstrated a strong
relationship between intellectual development and the development
of empathic understanding. However important, intellectual
development is just one aspect of the capacity for empathy, and of
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the broader range of skills and capacities required for therapeutic
work. These results would seem to suggest that the use of a model
such as Kegan's, which focuses more inclusively on cognitive and
affective aspects of ego functioning, may have the potential for
illuminating larger aspects of counselor functioning.
Psychodynamic Supervision and Psychotherapist Development
Although it is outside the scope of this paper to review the
vast literature on psychodynamic supervision, I will briefly discuss
a few key authors whose work has informed this one. In focusing
more on the affective component of becoming a psychotherapist, the
psychodynamic literature on supervision offers a counterpoint to the
cognitive orientation of much of the counselor development and
supervision literature. Psychodynamic models of psychotherapy
supervision have largely not addressed the issue of development
explicitly and thus have stood outside of the growing body of
literature on developmental supervision. However, in general, this
work has discussed issues of supervision and therapist development
in ways which capture much more of the complexity of the process.
In focusing more on the emotional issues involved in psychotherapy
training, the psychodynamic literature seems to have come much
closer to the phenomenon of becoming a psychotherapist, as one
might with a zoom lens. Much of the developmental supervision
literature, in contrast, is not only more cognitive in orientation, but
also seems much more distant from the phenomenological experience
of learning to do psychotherapy.
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Clearly, of the two poles which Alonso (1983) described,
psychodynamic supervision is closer to the "supervision as meta-
therapy" than the "supervision as teaching" pole (25). The tension
between these two aspects of supervision has been at issue almost
since the very beginnings of supervision practice (Alonso, 1985, 20).
When clinical supervision began, at the psychoanalytic training
institutes of the 1920's, there was no distinction between the roles
of supervisor and personal analyst (Alonso, 1985, 13). Although
these roles have since been separated, the extent to which
supervision should function in a manner similar to personal analysis
has continued to be a question. Fleming & Benedek (1983) refer to
this tension as the "syncretic dilemma," (p. 3-10) suggesting that it
may be intrinsic to the multi-faceted nature of the supervisory
function.
Ekstein & Wallerstein
Ekstein & Wallerstein's (1958) classic work on psychodynamic
supervision provides a good example of how the complexity of the
process of becoming a psychotherapist can be understood. Drawing
richly detailed examples from their work with psychiatric
residents, they discuss ways in which both "problems in learning"
(problems in the interaction of supervisor and trainee) and "learning
problems" (problems in the interaction between psychotherapist
trainee and patient) manifest themselves. Ekstein & Wallerstein
also introduce the concept of the parallel process to describe the
mutual impact of what happens in the therapy and the supervision of
a case. Ekstein & Wallerstein acknowledge, however, that in
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describing the specific difficulties which these psychiatric
residents experienced, there is a tendency for the residents to
appear quite pathological: "the students seem to emerge as
uniformly 'sick' and in real need of psychotherapeutic help
themselves" (Ekstein & Wallerstein, 1958, p. x).
Ekstein & Wallerstein recognize the risk of self-exposure as
both a dilemma in training and a source of resistance to learning,
"that one must expose his weaknesses and dilemmas in order to
learn and do this in the face of so many possible consequences to
job, status, professional training and advancement" (Ekstein &
Wallerstein, 1958, 174-175). While this dilemma may be inherent,
to some extent, in the learning process, it is exacerbated by a
supervisory perspective which sees problems in learning as
stemming primarily from unresolved conflicts in the trainee.
A developmental model, in contrast, has the potential to make
sense of many of the difficulties which psychotherapist trainees
experience as normal and predictable at particular stages of
development. The same difficulties which Ekstein & Wallerstein
discuss might also be understood from a developmental perspective,
using Kegan's (1994, 1982) model. For instance, one case they
discuss in detail concerns the problems in learning of "Dr. T," the
resident who seemed able to consider his patients' problems and
psychological processes but not his own. They dub his the "problem
of finding a problem" because of his apparent inability to find
anything problematic in his own therapeutic work to address in
supervision. Dr. T's supervisor, they report, "said that it seemed
true that Dr. T. could see conflicts and problems in the personalities
58
of his patients, but seemed not to have ihe same psychological
perceptiveness in regard to his own mental processes, even when the
two situations were somewhat parallel" (151).
From the perspective of Kegan's model. Dr. T.'s problem might
reflect a developmental limitation in the capacity for reflecting on
his own intrapersonal relationship or in the ability to take
psychological ownership for the ways in which his personal histoiy
shapes that experience. If so. he would be demonstrating a
developmental limitation shared by about half of all highly educated
adults (Kegan 1994, p 187-197). Understanding this difficulty in
developmental terms seems to lessen its pathological or pejorative
connotations. It also potentially shifts the focus of supervision
away from the more therapeutic function of resolving unconscious
conflicts to a more educational one of facilitating adult
development.
Doehrman
Ekstein & Wallerstein laid the foundation for Doehrriian's
groundbreaking study on Parallel processes in supervision and
psychotherapy . Doehrman conducted a qualitative research study
with two supervisors, four psychotherapist trainees and eight
clients, for a total of eight case studies. Doehrrrian used intensive
clinical interviewing to follow the course of therapy and supervision
in each case. She analyzed her data in light of her central research
question: "How can one ongoing clinrcal process, the supervision ot
student therapists, affect and be reflected in another ongoing
clinical process, the psychotherapy of adult patients?" (Doehrman,
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1976, 9). Doehrman herself was surprised to discover parallel
processes operating in each and every case.
Doehrman's work is important not only for her results, which
have had a profound impact on the way in which clinicians and
supervisors understand their work, but also for her methodology.
Doehrman's is the first major work to study the supervision process
using clinical methods. If Ekstein & Wallerstein's work brought us
closer to the phenomenological world of supervision and
psychotherapy, Doehrman's has taken us yet closer. The contrast
between Doehrman's work and the empirical studies in
developmental supervision is striking. Her methodology was
essential in generating a complex understanding of the parallel
processes, and a view "beneath the surface" of the supervision
process. Doehrman concludes her work with the following comment:
If there is any one conclusion all these findings add up
to, it is that the parallel process phenomenon occurs and
recurs in a remarkable multiplicity of forms. At the very
least, one comes away from this material with a sense
of humility about the complexity, subtlety, and depth of
human relationships. One is struck by the multifaceted
nature of what on the surface seems to be a simple and
even rather limited human relationship. . . .
Doehrman, like Ekstein & Wallerstein, views the
psychotherapist trainee's "problems about learning" as
stemming from "his idiosyncratic character attitudes and ego-
defense mechanisms" (Doehrman, 1976, 16). From a
developmental perspective, this seems a limitation in her
work. As discussed above, viewing the psychotherapist
60
trainee's problems in learning in this way seems unnecessarily
stigmatizing. It also undercuts the utility for the supervisor
of what one can learn from case studies if the trainee's
difficulties are seen as unique and idiosyncratic. In contrast,
a developmental framework has the potential for organizing
this kind of complex data. If there are developmental
regularities to the difficulties which psychotherapists
experience, then supervisors have a more useful framework for
understanding and addressing these problems in supervision.
Ralph
Although much of the work in psychodynamically oriented
supervision is not explicitly developmental, Ralph's (1980) work is a
notable exception. Other psychodynamically-oriented theorists have
considered aspects of psychotherapist development (See Alonso,
1983; Eckler-Hart, 1987; Farber, 1985; Horner, 1988; Kahn, 1986;
Reams, 1994; Rubin, 1989; Thorbeck, 1992). However, Ralph's work
is unique in taking a structural developmental approach to this topic.
Ralph did a qualitative study of the process of learning
psychotherapy, gathering data from interviews with 36 graduate
student trainees and eight supervisors. He found four milestones in
the process. First, Ralph found, trainees had to master the role of
non-directive (rather than advice-giving) expert. The second stage
involved the adoption of a theoretical approach, often client
centered, and a tendency to focus on the client and the client's
feelings. At the third stage, there was a recognition of
"psychotherapy as an interpersonal process involving the feelings
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and reactions of both therapist and patient" (Ralph, 1980, 246).
Finally, at the fourth stage, the therapist developed an increased
capacity to trust and use her/his own reactions as an important
source of information in the therapeutic process.
Ralph's work seems to capture important aspects in the
process of becoming a psychotherapist. Ralph speculates about the
nature of the developmental changes which his research uncovered.
Although seemingly related to cognitive development, Ralph
recognized the strong emotional component which makes cognitive
development seem too narrow a concept to describe these changes.
He concluded that the developmental process would best be
described as "a facet of ego development -- that is, enduring
changes in schemas about the self and others" (Ralph, 1980. 249).
Although Ralph's first two stages seem to combine phasic and
structural elements, his later two stages do seem more reflective
of structural development. Ralph's work seems to provide the
beginnings of a response to Holloway's question as to whether there
is a developmental process particular to psychotherapists. The
changes which Ralph describes at his stages three and four seem to
involve transformational shifts in the way one understands one's
work. Coming to experience "psychotherapy as an interpersonal
process involving the feelings and reactions of both therapist and
patient" implies a developmental change as well. Similarly, learning
to trust and use one's own reactions therapeutically might imply a
developmental change.
What is not clear from Ralph's work is how these stages in the
development of the psychotherapist fit in with the person's level of
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ego development in general. For instance, the stage four capacity in
Ralph's model might be understood as a structural change in ego
development precipitated by the practice of psychotherapy, or it
might be understood as a skill developed with experience for which
the necessary level of ego development already existed. While
Ralph's stages three and four do seem to imply structural
developmental capacities, it is not clear that the underlying
structure for each is different. Although they may be, I don't think
that Ralph has given us enough data to make that assumption, for the
changes which Ralph describes may be understood from different
levels.
For instance, one could attempt to map Kegan's stages of adult
development onto Ralph's last two stages of psychotherapist
development. Ralph's stage three description seems to fit Kegan's
stage four, in which the capacity to take a perspective on one's
relationships is developed. Ralph's stage four might also fit with
this same stage four in Kegan's model, because the capacity to trust
and use one's own feelings and reaction in therapy is also a stage
four capacity in Kegan's model. With greater description from
Ralph's clinical interview data, it might be possible to distinguish
the underlying structural capacities of his stages.
Ralph's study has identified important benchmarks in the
process of becoming a psychotherapist. His stages seem to reflect
changes in the psychotherapist which are both authentic and
important to the development of therapeutic expertise. The
universality of Ralph's stages of psychotherapist development as
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well as their relationship to a more general model of ego
development are important questions which remain.
The contributions of the psychodynamic perspective to an
understanding of psychotherapist development and supervision are
important. Ralph's work, like that of Doehrman (1976) and Ekstein &
Wallerstein (1958) seems to capture more of the phenomenological
process of psychotherapist development than was addressed in the
literature on counselor development and supervision. An analysis of
the interactions of therapist and patient, of supervisor and trainee
and of the parallel processes also point to a complexity which has
been missing from the work on developmental supervision. However,
the developmental perspective is still most often missing in
psychodynamically oriented work. The structural developmental
perspective has much to offer in terms of making sense of the
complexity which psychodynamic theory has described so well. A
structural understanding of psychotherapist development can help
supervisors and therapists themselves better understand the
challenges of becoming a psychotherapist. The world of parallel
processes, opened up by Ekstein & Wallerstein and elaborated by
Doehrman, can also be examined and interpreted in light of
structural adult development theory. A structural developmental
framework can potentially superimpose meaning and order onto the
complexities of the supervision process and the parallel processes.
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Applications of Kegan's Model to Adult i padershio with I mplicatinn^
for Clinical Superviqinn
Although Kegan's model has not previously been applied to
clinical supervision, Kegan & Lahey (1983) explore the implications
of constructive developmental theory to leadership. This work
raises fundamental questions about what developmental stage
differences mean in the interactions of "leaders" and "followers" and
has important implications for the leadership role of the clinical
supervisor.
Kegan & Lahey look at leadership in three different domains:
the leadership demands of parenting, governmental leadership and
leadership in schools. Of particular relevance here is their
discussion of school leadership. Kegan & Lahey describe the
relationships between principals and teachers at two different
schools. They use the examples of two principals at different
developmental levels (stages four and five) and three teachers in
each school, each representing a different level of adult
development (stages three, four and five). They let each of the six
teachers speak to their experience of their principal's leadership.
The differences which emerge in the teachers' perceptions have a
number of implications.
First, they suggest that "what a leader does might be
differently understood and responded to by followers who are at
different developmental positions" (Kegan & Lahey, 1983, 209). This
assertion goes beyond the basic idea that different people see the
same thing differently. Instead, Kegan & Lahey suggest that:
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The constructivist view questions whether it is the same
thing that is being seen differently or whether it is a
different thing that is being seen in a different way. Of
course, each is talking about the same physical entity,
but if each is constructing reality out of a whole
different logic, then in the psychological sense three
different "objects" do exist .... Some unseen part of
the principal, for example, could not simply be pointed
out to a teacher who would then immediately see it. It
might require a whole developmental transformation in
the teacher for her to see the principal in that new way
(Kegan & Lahey, 1983, 21 1).
Second, Kegan & Lahey note that the ways in which a leader is
understood differently is not random and is not independent of the
leader (Kegan & Lahey, 1983, 213). Rather, "how a person's
leadership is perceived ... is a function of both the meaning systems
of the followers and the meaning system of the leader" (Kegan &
Lahey, 1983, 218). Clearly, the issues involved in the interaction of
the meaning systems of "leaders" and "followers" can be applied as
well to clinical supervisors and psychotherapists. Kegan & Lahey's
suggestion that "what a follower experiences as support from a
leader will differ depending on the follower's developmental
position" is an important consideration for clinical supervision.
"Leaders who can provide support in forms the followers themselves
experience as support will be more effective" (218).
The implications of a developmental framework for
understanding the interactions of supervisor and therapist are far-
reaching. Kegan & Lahey make two key points in this regard. First,
they state that "followers ... are generally dissatisfied with
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leaders who are operating out of a meaning system less developed
than their own" (218). Secondly, they assert that "leaders who are
developmentally beyond their followers are vulnerable to having
their purposes translated into meanings they do not necessarily
intend. (But the basic forms of such translations are not completely
random and can be anticipated.)" (218). This statement is also true
in the reverse, that psychotherapists (or other "followers") who are
developmentally beyond their supervisors are prone to having their
meanings misunderstood in ways that could potentially be
anticipated in terms of an understanding of the developmental levels
of the players.
The implications of Kegan & Lahey's work for clinical
supervision are multifaceted and go well beyond a strategic
prescription for tailoring supervision to the developmental levels of
psychotherapist trainees. This structural developmental theory can
provide another framework for interpreting the issues and challenges
involved in the practice of psychotherapy supervision.
In summary, Kegan's model has much to offer in terms of
understanding the development of psychotherapists, as well as
important implications for supervision. As a structural model of
development, it offers a fundamental shift in the way that the
process of becoming a psychotherapist may be understood. Kegan's
model is a robust one, capable of addressing issues of
psychotherapist development in their complexity. While maintaining
the richness of the psychodynamic perspective, Kegan's model may
also provide an organized schema for understanding development
which mitigates the potentially stigmatizing aspects of the
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difficulties in learning which psychotherapists experience. Kegan's
model offers a systematic method for assessing development, which
allows the research in this area to move beyond self-report
techniques and the subjective impressions of supervisors. Finally,
Kegan's work is a reminder that we are each embedded in our own
system of meaning making, and that for supervisors as well as
supervisees, that system represents both an achievement and a
constraint.
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CHAPTER 3
METHODOLOGY
Design Decision?^
Kegan (1982) has suggested that his work is "an organized way
of wondering what happens if the evolution of the activity of
meaning is taken as the fundamental motion of personality" (15).
This quality of "watching and wondering" is integral to a qualitative
approach to research (Patton, 1980, 193). Underlying this approach
is an attitude that fidelity to the phenomena under study is
essential, and that one's research methods must be shaped by the
questions one seeks to explore -- rather than shaping one's
questions to fit a particular method (Giorgi, 1970). It seems fitting,
then, that a project which seeks to both explore the limits and
extend the applications of Kegan's theory should utilize a qualitative
approach. Since the purpose of this study is to develop a fuller
understanding of the meaning-perspectives of therapists, a
qualitative approach seems important for two reasons: First, the
complexity of the data necessary to address questions of meaning-
making should not be artificially reduced in order to fit a
quantitative methodology. Secondly, it would seem that complex,
qualitative data, generated in a manner consistent with clinical
intervention methods, would have the most practical utility for
clinical supervisors.
A qualitative methodology also seems most in line with the
epistemological foundations of the constructive developmental
approach which provides the theoretical framework guiding this
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study. As Sevigny (1981) has suggested, qualitative methods are
founded in a view of reality as "interpreted rather than discovered"
(73). In line with a constructivist view, reality is seen as "socially
constructed, negotiated and maintained" (73). This same
epistemological foundation also underlies Kegan's work. The very
notion of constructivism, as Kegan describes it, includes the idea
that "there is no feeling, no experience, no thought, no perception,
independent of a meaning-making context in which it becomes a
feeling, a thought, a perception, because we are the meaning-making
context" (1982, 11). Thus, in using Kegan's constructive
developmental lens to examine the ways in which therapists
construe their own professional experience, it has been necessary to
draw upon a methodology which is also constructivist.
I chose a qualitative case study approach with the goal of
understanding each therapist's meaning-making system, and being
able to compare across cases. The qualitative case study approach,
Merriam has suggested, it is often the "best methodology for
addressing those problems in which understanding is sought in order
to improve practice" (1988, p. xiii). Holloway, too, has suggested
that there is a need for qualitative studies, particularly using a
clinical interview method, to address current research needs in the
area of developmental supervision. She has also suggested that
research needs to study counselor development directly, not just in
the context of the supervisory relationship.
This study aims to address these needs. It studies the
applicability of Kegan's model to psychotherapist development by
looking at whether therapists' responses to key issues differ in
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ways that the theory would suggest. It also aims to build upon
Kegan's theory and to begin developing conceptual categories about
specific key issues in psychotherapy as these may be experienced
differently by therapists at various stages of development. In line
with Borders request for a moratorium on "new and improved"
models, this research is based, instead, on a robust, extant model of
development. The application of this model to the domain of
psychotherapist development will hopefully provide a much needed
integration of adult development theory into the field of
psychotherapy supervision. The result of this extension of Kegan's
work might be that supervisors and counselor educators can have a
conceptual framework for understanding how key issues might be
experienced from various developmental perspectives. In choosing
an interpretive case study approach then, my goal has been to
develop an in-depth understanding of the meaning perspectives of
each of the twelve therapists I interviewed, in order to "reveal the
properties of the class to which the instance being studied belongs"
(Cuba and Lincoln, 1981, 371).
In line with the idea that one's methodology must be reflective
of the questions one wishes to ask, support for a qualitative design
also comes from Loevinger's very useful discussion of the difference
between polar variables and milestone sequences (1976, p. 207-
209). Polar variables are traits which can be measured in a linear
fashion, while milestone sequences are structural stages which may
not follow a linear progression in their development. Loevinger
suggests that human development can be viewed in either of these
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two very different ways, and that each has particular implications
for the assessment of development.
Viewed in terms of the acquisition of particular personality
traits, development may be measured in terms of polar variables and
may be usefully studied using a psychometric approach. In contrast,
however, the psychometric approach does not do justice to the
milestone sequence (or structural stage) aspect of development
because its tools are inadequate in this regard. Factor analysis "can
only treat all variables like polar variables" (Loevinger, 1976, p.
208) and so what is essential in understanding structural
development may be undiscoverable via quantitative methods.
To illustrate this point, Loevinger cites "spontaneity" and
"impulse expression" as examples of traits which "follow a
complementary curve, being high at the low and high ends of the ego
scale" (p. 208). To understand the way in which a particular trait or
traits may change over the course of development in a non-linear
way is thus a more qualitative than quantitative question. Thus
what would seem to be simply an issue of measurement has broader
implications, as Loevinger's work suggests, in terms of a way of
viewing human development.
The implications of this issue for the field of adult
development are interesting because they touch on some of the
contemporary controversy in the field regarding gender issues. In
the field of adult development, it would seem that viewing
"autonomy" as a polar variable has lead to erroneous conclusions
about development, i.e., that greater levels of autonomy imply higher
levels of development.
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Gilligan (1982), for instance, in her critique of the male bias
in Kohlberg's model of moral development, recognized that moral
development is not a unitary process. Her work introduced the idea
that a more relational or "care" orientation exists along side of a
"justice" orientation. She found this "different voice" most often in
women, but recognized that it was to be found among both genders.
Gilligan's critique is important in recognizing the one-sided nature
of the more separate, autonomous mode of making moral judgments.
Although Gilligan does not make this point explicitly, it might be
said that Kohlberg's model (indeed any model which prizes autonomy
as a measure of development) suffers by virtue of treating as a polar
variable a trait (autonomy) which actually follows a complementary
curve.
Kegan's model is important in being able to integrate the two
"voices" into a consistent model of development which recognizes
and appreciates both sides of this ostensible dichotomy. Kegan's use
of the helix seems to graphically illustrate the complementary curve
nature of development and provide a heuristic for a model which
respects each of these orientations. In his later work, however,
Kegan (1994) recognizes that the helix image may be misleading if it
suggests to people that these two orientations (toward either
autonomy or connection) are synonymous with stage differences (p.
217-222). Rather, each of these orientations exists simultaneously,
"in lifelong tension" (Kegan, 1982, p. 107).
Noam (1985) made the important distinction between "stage"
and "style," suggesting that people may favor an orientation toward
either connection or autonomy, a stylistic preference that would be
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consistent across the lifespan of developmental stages. Kegan
(1994) builds upon this idea, and captures more of the complexity of
the relationship between these two "yearnings" (Kegan, 1982, p. 107)
or styles when he states:
The stylistic difference is not one of favoring one to the
exclusion of the other, but one of figure and ground. Some of
us may make the experience of connection the base from which
we then move toward experiences of agency that may also be
greatly important to us. Others may make the experience of
independence the base from which we then move to
experiences of connection that may also be precious to us or of
paramount importance (p. 218).
Kegan draws a contrast between stylistic and stage
differences, suggesting that stage theories and theories of stylistic
difference are making two different kinds of distinction. He
acknowledges that his own earlier writing (1982) contributed to
conflating these two sets of distinctions, and suggests that
Gilligan's work, published that same year, did so also. He goes on to
delineate a relationship between stage and style which preserves
the distinction between the two. This description seems to
challenge Gilligan's theory but also to encompass a larger and more
complex understanding of the gender issues which she raised. This
description may also explicate Kegan's (1994) claim to a non gender
biased theory:
"Increasing differentiation" may indeed be the story of
everyone's development, but "increasing differentiation" can
itself be the story of staying connected in a new way, of
continuing to hold onto one's precious connections and
loyalties while refashioning one's relationship to them so that
one makes them up rather than gets made up by them
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"Autonomous" means self-regulating, and that regulation might
well be on behalf of preserving and protecting one's precious
connections according to an internal compass or system.
Sample
My aim in this study was to do purposive or criterion-based
sampling. I hoped to interview therapists representing as broad a
range of adult development as possible, in order to begin to compare
and contrast different developmental perspectives on key issues in
psychotherapeutic work. In contrast to probability sampling, I was
interested instead in selecting a sample which might best
illuminate developmental differences. As Merriam has suggested,
criterion-based sampling is "based on the assumption that one wants
to discover, understand, gain insight; therefore one needs to select a
sample from which one can learn the most" (48). In choosing a
sample, then, I hoped to find subjects at the upper and lower ends of
the developmental distribution. This proved more difficult than
expected for two primary reasons.
First, on the practical side, just as I began my sampling, I had
to move 1 000 miles away from the friends and colleagues who could
have helped to facilitate the criterion-based sampling I had planned.
Without such contacts, it proved quite challenging to even find
subjects who met my criterion for age, education, gender and
experience willing to participate in the intensive two to three hour
interview my research required. Although I did use peer
nominations, my pool of potential research subjects was such that I
would have asked those nominated in any case because they fit my
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(non-developmental) criterion and lived or worked wiihin a
reasonable geographic area.
A second challenge to my plan lor criterion-based sampling
was related to the difficulty of getting not only nominations but
also participants from the lower end of the developmental spectrum.
It is obviously easier to ask someone to recommend a friend or
colleague for their potentially high level of development than the
reverse. Still. I believe I was able to tactfully solicit potentially
lower developmental level nominations. Interestingly, the two such
nominations I received were for the same therapist, who declined to
participate, citing her hourly charge as the reason. Although I had
many therapists decline to participate in my research, she was the
only one who gave a monetary reason for doing so.
I chose to limit my sample in a number of ways. First, I
selected a relatively small sample of twelve psychotherapists. This
was done because of the time-intensive nature of this research and
the desire to generate a fuller understanding of a smallei sample.
This decision is linked to the absence of prior research in this area,
which makes a hypothesis-generating study best suited to the most
immediate research needs in this area.
I also decided to restrict my sample in terms of gender, age,
experience level and type of training, limiting my subjects to female
psychologists in their forties with a minimum of five years of
clinical experience. These decisions were made in order to "contiol"
for a variety of factors which might potentially affect the results
had the sample been broader-based. Restrictions in terms of age and
training were made in order to control for possible cohort effects.
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Although I did include female psychologists from both clinical and
counseling psychology training programs, I hypothesized that
differences in selection or training would be relatively insignificant
among experienced therapists within a certain age range. To control
for experience level seemed important because this is the major
factor which has been used to explain developmental variability in
prior research.
Finally, the decision to control for gender was made for a
number of reasons. First, if I were to include both men and women
in my sample of twelve, the sample of each gender would be too
small to begin to make any meaningful generalizations about
psychotherapists' development. Secondly, I did not want to base my
research on the assumption that there are no significant
developmental differences along gender lines. Neither do I assume,
however, in line with Gilligan (1982) and Belenky et al. (1986) that
significant gender differences or different developmental pathways
are to be found between men and women. I do believe it is important
to consider the differential impact of a variety of socialization
factors on human development, of which gender is just one. Bar-
Yam's (1991) work is interesting in this regard. Both her own study,
based on Kegan's developmental theory, and her review of several
larger-scale and meta-analysis studies of moral reasoning suggest
that age, education and sociocultural factors have a much greater
impact on development than does gender.
In line with Borders (1989) request for a moratorium on
research conducted in academic settings, and the plethora of
research on beginning trainees, I selected a sample of experienced
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psychotherapists engaged in clinical practice. My sample consisted
of twelve female psychologists ranging in age from 40 to 48
(average age 45) with at least five years of clinical experience.
They had an average of twelve years of clinical experience, ranging
from five to twenty years. Eight of the twelve worked in private
practice, two in college or university counseling and two combined
teaching and/or research with private practice. Two therapists in
the group (already counted) also worked for a human service agency.
Despite attempts to control for age and experience, my sample
reflects real differences in these areas. The difference between
five and 20 years experience, for instance, is substantial. It makes
intuitive sense that the practice of psychotherapy, with the
attendant opportunity for both self-reflection and reflection on
interpersonal dynamics, would tend to enhance development. (It is
possible, too, that a psychotherapist's experience in a particular
kind of practice could have an impact on development.) Similarly,
even the age differences among people in their forties might be said
to account for developmental differences, to some extent. However,
neither of these factors appear to be true for this sample. When I
separate the sample into two groups according to developmental
level, the higher developmental group has the same average years of
experience (twelve) and is actually somewhat younger than the other
group.
Purposive sampling was done, then, with the intention of
exploring developmental differences among the twelve therapists.
As Stake (1978) has suggested, "What becomes useful understanding
is a full and thorough knowledge of the particular, recognizing it
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also in new and foreign contexts" (quoted in Patton, 1980, 281). If
this study is to be useful to practitioners, what might be valuable is
just this kind of in-depth understanding of the meaning-
perspectives of therapists at different developmental levels.
Clinical supervisors and counselor educators might then use this
data to enhance their own understandings of those they teach and
supervise. As Kennedy (1979) has suggested, in the clinical field
generalization is most appropriately done by the user of the study.
In order to illustrate the reasoning of these twelve therapists in
some depth I have included as much interview data as feasible in my
"Results" chapter. In this way, I hope to provide a foundation from
which other clinicians might generalize to their own particular
cases.
It has been suggested that "generalization" in qualitative
research be thought of as a "working hypothesis" (Cuba, 1 978) or in
terms of user generalizability (Wilson, 1979; Walker, 1980). It is in
this sense that generalization might be possible from my interview
data. As Kennedy suggests, potential users will generalize to their
own cases rather than to a population, so that my findings may
become working hypotheses for clinical application. As Cuba has so
aptly stated, "in the spirit of naturalistic inquiry (one) should regard
each possible generalization only as a working hypothesis, to be
tested again in the next encounter and again in the encounter after
that" (Cuba, 1978, quoted in Patton, 1980, 281).
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Data Gathering
Merriam (1988) has suggested that "naturalistic inquiry, which
focuses on meaning in context, requires a data collection instrument
sensitive to underlying meaning when gathering and interpreting
data" (3). For this reason, my primary data gathering technique was
a semi-structured but open-ended reflective interview. The
interviews were structured to the extent that each therapist was
asked six prepared questions during the course of the interview: one
on each of the three key issues (manipulation, termination and dual
relationships), a general question on the counseling relationship, a
question about what is most challenging about their work and a
question on the supervisory relationship. I asked each interviewee
to think about a situation in their own practice related to each of
the key issues questions. Apart from this structure, the interviews
remained open-ended.
The open-ended nature of the interviews was absolutely
essential, for two reasons. First, it allowed me to tailor my follow-
up questions to the specific situations and concerns raised by the
interviewee. Second, but most important for my purposes, it
provided the opportunity to design questions which might allow me
to understand and score each interview according to developmental
stage. In order to make such an assessment, the researcher must
probe for the way in which subjects make sense of their experience
and for the underlying reasoning from which one can extrapolate
developmental structure. Probes must be specifically tailored to
each subject's meaning-making in such a way that their most
complex thinking is elicited. In line with a qualitative approach, in
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the Kegan scoring system, the researcher is truly the only
instrument which could be sensitive enough to the nuances of
meaning that must be explored in this clinical research interview.
Despite its strengths, Selman (1980) has suggested that the
formal, reflective interview is limited for a number of reasons. A
primary issue is that people's behavior in practice may, of course, be
quite different from their reasoning capacity. The reflective
interview "appears to tap social cognition under optimal conditions,
providing more a measure of competence than of performance" (216).
He describes a "dynamic" dimension in research, "orthogonal to
both vertical-developmental and horizontal-categorical dimensions
. .
this dimension is said to traverse a continuum from formal
reflective thought on the one hand to functional or spontaneous
concepts-in-action on the other"(289). Selman discusses
differences in both the context and the content of the reflective
interview versus observations in the natural environment. Clearly,
the context of the reflective interview is different from
observations of behavior under the normal pressures of daily living.
For the purposes of this research, this limitation seemed acceptable
since this is also the way in which the supervisor generally gets
information about the therapist's work. Nevertheless, the
distinction between behavior and reasoning is an important one.
Selman also discusses differences in the content of reflective
interviews along this "dynamic dimension." Content may be real life
or hypothetical, ongoing or remembered, stressful or nonstressful,
self or other focused, personal or general and spontaneously
occurring or deliberately introduced. Although the context of my
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interviews is low on Selman's dynamic dimension, i believe that
they are high on this dimension in terms of content. The focus is on
real life issues, with a particular focus on personally significant
and problematic issues. Although several general topics are
deliberately introduced by the researcher, to allow for
developmental comparison on particular issues, in each case the
research subject is asked to speak to a specific situation of
significance to them on that theme. In addition to questions focused
on particular themes in therapeutic work, there is an open-ended
question which asks research subjects to speak to that which is
currently most challenging in their therapeutic work. Thus the
content of this research interview was designed to be high on the
dynamic dimension. Despite the inherent limitations of the formal
reflective interview, Selman does concede that it is "probably the
best choice we have so far when the goal is a formal analysis of
stage development" (216).
In a similar vein, Patton (1980) has suggested that "interviews
are a limited source of data because participants . . . can only report
their perceptions of and perspectives on what has happened" (Patton,
1980, 157). However, this is what makes them the key source of
data for my project, because this is precisely my focus of concern.
From a constructivist viewpoint, what really happened may be
impossible to ascertain. Most important for this research are the
meaning perspectives of each of the participants, even as these are
in flux, for it is this very process of change that is the focus of
Kegan's developmental model.
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In regard to the veracity of interview data. Light has
introduced a useful insight. "Inaccurate recall," he suggests, "is
more insightfully seen as the reconstruction of past events to fit a
new sense of self, an emerging professional identity" (1979, 553).
This sense about retrospective reporting is relevant to my
interviewing. In an earlier pilot study, I had a sense with the least
experienced therapist, in particular, that she was reporting on a
changing sense of herself as a therapist. I would guess that the
feelings she talked about having experienced in relation to events
and issues in her work from a year ago were quite different feelings
from the ones she actually experienced at the time. However, since
my interest is in a process or structure for meaning-making, the
perhaps inextricable mixture of past and current perceptions is as
valuable as any hypothetically "accurate" rendering.
Although the notion that there is one accurate perception of
events which might be captured in research is antithetical to this
approach, the need to understand the perspective of each
interviewee as closely and accurately as possible necessitated a
transcription of each interview. I met with each of the participants
for two hours to four hours. Part of each meeting included
describing my project, answering questions and initially getting
acquainted. These interviews were conducted in private in either
the interviewee's home or office. Each interview was tape-
recorded and transcribed. The professional transcriptions were each
checked by the interviewer for verbatim accuracy as much as
possible.
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Development of thp Interview
I chose to adapt the Subject-Object Interview, developed by
Kegan and associates (Lahey et al., 1988). Before I describe the ways
in which I adapted it to my research needs, I would like to describe
the interview itself.
The Subject-Object Interview is an approximately 90 minute
interview, based on Kegan's (1982) work, designed to assess
structural developmental level. The interviewee is asked to
consider ten different feelings or issues, each of which is printed on
an index card. After being given some time to consider the cards,
the interviewee is asked to pick one or several to discuss. The ten
feelings or issues are: 1) ANGRY, 2) ANXIOUS, NERVOUS, 3) SUCCESS,
4) STRONG STAND, CONVICTION, 5) SAD, 6) TORN, 7) MOVED,
TOUCHED, 8) LOST SOMETHING, 9) CHANGE and 10) IMPORTANT TO ME.
The key goal in interviewing is to probe the interviewee's meaning in
order to determine the structural developmental level underlying the
content of the interview. The interview is based on real-life
experiences with emotional as well as cognitive content. Aside
from the ten initial issues, all of which are not intended to be
covered, the interview is open-ended.
I chose to adapt this very open-ended interview to the domain
of psychotherapeutic work. Rather than allow research participants
to talk about any personally significant topic, I wanted them to
focus on issues germane to the practice of psychotherapy. In this
way, I hoped to be able to make some comparisons about the ways
that specific issues were understood from different developmental
perspectives.
84
The interview protocol was constructed in collaboration with
John Carey. The specific issues were chosen based on our combined
clinical experience and informal discussion with other clinicians.
Had a more formal method been used to select key issues, such as a
survey of clinicians, it is likely that a different set of issues would
have comprised the interview protocol.
With the original Subject-Object Interview, as developed by
Kegan and associates, the key issues merely served as a spring-
board for developmentally rich data. In this regard, the specific
issues were not so important except in so far as they would
generate developmentally scorable material. For this reason, I felt
that I could adapt the Subject-Object interview to the domain of
psychotherapy without compromising the essential purposes of the
interview.
I used this adapted interview, to be described in detail below,
as the basis for both developmental and thematic analyses of the
interview data. This was largely a practical decision. Given my
desire to conduct lengthy, in-depth interviews on the subject area of
psychotherapy, doing the standard Subject-Object Interview as well
would have been asking a lot of research participant already giving
very generously of their time. The decision also reflects my own
underlying assumption, discussed earlier, that structural
development is a fairly consistent construct. The use of one
interview for both structural and thematic analyses could be
problematic if one considered (with Stoltenberg & Dellworth, for
instance) that therapists might operate from a different
developmental perspective in their personal lives. However, since I
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focus solely on psychotherapists' meaning-making about their
clinical work, and draw no conclusions about their development in
the private sphere, the issue of consistency is not crucial to this
research.
In designing my interview protocol, an important consideration
was to focus on potentially problematic areas in the practice of
psychotherapy, for two reasons. First, these are where limitations
in one's ability to make meaning are most evident, and therefore
where structural development should be most evident. Second, these
areas are likely to be personally meaningful to participants.
Traditionally problematic areas included dealing with client
manipulation, with the issue of dual relationships, and the
termination of therapy. I was also interested in therapists'
perceptions of their own internal change process, for reasons which
will be discussed below. These four issues formed the basis of my
first interview protocol, used in a pilot research project for the
dissertation. Following this, I added two additional questions; one
regarding supervision and the other about what the therapist finds
most challenging in her work.
Since I aimed to retain the approach to interviewing and use
the developmental scoring system of the Subject-Object Interview,
the initial formulation of interview questions involved speculation
about not only what might generate scorable material, but also about
the kinds of developmental differences I might find.
Based on my understanding of the limits of each stage, I began
with some general hypotheses about the differences I would expect
to find among therapists at various stages of development. These
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beginning hypotheses included the notion that stage three therapists
would have more difficulty with anger and with limit setting and
might have an overriding need to be liked by the client. I expected
therapists at stage four to be relatively comfortable with and clear
about limits and boundaries.
Another area of difference, especially relevant to the
distinction between stages three and four, was suggested by
Benack's (1988) work on counselor empathy. Using Perry's (1 970)
model of cognitive development, Benack found developmental
differences in the capacity for empathy. With the development of
relativistic thought and the recognition of multiple perspectives,
she suggests that empathy can begin to include a cognitive,
differentiating aspect as well as an affective, identifying
component. This cognitive shift in Perry's model seems to parallel
the stage three to stage four transition in Kegan's model. I
hypothesized that in answering questions specific to counseling,
differences might emerge between these two stages, with stage
three therapists more prone to "overidentification" with the client
and stage four therapists more able to tune in to the particulars of
their clients' experience.
Based on the above considerations, six questions comprised the
interview protocol for this research. The interview questions, along
with a more detailed discussion of their construction, follow:
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Question #1: Client Manipulation
As you think about your work with clients, can you think about some
times when you felt that someone was being manipulative? Is there
a particular situation which stands out for you? Can you describe
the situation and your reactions? What kinds of feelings were
evoked for you in this situation?
As originally conceived, this question was designed to
distinguish between therapists at stages three and four. The ability
to set limits with manipulative clients, I hypothesized, would be
better at stage four because of the clearer "boundaries" associated
with this stage of development. At stage three, I suspected, the
therapist would experience more pressure from the demands of
manipulative clients. If stage three is characterized by an
"embeddedness in relationships," then the structural limits of this
stage would make it difficult for the therapist to take a stand that
would result in conflict or make the client angry. In the pilot study,
this question did seem to distinguish stages three and four, but not
beyond.
This limitation seemed to point to a need to re-design the
question in order to get at some of the developmental differences
between stages four and five. It seems that the capacity to
acknowledge and grapple with difficult feelings, rather than an
ability to somehow transcend such feelings, is a mark of increasing
development. What I was looking for in this question and didn't get
was a sense of therapists' ability to address their own
countertransferential feelings toward difficult clients. This
question, it seemed, could generate potentially useful developmental
data in terms of considerations such as these:
88
Is the therapist able to acknowledge "problematic" feelings or
are they denied? How does the therapist respond to these feelings
in him/herself? Are they acknowledged with difficulty or accepted
as a matter of course? In describing a problematic situation, how
does the therapist understand the source(s) of difficulty? Are they
seen as existing solely within the client? Are they seen in the
context of the relational dynamics? Is there an ability to
acknowledge when the therapist's own material gets triggered?
In order to access this level of very personal meaning-making
about one's therapeutic work, it seemed that I would need to create,
both in my framing of the question and in my manner in the
interview, an implicit sense of permission to address issues which
were problematic for the therapist. I attempt to do this in the re-
designed question as follows:
Question #1.b) We've all dealt with clients who use manipulation as
a regular way of dealing with other people, for instance, the classic
borderline client. Can you talk about a time when a client's style of
manipulation was particularly problematic for you? Can you
describe the situation and your reactions? What kinds of feelings
were evoked for you? How did you make sense of these feelings?
Question #2: Termination
Can you think about some times in your work with clients when the
issue of termination was in some way problematic? Is there a
particular client or situation which comes to mind? Can you
describe the situation and your reactions?
This second question was also designed, generally, to tap into
a potentially problematic area of therapeutic work. Two different
kinds of problematic terminations were anticipated: those initiated
by the therapist leaving a training site or other institution and those
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initiated by the client before the mutually agreed upon completion of
treatment.
In the first case, dealing with strong emotional reactions on
the part of the client, especially feelings of loss or of anger, seemed
most salient. In the second case, with client initiated terminations,
questions of competence, self-doubt, feelings of loss, anger and
other emotions on the therapist's part seemed likely. In either case,
it seemed that strong feelings would be engendered by a termination
which stood out for the therapist as problematic.
Questions of how these emotions are understood and processed
(or not) seemed likely to include some developmental indicators. Of
particular relevance for distinguishing between stages three and
four would be the manner in which the therapist assigned or
assumed responsibility for feelings. For instance, would the client
be seen as the source of feelings of incompetence or loss or anger in
the therapist? Would the therapist assume appropriate
responsibility for his/her own feelings? Or would the therapist also
assume responsibility for the client's feelings?
The manner in which a therapist processed his/her own
feelings about client initiated terminations might also provide some
indicators of development beyond stage four. This stage is
characterized by an "embeddedness in the institutional," which in
the domain of psychotherapy would mean an inability to reflect on
the self-system's underlying assumptions. In those cases in which a
client initiated termination might prompt appropriate self-
questioning and re-evaluation, the ability of the therapist to engage
in this process may be an index of development. As Kegan has
90
suggested: "Each new stage represents a capacity to listen to what
before one could hear only irritably, and a capacity to hear irritably
what before one could not hear at all" (Kegan, Noam & Rogers, 1 983,
p.ll6).
Question #3: Dual relationships
Can you think about some times when the issue of dual relationships
became problematic? Can you describe the situation and your
reactions?
This question was seen as an opportunity to analyze the way in
which therapists relate to a system of professional ethics. In terms
of a developmental assessment, it is the structure rather than the
content of one's beliefs that is most important. For instance,
professional ethics might be followed for stage three reasons:
wanting to be a good person, wanting to please others, to follow
group norms. Or professional ethics might be adhered to because
they are part of a self-chosen system of values, a stage four
construction.
My pilot research yielded additional data about
developmentally related constructions of this issue. Although each
of my research subjects has been apparently quite ethical, their
different constructions of meaning on this issue led me to think
about how unethical behavior might also be construed. The
difference between structure and content is important here. Seeing
the way in which my stage three and four research subjects made
meaning about this issue allowed me to envision how the same
structure of meaning could, with a different content, be the
foundation for less ethical behavior.
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For instance, at stage three a therapist might be swayed by the
power of the interpersonal relationship with a client to become
involved in a dual relationship. This may occur, in part, for
structural reasons. Being "embedded in one's relationships" may
mean that a system of professional ethics is, in itself, too abstract
and remote to anchor a stage three therapist's behavior. A person at
stage three may be torn by the competing claims of two different
interpersonal contexts, but is likely to be swayed by the one that
s/he is involved in at the moment.
The stage four construction of meaning also has implication
for potential difficulties in adhering to professional ethics. While
the stage four therapist can internalize professional ethics in a way
that the stage three therapist may not be able to, the ability to
create a self-chosen system of values means that that system may
not always be in accord with professional ethics. The therapist at
this stage may hold a different theory, not in itself problematic, but
potentially so. This ability to construct a self-generated theory
may be a means of providing quite sophisticated rationalizations for
unethical behavior. The self-sealing nature of the psychic
"institution" and the absence of a genuinely self-reflective, self-
correcting capacity makes this especially problematic at stage four.
These first three questions, based on the pilot research, have
asked the therapist to reflect on a particular theme in relation to
therapeutic work. By asking each therapist to reflect upon the same
themes, I hope to generate the beginnings of a typology about how
therapists at various stages of development understand key issues
in therapeutic work. Each of the questions has been designed in such
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a way that I might elicit reasoning which could define the limits of
each therapist's system of meaning making.
In designing this study, I have added three new questions to
the interview protocol:
Question #4: Challenge
I'd like to ask you, what is the most difficult or challenging issue
you face in your work as a therapist? I would like to ask you to
speak to a current challenge in your clinical work, rather than to one
of the problems you've already solved about doing this work. What
are the struggles or the questions you have at this point?
In a manner consistent with Kegan's original Subject-Object
Interview, the challenge question is deliberately open-ended. Each
of the interview questions has been designed to elicit material
which might help define the limits of the therapist's system of
meaning making. Question number four attempts to do so more
directly by focusing on what is currently most challenging, i.e., what
is at the limits of the therapist's ability to make sense. The more
open-ended nature of this question also allows for new data on what
themes therapists at various stages of development might
spontaneously focus on as important.
Question #5: Supervisory relationship
Is your supervisory relationship a context in which you can address
the issues which are most alive for you? Why or why not? If not in
formal supervision, do you have a place where you can discuss these
issues?
The fifth question is an opportunity for therapists to assess
their own supervisory relationship in terms of providing a context in
which they can process the issues which are on the "cutting edge"
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for them. In line with Kegan's view of development, it is the
occasions when it is most difficult to make meaning that often
provide the greatest opportunities for growth. For the supervisor to
create a context in which this kind of learning can occur seems a
crucial albeit challenging task. This question was designed to allow
therapists to assess the extent to which their own supervisory
relationships can do so, and to provide their understanding of why
this is so.
Question #6; Change
If I were to ask you to reflect back on your work as a therapist, how
do you see yourself as having changed, especially in relation to any
of the issues that we've discussed today? If there are issues which
you see differently now, I'd be interested in what you can recollect
about how you made sense of things at an earlier point in your own
development.
This final question, which asked therapists to reflect back on
their own thinking and professional development, was designed as an
opportunity to see implicit developmental movement in the changes
in the person's perceptions over time. My assumption, in line with
Kegan model's, is that development in unidirectional. This
assumption might best be tested using a longitudinal research
design, which was precluded by current limitations of time and
resources. However, if Kegan's sequence is valid, I would expect
therapists to report past construction of meaning reflective of
earlier levels of development. Therefore, this question was included
to give research subjects an opportunity to present data which
might either corroborate or challenge this underlying assumption.
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Data Analysis
In terms of data analysis, I chose a cross-case comparison
approach. I aimed to develop an in-depth developmental
understanding of each case, in order to facilitate a beginning
comparison of ways in which key issues in the practice of
psychotherapy might be experienced differently by therapists at
various stages of development. Following the developmental
analyses of each interview, I did a thematic analysis of the twelve
interviews as a whole, looking in particular for developmental
patterns in the understanding of key themes and issues.
In line with a qualitative approach, the processes of analysis
and interpretation have been simultaneous with that of data
collection, and have been an ongoing aspect of the project (Merriam,
1988). The process of interviewing itself involved ongoing analysis
and interpretation. In order to generate scorable interview
material, the authors of the Subject-Object Interview recommend an
ongoing process of hypothesis generation and testing during the
interview itself. This process allows for the formulation of probes
and areas of inquiry which are most likely to result in a scorable
interview. Ironically, they have suggested that it is the process of
actually scoring an interview or interviews which builds the skills
necessary to this kind of on-going hypothesis formation, so that the
processes of data collection and analysis are clearly seen as
simultaneous and mutually facilitative.
The analysis of the interview transcripts involved a
systematic process of developing hypotheses based on the interview
data. Given that structural developmental level is itself an abstract
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construct, this kind of assessment necessarily involved some
abstraction or movement "from the empirical trenches to a more
conceptual view of the landscape" (Huberman, 1984, 228). It
involved hypotheses, on the part of the researcher, about alternate
ways in which a given situation might be construed. Unless one can
conceive of alternate constructions, one cannot "place" or get a
perspective on the developmental epistemology from which the
interviewee constructs her experience. However, as Patton (1980)
has suggested, in qualitative research this theoretical analysis
necessarily involves a constant movement back and forth between
the data and our abstractions about the data. The Subject-Object
Interview scoring system is quite rigorous in this regard.
Developmental conceptualizations must be constantly tested against
alternate interpretations of the same interview data.
Both the nature of the material and the fact that there was
only one researcher involved with this project precluded doing
independent developmental and thematic analyses. In theory,
whichever analysis was done first could potentially shape the
results of the other. It seemed important to do the developmental
analysis first. The developmental analysis was the more difficult
(as discussed in detail later), and therefore potentially most subject
to subjective distortion based on the content of the thematic
analysis. On the other hand, given that themes are part of the
content rather than the structure of the interview, there was really
no developmental "mold" that the themes were expected to fit.
Although I did have some general expectations going into the
interviews, as described above, these were based on an
96
understanding of developmental structures rather than a sense of
stereotypical content. I believe that my process of data analysis did
separate development and thematic content as well as possible
given the limitation of having one researcher for the project.
Following the individual developmental analyses, I did a thematic
analysis for each question, using the interview data from each of the
twelve interviews. The fact that some of the results were contrary
to my own expectations should suggest that these two analyses
were reasonably well separated.
The Subiect-Obiect Interview and General Principles of
Analysis
Although I adapted the interview to the domain of counseling
and psychotherapeutic practice, my data analysis procedures adhered
to those described in the Lahey et al. A Guide to the Subiect-Obiect
Interview: Its Administration and Interpretation . The process by
which one goes from the transcription of the research subject's
actual words to a developmental analysis is a complex one which the
authors of the Guide describe at length with numerous and lengthy
examples. It may be useful here to elucidate some of the key
features of this process.
First, the central question to be addressed in a constructive
developmental analysis is this: "From where in the evolution of
subject-object relations are the person's meanings generated?"
(Lahey, et al., 1988, 11). One begins to answer this question by first
identifying the part of the subject's speech which contain structural
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material, i.e., material which rellecls the speaker's subiect-ohiect
bnlancinn. The authors of the Guide speak to this task:
How do you know when you have found the speaker's sul)j(M:t-
ol)j(M;t level demonstiating itself'' "Subject" refers to ihe
~
basic principle of organization; "object" refers to thai which
gets organized. That which gets organized can be reflected
upon; we can take it as an object of attention. Or in anothei
language: that which gets organized is "internalized;" it is an
internal object. The principle of organization cannot be
reflected upon. We aie subject to it and we subject olheis to
it in our construction of them. Since persons, by definition,
are embedded in wliat is "subject," they cannot, in an
interview, tell you about what is subject for them; they can
only demonstrate what is subject (in part by your locating how
it is they cannot talk). Persons can talk about what is "ol)ject"
for them, what it is they can take a perspective upon, what it
is they have internalized, what it is they can control, be
responsible for . . . (Lahey et al., 1988, 13).
Those parts of the interview which contain structural material
form the unit of analysis and are referred to as "analyzable bits."
Goodman (1983) describes a "bit" as "any continuous speech on a
single subject which clearly exposes the underlying developmental
structure of the speaker's thoughts, feelings or actions" (81).
Goodman goes on to describe two types of speech: that which is
self-reflective and that which is other reflective, acknowledging
that some speech may contain both elements (82-83). Self-
reflective speech "has to do with the self's thoughts and leelings
about the self" (82). Other reflective speech "refers to the sell's
ability to comment on its relationship to others" (82).
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Three general Crit(Min omorge in terms ol Jiuilyziruj tho
speaker's construction of meaning. The first concerns the spe.iker's
sense of a psychological "boundary" and the way in which a [^.M .on
construes the boundaries between self arui other. The central
question in tins regard might be: "What psychological processes
does the speaker claim as his or her own and wliat psyclK)k)gical
processes does the speaker identify as belonging outside himself or
herself," i.e., project onto others? (Lahey et al.. 1988. 15-16).
The second criterion is the speaker's ability to take a
perspective on something, whether that "something" be systems of
needs, relationships or one's own psychological process. That which
a person can take a perspective on has become, for that person,
"object". What one cannot take a perspective on is "subject"; one is
"subject to" their current embeddedness in this regard. The aim of
the Subject-Object Interview is to provide the opportunity for each
person to demonstrate then highest level of meaning making. Ihis
means giving the person the opportunity to demonstrate their
greatest capacity for perspective taking. "We know we are in
subject territory." the authors of the Guide suggest, when we hear
the person talking as if, in the experience itself that he is
describing, he is unable to construct any wider form ot leleience lor
the experience, despite opportunities to do so created by the
interviewer" (14).
A third criterion relates to the realm of responsibility taking.
By considering what a person is able to take responsibility for. we
gain evidence of developmental capacity. "Something must he object
for the person to take responsibility for it; a person cannot take
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responsibility for that which she is subject to" (15). When
something is "subject" there is nn implicit lack of awareness of that
which one is subject to or embedded in. One can only see the t inure
(object) and not the ground (subject). The process of development is
one in which what was subject becomes object and a new
subjectivity (increasingly less limited) takes the place of the old.
This suggests a continuum of awareness(es) which, in terms of
responsibility taking, can be assessed via the following questions,
taken from the Guide: "What does she take responsibility lor?' What
does she not take responsibility for? What does she not take
responsibility for and know she does not take responsil)ility for?
What does she not take responsibility for and not know she is not
taking responsibility for'f* (16).
Distinguishing Structure and Content
An impoitant issue involved in developmental assessment is
that of distinguishing between structure and content. Ihese two are
difficult to separate in practice, because structures are embedded in
the content of the interviews. One can identify elements which are
reflective of structure, but there are no pure structures to be fouiui
in practice. It is important to note that a full lange of feelings and
behaviors are possible at a given structural stage, as well as the
converse, tliat particular content can be experienced from any
structural perspective. Making developmental assumptions on the
basis of a person's behaviors or feelings is problematic. As
Loevinger states. "Any observable behavior can be arrived at by many
routes, can be undertaken or given in to for a variety ol leasons.
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While there may be exceptions, one cannot assume any behavior to be
unequivocally related to ego level" (Loevinger, 1976, 183). It is
people's reasoning about their experience which holds the key to
understanding structural developmental capacity. A recognition of
the ways in which structure and content are distinct though
intertwined should be a caveat against simplistic characterizations
of stage perspectives.
Researcher Role
The role of the researcher in qualitative, naturalistic inquiry
is an interesting one. Since the researcher is the primary
instrument of the research, the impossibility of an "objective" point
of view is more explicit here than it is within the positivist or
scientific paradigm. A greater awareness of the subjectivity of
points of view may be a strength of the naturalistic paradigm,
because it facilitates an explicit consideration of the role and
impact of the researcher. Although it has been considered
disadvantageous within the scientific paradigm, the researcher's
"subjectivity" has also been recognized as a source of strength.
Bromley, for instance, suggests that a qualitative case study
approach allows the researcher to "get as close to the subject of
interest as they possibly can . . . partly by their access to subjective
factors [such as] thoughts, feelings and desires" (1986, 23).
If subjectivity is seen in this light, as an ability to access
non-quantifiable factors, (personal, meaning components of human
experience, the subjective experience of others) then it is an
essential component of research which seeks to answer qualitative
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questions. On the other hand, a consideration of subjectivity as the
personal lens we bring to the research enterprise is essential, as
research of any kind is enhanced by an awareness of one's own
subjectivity. What seems important then, is not a distant kind of
"objectivity," but an ability to recognize and (in many cases) to
minimize the impact of one's own subjectivity. As Patton (1980)
has suggested, "distance does not guarantee objectivity; it merely
guarantees distance" (337).
Although subjectivity is intrinsic to any research, it may be
said to exist on a continuum. Geer (1964) names "the problem of
empathy," in terms of the empathy that may naturally develop when
one conducts field work. However, empathy may also be a function
of who the researcher is as a person in relation to the research
subjects. Krieger (1985) suggests that "we need to link our
statements about those we study with statements about ourselves,
for in reality neither stands alone" (321). This suggestion may have
particular relevance to research on adult psychological development.
In conducting this study, I became aware of several ways in which
the "problem of empathy" may operate.
First, as Geer suggests, a degree of empathy will naturally
develop from interaction with the research participants. This
empathy may become problematic when, in seeking to understand the
internal point of view of the participants, one comes to take on this
perspective oneself, and to some extent lose the external
perspective of researcher. Even if the "problem of empathy" does not
occur in this fashion, however, the researcher/clinician may have
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particular difficulty balancing the tension between empathic
listening and active probing.
As a researcher who is also a therapist, I found myself
tending, in the pilot study, more toward empathic listening than
active probing. Lahey et al. discuss this tension, emphasizing the
importance of both roles for this kind of clinical interview. It is
important, of course, to be an empathic listener when people are
sharing issues of personal significance. To conduct an effective
research interview, it is also necessary to probe much more often
and directly than one is trained to as a clinician. Discussing this
distance-involvement tension in relation to research, Emerson
aptly states that "good fieldwork is characterized by a paradoxical
and 'peculiar combination of engrossment and distance'" (179). The
recognition and effective balancing of this tension would appear to
be an ongoing task for the clinical researcher.
In developmental research, empathy may also be a problem in a
way which Geer did not anticipate. My work on a pilot study for this
project demonstrated to me the ways in which one's own perspective
really influences what one is actually able to see in the "field." An
assessment of ego development in this model, as described earlier,
involves looking for what the interviewee cannot take a perspective
on; what s/he is subject to. If the researcher is also "subject" in
the same way, it becomes problematic to make a developmental
assessment, because there is little ability to take a perspective on
the development of the research subject.
In conducting the pilot interviews for this study, I noticed that
I slipped most easily into an empathic listener mode with "Sally,"
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the therapist I am closest to in age, and perhaps in terms of
developmental level. (Although level of development will not
necessarily correspond with chronological age, it did so in the three
interviews I conducted for the pilot study.) I found myself, during
the interview, assuming that I knew what she meant. I had the
easiest time taking a perspective during the interview itself on
what "Dianne," the youngest therapist, relayed to me of her
experience. I suspect that was because I could look back on a
developmental perspective that I had moved beyond. In my interview
with "Abby," the oldest therapist I interviewed, I certainly felt that
I understood her perspective. However, actually scoring the
interview was difficult because I found myself unable to ascertain
what it was she might be unable to take a perspective on, and
perhaps had not asked questions which would probe that in my
interview. As a result, I felt that I could identify the "floor" but not
the "ceiling" of her developmental level.
Not too long after having struggled with the scoring of "Abby's"
interview (apparently the most developmentally evolved in my pilot
sample), I had the opportunity to speak with Robert Kegan at the
Fifth Annual Conference on Research in Adult Development. It is
greatly reassuring to have his acknowledgment of and perhaps
company in the difficult experience of trying to assess
developmental levels beyond one's own.
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Soundness
My primary concern regarding the soundness of this study was
for the validity of the developmental assessment made of each
research participant. Since this developmental analysis was to be
the foundation from which the study might then formulate
hypotheses about the impact of structural development on
therapists' understanding of their clinical work, the validity of this
analysis was crucial.
My first approach to this issue was to try to become a reliable
scorer in the Kegan (Lahey, et al., 1986) scoring system. Having a
long-standing interest in the theory, along with some training and
experience working with the scoring system, I was unprepared for
the difficulty that attempting to establish reliability would entail.
Reliability in the Kegan system can be established by taking a test,
composed of ten real-life interviews in which people talk about
their lives for about an hour. These test interviews are transcribed.
Reliability is determined by either a perfect match or scoring within
one discrimination on eight out of ten interviews. The scoring
system makes five discriminations for each stage, so a difference of
one discrimination is equivalent to one-fifth of a stage.
After two unsuccessful attempts at this reliability process, I
needed another alternative. (Although it is apparently not uncommon
for researchers in the Kegan theory to fail to establish reliability on
the second attempt, there is currently no third reliability test.) In
retrospect, too, I see that my work to understand the reasoning
behind the scoring of the first reliability test prior to taking the
second one was probably not at all useful. For my own
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understanding, I needed an actual dialogue with either the authors of
the scoring system or someone with equivalent expertise. To assure
the reliability of my results, I needed a second scorer with this
same high level of expertise.
Finally, to assure the soundness of my study, I had each of my
interviews scored by Dr. Nancy Popp, who is certified by Robert
Kegan as a reliable scorer, has worked with the Subject-Object
scoring system for over ten years, and has administered the
reliability test. We discussed scoring differences at length, each
sharing fully our reasoning and resolving differences through an in-
depth discussion of the interview data. In the course of this
discussion, I learned that I made a scoring error on at least two
interviews when I considered the internal consistency of a person's
theory. This is similar to the common error of confounding
structure and content, albeit perhaps more sophisticated. Rather
than seeing a lack of internal consistency in a person's theory as
evidence of a less than stage four meaning-making, I came to
understand this as another variant of the stage four inability to take
a perspective on one's theory.
Limitations
This study has a number of limitations. First, the sample size
(twelve) is small in order to be able to generate a more thorough and
compelling description of psychotherapist development. Thus the
quality and complexity of the data, as well as the desire to generate
a range of data on each subject were considerations which
necessarily interacted with sample size. As Carey has suggested,
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sample size in qualitative research may not so much limit as change
the nature of generalizability. In studying complex phenomena,
"generalizability to the level of meaning" may be most important,
such that the phenomena you are trying to understand can be
understood by others at remote locations (Carey, 1993, personal
communication).
Related to the decision to limit the size of the sample is that
of restricting the study to female psychologists. Without a sample
large enough to adequately control for gender or training
differences, it seemed preferable to limit the sample in this way. It
would be important and interesting to include male psychologists, as
well as psychotherapists from a variety of training backgrounds in a
larger study.
This study aims to explore the applications of Kegan's model to
understanding psychotherapist development. As such, it accepts the
assumptions of Kegan's theory and does not evaluate the model based
on an outside reference point. This theory (like any other) contains a
number of embedded assumptions. For instance, the final research
question about change over time is aimed at addressing (in a limited
way) the assumption of a hierarchical, unidirectional sequence of
development. However, this study essentially looks at
developmental differences among therapists at a given moment in
time and makes assumptions about development, rather than
studying the process of change in individuals over time. Such
longitudinal studies would be important in confirming the validity of
Kegan's model and elaborating our understanding of psychotherapist
development.
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Other assumptions of Kegan's model include the idea that
greater development brings increased complexity and that structural
development is relatively unified construct, with consistency across
domains. This research doesn't test this assumption, as would a
study designed to compare the developmental levels of
psychotherapists in their clinical work as opposed to their personal
lives. Although this study will address the complexity of
developmental constructions, the implications of increased
complexity are unclear. It would be interesting to study, for
instance, whether clients or supervisors are more satisfied with
therapists at higher stages of development.
Another limitation which must be considered in the application
of Kegan's model at this point in its development is the potential
difficulty of establishing reliability with its scoring system.
Although I can only speak from my own experience, that experience
leads me to believe that the current scoring system is excessively
difficult for any researcher who is not in close contact with the
authors of the theory.
Finally, this study is limited to studying the development of
psychotherapists. As such, it focuses on just one side of the
supervisory dyad, ignoring the equally important factor of
supervisors' development and the interaction of the developmental
levels of both players in this process.
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CHAPTER 4
RESULTS AND DISCUSSION
Overview
In this sample of twelve experienced female psychotherapists,
six were found to be at Kegan's stage four. The other six were at
various points in the transition from stage three to stage four.
These developmental positions are in line with other samples of
highly educated adults who have been assessed using the Subject-
Object Interview based on Kegan's model. In a composite sample of
"professional highly educated" subjects from nine dissertation
studies (N=207), 47% had reached or exceeded stage four, in the
largest study to date using the Kegan methodology, Bar-Yam
interviewed 60 subjects, also highly educated. In this sample, 52%
had reached or exceeded stage four (Kegan, 1994, 187-197).
The results of this study support the utility of Kegan's model
in understanding development among this population. Clear
developmental differences were evidenced between therapists in the
stage four group versus the stage three to four transitional group.
These differences, as well as some finer distinctions between
therapists at various points of the stage three to four transition,
will be illustrated below. Most of the differences which transpired
were in line with this researcher's expectations for development
according to Kegan's model. There were some surprises as well. In
some cases, therapists' reports of behavior or emotions were
contrary to stereotypical stage expectations, underlining the crucial
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distinction between structure and content. However, most
surprising to this researcher were the differences which transpired
within a developmental level. As these results will illustrate, the
quality and even the complexity of responses can be vastly different,
even at the same stage of development.
This chapter consists of six sections, one for each research
question. In each section, the interview question and the
expectations behind its design are reviewed, and the results are
discussed and summarized. In addition, some of the results from
this chapter are also presented in tabular form in Appendix A.
Research Questions and Results
Manipulation
Interview question 1: We've all dealt with clients who use
manipulation as a regular way of dealing with other people, for
example, the classic Borderline client. Can you talk about a time
when a client's style of manipulation was particularly problematic
for you? Can you describe the situation and your reactions? What
kinds of feelings were evoked for you? How did you make sense of
those feelings?
In formulating this question, I had speculated that stage three
therapists would have greater difficulty dealing with client
manipulation, would experience pressure from the demands of
manipulative clients and have difficulty setting limits. All of the
therapists in this sample were at least somewhat beyond stage
three. However, of those therapists in the stage three to four
transition, three did seem to have difficulty with manipulative
clients, but two others seemed to defy this expectation. This result
is surprising, and may be understood in a number of ways.
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It may be that these therapists, not being fully embedded in
stage three, were able to draw upon their stage four abilities to
take a perspective on the therapeutic relationship, and thus could
more easily handle client manipulation. This seems a possibility in
only one case, in which the therapist, at stage 3/4, could operate
from either stage perspective. Another explanation might be that
the therapist's education, colleagues and mentors may have
functioned as an alternative "culture of embeddedness" for the
interpersonal self and thus supported them in setting appropriate
limits. Indeed, the therapists in transition from stage three to four
did seem to draw support from professional expectations for
addressing this issue. A third and related explanation might be that
with increased experience, clients ceased to be an interpersonal
source of reference for the therapist, strengthening the professional
culture as that reference for the therapist. These latter two factors
would allow the therapist to do the "right thing" despite the absence
of a full stage four operating. This was most clearly demonstrated
by Kara, who at stage 3(4), reported that she was able to set limits
with her client:
I try to be fairly flexible in my work and I try to be helpful to
people, but boundaries are very important too. He needed to learn
that this was not appropriate, so it was a constant-- I mean I had to
put a lot of energy into keeping the boundaries. I had to work hard at
it. And you were asking what feelings it pulled? (YEAH.) It pulled
irritation, it pulled anger, you know, it was very annoying to have
someone constantly pulling for so much, kind of exhausting. You
know, but I also realized my job was to teach him about boundaries
and to set appropriate limits, so we did.
These results raise interesting questions about the interplay
of stage and style. When the results are not fully explained by stage
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factors, as seems the case here, might stylistic factors explain part
of the variability? The distinction Noam (1985) makes between
boundaried and connected styles seems especially relevant here.
Although I do not use a measure of this stylistic difference, I found
myself thinking about some of the results in these terms. (Noam,
1985, suggests that he is developing such a measure but it is not yet
available, to my knowledge.) Despite the lack of a measure for
stylistic differences, I will use Noam's terminology to describe my
subjective impressions of the therapists in my sample when
stylistic factors seemed like a plausible way to explain variability
that is not accounted for developmentally. I will discuss this issue
further in the last chapter, as it seems especially relevant for
future research.
One might speculate that therapists with more boundaried
personality styles might have less difficulty with client
manipulation than more relationally oriented therapists. This factor
could explain Kara's relative ease with limit setting, at stage 3(4),
compared to Joanne's relative difficulty, at stage 3/4 . Two other
therapists seemed to have greater ease in defining and setting
limits than did their peers at the same stage, suggesting the
possible affect of more boundaried personality styles:
Arlene, at stage 3/4 says:
I wasn't successful with this client, but I know I gave it my best
shot. I always afterwards go through and process in my head, did I
miss a . . . did I cover all the possible bases that I could have
covered? Yes. There's nothing more I can do and so then I have to
accept the fact that I have done the absolute best I can and let it go.
Similarly, Elizabeth at stage four says:
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I have the responsibility to do the best of my ability to make sure
that I am providing whatever service and giving the suggestions that
are necessary, the support that's necessary, but its ultimately your
responsibility to decide how to handle things. If you choose to be
unhealthy, the best I can do is try to be helpful.
Both Elizabeth and Arlene are able to clearly and easily
delineate responsibility between themselves and their clients, a
feat that may seem either more difficult or more complex to
therapists with a more relational style, depending on level of
development. Although a stage four therapist with a relational style
will be able to clearly delineate responsibility, as we will see later,
there will be a more complex consideration of the issues involved.
At a split developmental position (i.e, stage 3/4 or 4/3) a
relationally oriented therapist might actually have more difficulty
delineating responsibility, as Joanne's interview will later
illustrate.
In line with my expectations, therapists at stage four did
generally articulate a self-authored theory about client
manipulation. Julie's statement here provides a good illustration of
such a theory:
I work with a lot of women who are diagnosed borderline or who
would be diagnosed borderline in other mental health settings and I
think the bias in the field is to see women who are trying to get
their needs met either directly or indirectly as manipulative. I
prefer to see that as trying to get their needs met and trying to
become empowered. When a client tries to get me to do something,
get something from me, get me to be a certain way, I look at what
that says about how empowered or disempowered they feel and I feel
like it's my job to help them be as powerful as they can, so what
others might call manipulation, I would see very differently.
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An important ability demonstrated at stage four was the
capacity to recognize one's own personal issues and understand their
impact on the therapeutic relationship. This is not to suggest that
therapists below stage four did not demonstrate some ability in this
regard or that therapists at stage four always used this capacity.
However, this level of self-understanding was more common at
stage four and is illustrated well by Camille. Here she describes her
struggle to delineate her own responsibility in terms of the client:
I think when I feel anger, when I can't detach and be my most
therapeutic, that's when I'm clicking into my own stuff with my own
mother and my own guilt with my mother and my desire to make my
mother better and her not getting better and all of those things. So,
those are the times when I really have to try to remain very self-
aware.
I would say the process is: the first part is self-doubt and
wondering am I being therapeutic. The second part may have some
guilt put in there because of, like, I'm not getting her better, like I'm
supposed to be responsible for her getting better, right? And I know
that's garbage, but it still pushes those buttons for me. And then of
course I realize, wait a minute, I'm not responsible for her mental
health, you know, all I can do is open the door and if she's not going
to walk through then that's not my fault and, you know, and so I go
through that whole circle and I'm getting, I think, faster at going
through the whole circle, but I still have to go through it.
Camille's ability to handle her client's anger, her capacity to
confront the client and to take a perspective on this therapeutic
relationship provide a good exemplar for stage four development:
I think I'm very honest with her. The problem is that whenever I'm
very honest with her, she really gets defensive and I'm not sure that
that's particularly helpful. I really experimented with my responses
to her. You know, I've been very supportive and tried to get her to
see things in new perspectives, and be real understanding and all
that, but I saw no change. So, then I decided, okay, maybe I need to
be more confrontative here. So, I get, you know, more confrontative,
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she gets more anxious, but still no change. So then I thought maybe I
need to be just flat out dead honest with her and say everything I'vebeen thinking and all that happens is there's a big histrionic display
and still nothing changes. But actually, no, that seems to give me
more distance. (OKAY.) Because then I'm able to see, okay I've iust
I have pushed whatever button gets pushed here and she is once again
being angry and demanding and attacking and to me- I don't know I
can get distance on that instead of getting involved in it, then I can
say, "Okay, this is what's happening, now what's the most
therapeutic move here?"
Camille is able to take the client's anger in stride. Rather than
being disturbing or raising self-doubt (as might typically be the
case at stage three), the client's "histrionic display" actually allows
her to get more distance.
This stage four capacity to take a perspective on one's
relationships is clearly evidenced in Dana's response below to a
challenging manipulative client. She is able to reflect on her own
negative feelings toward the client with a fairly dispassionate
interest and even humor. (A typical stage three response, in
contrast, would likely include discomfort with one's own negative
feelings.)
There's part of me that just thought they [her own negative feelings
toward the client] were interesting. Like, oh, isn't this interesting
that she can get to you like this, you know, so I guess there is an
interesting or entertainment aspect. Um, yeah if I stop to think
about that, it would probably be just a "oh, this is interesting" I
think. It wasn't like I was mad at myself for letting her get to me. I
don't tend to do that much to myself, so... And I think that's a stress
control thing for me, that I can find the amusing side of it.
It is interesting to hear from Sarah, a stage four therapist
reflecting back on her feelings and perceptions working with a
manipulative client when her development was (at least in part)
stage three. In this statement, she actually gives a good
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demonstration of the very perspective-taking capacity which she
felt she lacked earlier:
[I would feel] Helpless. She would be helpless and I would feel like
she's trying to reel me into her net and I think enough experiences
with people like her had to do with my preference not to be a full-
time therapist. ... I didn't have the capacity to, the personal
capacity to really not get pulled into her stuff, to be able to stand
outside it, keep interpreting back to her what I thought she was
doing without getting angry about it.
We also hear from Julie, who at stage 4(3), has a high level of
ability to reflect on her relationships and a good understanding of
therapeutic boundaries, but who seems on occasion to need to work
hard at maintaining those boundaries. Julie seems to be a very
relationally-oriented therapist, which makes it harder to determine
whether what sounds like a stage three pull is due to development or
to personality style. (Thus an excerpt like this could also represent
development at stage four, depending on the overall context of the
interview.) However, it seems a good exemplar for stage 4(3):
The other situation was a client that I still work with and am very
fond of, a woman I've worked with for eight years I believe, who was
presented to me as a chronic when she came. . . . She'd been in and
out of the state hospital. I think she had had 25 hospitalizations by
the time I started working with her in her late 20's. She had had
numerous suicide attempts, overdoses, she is a self-mutilator,
burning her skin, cutting her skin, and the cutting was quite acute
when I started working with her. But we work well and she's come a
long way. At some point over the years she started telling me that
she loved me, which is very sweet and very important to her.
And I said, you know, when I say to somebody I love them, it carries
a certain emotional charge for me that I associate with my family,
my best friend, my children, and it feels confusing to me to say that
to you. It feels to me like it muddies the boundaries in our
relationship. And we use that language and she knows what
boundaries are about. So I said so I'm not going to tell you that I
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love you because I feel like it's not good for our relationship-- for
me to feel so uncomfortable for saying particular words and you
know that I care about you a lot and that you're an important person
in my life. So I set a limit on those words and there have been times
over the years where she would label her own behavior around that
issue, manipulative, which we could do with humor. You know, she
does it with humor and I receive it with humor.
. . So that's the
limit I set around not saying I love vou was an attempt for me tn
fortify my own boundaries , you know, in a way that would continue
to serve that particular client and it has.
Finally, we will hear at length from Joanne, a thoughtful and
reflective therapist who clearly demonstrates how the stage three
pull may be experienced from a transitional developmental position
like stage 3/4. Joanne is also seems to be a relationally-oriented
therapist and has less experience than others in the sample. Both
these factors may come into play in terms of understanding her
struggle with this issue in particular. The following excerpts typify
the ways in which a stage three or stage three to four transitional
therapist may have difficulty dealing with manipulative clients:
I was very angry and . . . from a long time of dealing with this
particular client and having gone over the same issues over and over
again, it makes me very frustrated and so I was aware that when she
called me that my immediate reaction was anger, like that. I was
hoping that I didn't sound like that on the phone, but she very clearly
picked that up and was infuriated with me.
It's as though since she's my client she also thinks that if she wakes
up in the middle of the night and has a bad dream that it's okay to
call me and say I had a bad dream and I'm feeling bad. She wants me
to be the sort of person that can respond to that, that can be like a
really supportive and caring person in a family. I really understand
the desire to have someone like that in your life. There's a part of
me that likes knowing that I have friends and family members that I
could call if I felt that way although I don't call them when I feel
that way, out of concern for them. So it's confusing to me that I
know that she values our relationship a lot, but she values it
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entirely in its value to her and is not able to put boundaries on it
protect the relationship and so my role-- and I recognize this is
therapist's role with a borderline- but my role is to set those
boundaries in such a way that she feels cared about but also
restricted or, I don't know what word to use, supported in a
foundation.
[I felt] frustrated and angry. Also, really sad- there has been a
great deal of sadness in our work together for me because I see
myself as a pretty reasonable person and a person who's fairly
giving and I don't like to leave people hanging and if she didn't take
advantage of it, then I would have a lot more to give her. I always
find myself having to limit what I'm willing to give.
I feel mean when I set the limits. It's difficult for me to feel that
this is what I'm supposed to be doing. This is a good therapist move
to set these boundaries and intellectually I know that, but
emotionally it feels like I'm being mean and that's, of course, how
she takes it also. That part is really difficult. ... I think the
hardest part is the bunch of feelings that it brings up in me. The
sense of wanting to be fair, wanting to be a good therapist, wanting
to be a nice person, and the idea that I might not be able to do all the
things at the same time or at least feel that I am.
The feeling of being torn between two significant
interpersonal contexts is a benchmark of stage three development.
While Joanne does experience this, at stage 3/4 she is also able to
take some perspective on it:
I feel kind of caught in the middle because there's a part of me that
wants to defend my client, maybe not her right to call me but her
need or her perceived need to call me and my husband is a lot more
willing to express his anger over my being interrupted than I am
sometimes and so I want to be everything to everyone (laughs) and
that's hard and, of course, I can't always do that. I don't think
anyone can.
Joanne also shows a good deal of insight into and openness
about her own feelings and responses and an interest in reflecting on
her relationship with the client:
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That, well there are two parts to that. One is that I like being a niceperson and I m generally a very polite and considerate person and
although I'm relatively assertive, I don't tend to do that in an anqrv
way. So one part of it is if I have to be very forceful in setting
limits and saying this is the way it must be, then 1 feel more
forceful than I want to be and that makes me feel mean The other
part of that is my client's reaction because she also will directly
say, you're mean, you're rejecting, you're not being what I want vou
to be. ^
Joanne's openness about her dilemma seems to allow her to
benefit from her capacity for self-reflection in a way that others
may not be able to, even at high stages of development. In fact, we
seem to actually watch her take another step in the process of
reflecting on the interpersonal here:
I think I get forced into it. That's my perception. Now that I hear
myself saying that, that probably means I need to take more of an
active role in doing that in advance.
. . . Never having had a client
like this before, I had never had the opportunity to really take a look
at how much am I willing to give in a therapy situation or to a
client. How much time am I willing to spend? So I have had to
define those things for myself and then I've had to define them for
the client in a way that is supportive as much as I can be, but also in
a way that is truthful so that I can say, if I do anymore than this, I
will feel angry and I will not be a good therapist. That's been very
tough and I think it's an ongoing problem with this client, probably
as long as I continue to see her we'll be doing boundary setting of
some kind or another.
Summary
The differences which emerged among therapists' responses to
manipulative clients were consistent with Kegan's theory, although
there were some surprises. A clear contrast could be seen between
those therapists with some stage three operating and the full stage
four responses. The example of one relationally oriented therapist
in the stage three to four transition was especially illustrative.
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This therapist illustrated well what it means to be defined, at least
in part, by the expectations of significant others. She had difficulty
setting limits, felt pressured by the manipulative demands of the
client and had difficulty with the client's anger. The stage four
therapists, on the other hand, were more centered, more self-
defining and did not judge the self based on other's feelings or
evaluations. These therapists also demonstrated a greater
complexity in their responses and generally higher level of self-
reflection than any of the therapists in the stage three to four
transition.
What was surprising was that some therapists at relatively
lower levels of development did not necessarily have difficulty
setting limits with manipulative clients. Several reasons for this
were suggested. First, since all of these therapists were in
developmental transition, they may have been using their stage four
side in the service of limit setting. Second, the client may not have
been a significant interpersonal reference for these therapists.
Instead, the expectations of their peers and the standards of the
profession may have defined their sense of appropriate behavior and
supported their ability to set limits. Finally, differences in
personal style might also be important factor to consider. It would
be interesting to actually measure whether those therapists with a
more boundaried as opposed to a more relational orientation had less
difficulty setting limits. The emergence of this dimension in the
discussion underlines Noam's (1985) thesis that style has an
important interaction with stage over the course of development.
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Termination
Interview question 2: Can you think about some times in your work
with clients when the issue of termination was in some way
problematic? Is there a particular client or situation which comes
to mind? Can you describe the situation and your reactions?
In designing this question on the termination of psychotherapy,
I had speculated that one developmental indicator would be the way
in which therapists dealt with the issue of responsibility. (Would
the therapist assume appropriate responsibility for her own
feelings? Or would the therapist also assume responsibility for the
client's feelings?) It was interesting to find that half of the
therapists in the sample directly addressed the issue of
responsibility in response to this question, including five of the six
therapists scored at stage four and one who scored at stage 3/4.
Although this issue was addressed by only one therapist in the three
to four developmental transition, the differences were as predicted:
this therapist assumed responsibility, at least in part, for the
client's feelings. The stage four therapists, in contrast, were
uniformly able to delineate personal responsibility. However,
differences in the manner in which they did so were quite
interesting.
I'd like to begin this section by focusing in depth on the
responses of Laura, a thoughtful and articulate stage four therapist
with a relational orientation. Laura's complex consideration of her
own sense of responsibility in relation to clients provides a sharp
contrast to the cut and dried statement we heard earlier from
Elizabeth. At first glance, Elizabeth may seem more able to
delineate personal responsibility. Laura talks about feelings of guilt
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and almost seems to experience a stage three-like pull toward
responsibility that is not hers. However, a close analysis of Laura's
words will illustrate a structurally identical ability to delineate
personal responsibility. Although these two therapists provide the
sharpest contrast, it will be interesting to see how each of the
stage four therapists addresses this issue of responsibility.
I will begin with Laura's own words, and follow her reasoning
through on this issue:
I think what it taps into for me is, you know, that I have issues
myself about being abandoned and not being accepted by people and
all of that. So I immediately worry that that's what people are
feeling. And so I feel guilty about terminating, especially when it is
like I did last summer, when the person is not making the choice to
terminate.
. .
Because in some sense, it was abandonment, you know.
So we had to talk about that and give them permission to name that.
So, that is the first problem that happens for me. My own issues
start to be projected onto my clients, and its hard for me to see
when it really is an issue for them and when it's my issue.
Laura demonstrates an ability to empathize with her clients
that is not simply bound by her identification with them. She is able
to understand how her own personal issues make identification and
projection likely, but she sees this as a issue which needs to be
disentangled, in order to accurately understand her clients'
experiences.
It was most problematic with clients who . . . couldn't talk about it
and . . . who would minimize our connection. And since I didn't like
to be inflated myself, about what the connection meant, I could buy
into that. So, I think if I erred in any direction, it was in not
insisting on people acknowledging the importance of what we had
done together, because that felt like a sort of egocentric thinking,
even though I knew that they needed help doing that.
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Laura shows an ability to understand her own responses in a
complex way, and to view her interpersonal process with clients
systemically. Her discussion of her own feelings of guilt did raise
the question of whether some stage three might be operating, and so
the interviewer probes for Laura's understanding of her own feelings
in this regard:
Interviewer: How did you think about those feelings of guilt?
Well I saw it in several different ways. One way was the way I
verbalized, which was that I was projecting my own fear of
abandonment on other people and all that . . . But, the other way was
that, even though I know that its part of being in the profession and
all that, there is something to feel guilty about. When you engage in
a relationship that has that much depth and that much connection,
and then suddenly, or not suddenly, but you know, within months,
'
aren't available for it any more. Because it is a relationship laden
with so much emotional content, that reminds one of familial
relationships and you know, all that transferred stuff, that it is
laden with all that. And therefore, if you pull out, you know it's not
clear how that person is going to take it away and make meaning of
it or whether it is going to be constructive or destructive.
Interviewer: And, so what would it mean if it were not constructive,
say, it were a very negative experience for the client?
It would just mean that it would reinforce their notions of
unacceptability and not being worthy of the connection . . . and
counteractive of the work that we were trying to do.
Interviewer: And then, how would you see your own responsibility in
that?
Well, my own responsibility in that, I think, was to do everything
that I knew how to do, to name that possibility for the client, so
that it could be explicit and talk about it, and also -- if I thought
that's what I thought was going on -- and also, really give the client
permission to explore . . . and space and time to explore all the
different ways in which it really was affecting them. So that they
could be dealt with it explicitly, at least anything that is explicit
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and available for revision is less damaging than something that qoes
unspoken, I think. (YES) So, that was the effort. I don't think I
succeeded in all cases though at all; there were people who right ud
to the last minute pretended that nothing different was happening
and I, you know, was unable to shift that, except to keep saying
things, then they would just keep going right on . . . and those were
the people for whom I felt the process was probably the most
destructive, because, there wasn't a realization that it was over,
until after it was over and then it was too late to process it.
I felt bad and I felt that somehow I hadn't done a good enough job.
But part of doing this work is not always doing, not always feeling
like I have done the best that the person deserves.
. . I mean that
part of the work is dealing with imperfection.
in the above dialogue, the speaker's feelings of guilt about
termination are explored more fully. Laura demonstrates that she
understands these feelings in a number of different ways. She
understands the element of projection that is related to her own
issues. Her ability to identify this projection is evidence that she is
able to take a perspective on it. She also suggests that there i_s
something to feel "guilty" about in termination, because of the depth
of the connection that may be part of the therapeutic relationship
and the negative meaning a client may make of its termination.
However, when these feelings are probed by the interviewer, it
seems there is a distinction between what the speaker is calling
feeling "guilty" and feeling responsible. She does not in fact take
responsibility for the client's feelings, even for the negative
meaning they may make of termination. She appropriately sees her
own responsibility in terms of doing everything she can to help
clients recognize and process the negative feelings that may be
present. Her assertion that there is reason for her to feel "guilty"
(although perhaps it would be more accurate to say that she feels
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"badly") seems more like an independently generated theory about
this work than an inability to delineate interpersonal responsibility.
Laura's clear and appropriate sense of responsibility is also
indicated in her ability to enlarge the picture in which these issues
are operating. She does this when she suggests that "part of the
work is dealing with imperfection." Although she does not take
personal responsibility for the client's negative feelings, the
speaker is willing to stay aware of the magnitude of the negative
feelings that clients may experience, and does not use a theory about
termination to rationalize away the difficulty or complexity of this
issue. She seems to be saying that she understands the theory, but
that her own experience is larger than that. Rather than fitting her
own experience into a theory of how termination is supposed to be,
she is willing to address the "messier" parts of the experience that
a standard theory about termination may not be able to handle.
Another aspect of termination that I didn't talk about, that's hard for
me, is just my own feelings of loss, never mind clients. . . but there
are people that I have talked to . . . [become] attached to . . . And, so
dealing with my own feelings of loss.
. . But it also helped me
understand how much I get out of the work. And it also helped me—
if I was feeling lost also, it helped me also to understand how other
people are feeling. . . . And, then I guess I was also dealing with my
own denial around what was really going on also. I mean, that of
course, is part of it too, not just that of the client. So, there were
times when I minimized also the loss . . .
Laura demonstrates that she can acknowledge her own feelings
of loss in relation to termination. She demonstrates a capacity for
empathy which includes what Benack called a "cognitive,
differentiating" component as well as an "affective, identifying" one.
She uses this multi-faceted capacity for empathy to deepen her
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understanding of clients. Laura also demonstrates systemic
thinking, in recognizing herself as not only a giver but also a
receiver in the therapeutic relationship. This systemic thinking is
also demonstrated in her recognition that the tendency to deny and
minimize the loss of termination is not located just in the client,
but in herself as well.
Camille, a stage four therapist who also seems to have a
relational orientation, reflects upon her own responsibility in
relation to the client at termination:
So she's going to leave angry and I'm going to question myself even
further about whether there was something more I could have done.
And I tend to be overly responsible and I think that's where I really
have to do my work, is to make sure that my sense of responsibility
doesn't get in my way here.
. . .
I mean its definitely her responsibility. And, you know, she's not
really ready to look at who she really is and until she can really look
at that, she isn't going to change. She doesn't really want to change.
I think what she wants from therapy is a way to control other people
more effectively. And, so, yeah, my own sense of responsibility is
certainly something I have to wrestle with, but I really do recognize
that it's her responsibility about whether she does anything with
this or not. And I opened the doors that I could open and she hasn't
stepped through, so I guess, you know, when I really look at it I know
I've done what I could do.
Although Camille, like Laura, talks about feelings of guilt, she
too demonstrates the capacity to take a perspective on these
feelings. She is able to understand how her own tendency to be
overly responsible makes her vulnerable to these feelings. However,
she is clearly able to separate the client's responsibility from her
own.
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Sarah is another reljliorujily-oriented st.uje loui ihoriipist
who stnuj(jlos with her own feelings of guilt and the issue ol
personal responsibility in relation to a client in which termination
was problematic. She reflects back on her work with ihis client at
an earlier stage in her own development. She identifies changes in
herself in terms of firmer boundaries and a more delineated sense of
responsibility, suggesting that she was operating Irom a stage three
(or stage three to four transitional) perspective in her work with
this client. From her current stage four perspective, some aspects
of the experience are certainly rTiore clear, but the issue of
responsibility remains a complex one:
I think I would have been able to see that she was very borderline a
lot earlier. And I think that I would have presented myself as not
necessarily being able to help all people in all situations. I see
myself more as a resource now than as a "It's my responsibility to
change your character", you know. And as a beginning therapist or a
relatively beginning therapist, that was more of how I believe I
presented myself and being very empathic and very supportive and
very, you know, really being with her at a feeling level and all this
kind of stuff which-- I think my boundaries were much, much moie
permeable than they are now. I think that probably wasn't good. You
don't really learn that except through experience.
And I think if I had a clearer sense of this is what I can do as a
therapist, this is what I can't do, you know. I think I would have set
it up at the beginning in a much better way. So, my expectations
would have been different. I would have led her to believe
expectations were different. You know, not like I will always be
here for you until your dying day, which was not my verbal
commitment, but it was probably my non-verbal commitment and I
think that's where I feel the sense of guilt of, you know, sort of
disappearing on that non-verbal commitment of, you know, I'll be
here for you in the long run; I'm not going anywhere.
[In response to the interviewer's probing this issue of responsibility
she says:] There are probably two levels. There's probably a
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personal level and a professional, ethical level. At the professional
ethical level, it's, you know, sort of realizing what are your
responsibilities to a client in terms of client abandonment versus
non-abandonment. So what are your responsibilities for the person's
well-being and did I carry them out, you know, actively enough
On the person level, that's where, you know, I feel that every person
who IS a client of yours, there's some way that you have a very
personal relationship with them and . . . I feel like I personally let
the person down And it's deep enough that I felt if I believed in
a day of last judgment, this is one of the cards that would be out
there. I have very, very few things like that.
Sarah makes a distinction between her professional sense of
responsibility and another, more "personal" responsibility she feels
toward clients. This distinction seems to suggest that while her
behavior certainly met professional standards, that she has another,
higher standard for herself. Her "guilt" in this case is only possible
because she is able to see a transgression in the intangible non-
verbal commitment she understands herself as having made. Her
sense of responsibility appears to stem from falling short of her
own high standards and a well developed sense of what clients might
deserve. The capacity even to make these kinds of fine distinctions
is indicative of stage four development.
The way in which Elizabeth addresses this same issue provides
a sharp contrast to the thinking of the three relationally-oriented
stage four therapists we have heard from so far. The effect of a
more boundaried personal style or other personality factors is quite
striking here when we consider that the level of development is
identical. At stage four, Elizabeth is well able to delineate personal
responsibility, but the issue seems perhaps too clear cut:
That's where I divide it up. I have the responsibility to do the best
of my ability to make sure that I am providing whatever service and
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giving the suggestions that are necessary, but it's ultimately your
responsibility to decide how to handle things. If you choo e 'to be
unhealthy, the best I can do is try to be helpful. ...
Part of the goal is to say, well, if you're not going to use the coping
skills, at least I have you medically covered. And there's a safety
net and I will not feel bad about it.
Among the stage four therapists, we will hear finally from
Dana, whose personal style seems more balanced between the
separate and connected. Here she is talking about her feelings about
a problematic termination of a client who had lost a child:
[I felt] I think probably helplessness. That I hadn't been able to
make it- help her make it better. . . It's that feeling that I had
failed somehow. That I hadn't been able to do it right. If I'd done it
different, maybe I could have helped better. There were numerous
times when I did go get consultation on this case because I knew it
was hard for me to be objective.
When Dana talks about her feelings of having failed in this
case, one might wonder if she is assuming too much responsibility
for her client's behavior. However, upon further questioning it
seems clear that she does not actually hold herself responsible for
the clients choices. She compares her feelings to the "non-
productive ruminating" of the bereaved, and suggests that this is a
necessary part of the grieving process. Her ability to clearly
delineate responsibility is evident in her responses to further
probing by the interviewer:
. . . But how I dealt with the feelings in this particular case, I think
at some point I just had to say to myself, "You did what you could
and this woman had the right to choose whether she a) wants to be
in therapy and b) whether she wants to be alive." You know, and
although I feel an ethical obligation when somebody's struggling
with that issue to side with the part of them that wants to live, uh,
you know, who am I to say that you shouldn't die, you shouldn't do
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that. It's really pretty humbling when you have someone who has
voursPl/"'fr.'i'
^''.^
'''^f^ ^^y- "Oh. no, don't killy self. I mean, who am I to say that? That's their choice
So, I think I just had to say to myself, I did what I could and she hasto make a choice about what she wants to do about taking care of
herself and if she doesn't want to take care of herself that's a
viable option for her. But it was very hard for me to watch.
In typical stage four fashion, Dana also presents a self-
authored theory about termination:
Well, my brain is going two directions because I have pretty strong
feelings about the whole issue of termination and the use of that
word, and what I often tell clients is I don't terminate with clients.
I tend to view what I do more like having a family doctor and there
may be long periods of time when you don't see your family doctor,
but that doesn't mean that our relationship has been terminated and I
think that's a real male sort of way of-- beginning, finish, end- and
that the one indication that you've done successful work is that
you've been able to finish. And I think if you look at more of the
relational theories that we have developed in more recent years that
that is a kind of arbitrary cut-off that makes me uncomfortable in
general and I don't think is very helpful to clients, so I use that
analogy with my clients to say, you know, you go to your family
doctor when you're having a problem or you're troubled about
something and once it gets resolved you don't continue to go, but you
know if you have a problem some other time you would call him
again. So, I don't think about what I do in terms of termination. It
was a long period of time before I was introduced to feminist
psychology, that I felt there was something wrong with me as a
therapist because I always felt uncomfortable terminating and now
I've decided it's not me, it's the issue itself that was taught wrong.
We will also hear from some of the therapists in the stage
three to four transition, who seemed to focus on the loss involved in
termination, although each person focused on a somewhat different
kind of loss.
For Mary, at stage 4/3, termination was both the loss of a
"heroine" and "role-model" and the "loss of a fascinating process". It
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is interesting that the loss described here is reflective of a self
which is both defined in relation to another (the heroine or role-
model) and at the same time represents apparently self-chosen
values. This aspect of Mary's loss seems to reflect her split
developmental position:
I have been involved off and on with this woman for several years
and why this termination is difficult? Because it strikes a personal
chord. This woman I saw as someone discovering herself at an old
age.
. . .
Really a fighter, a feisty person who against tremendous
odds, had come into her own ... a very determined person just a-
to me a heroine of sorts who
. . . had developed herself, had become
more and more authentic, had to do what she had to do and- did it
So it was very hard ... to say good-bye.
Her loss of the "fascinating process" of psychotherapy, on the
other hand, seems reflective of her stage four side:
The process itself with this woman was very exciting and
fascinating to me. It wasn't all uphill as perhaps it seems to be
from this description. It was very fascinating. Also having to say
good-bye, losing an incredibly fascinating process, which for me is
always part of the loss in terminating with someone. I find my work
as a therapist incredibly fascinating, just the process and how it
works or doesn't work or in what ways it works and so then to have
to say good-bye to someone can be difficult. It can also be and is
almost always exciting.
Arlene, at stage 3/4, also talks about the loss involved in
termination:
I get fond of my clients and I, after a little bit working here,
particularly in the college counseling center where the clients are
so neat, I realized at the end of the spring semester I would go into
this little mini grief reaction and I thought what's going on. You
know how you analyze yourself? And I realized I have issues with
saying good-bye to these wonderful people that I've had a chance to
share, you know, they've shared and I've been able to watch their
development and so I'm real attuned to this termination stuff and I
think it's always problematic because each of us deals with
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termination in different ways. ... A part of the therapeutic process
IS learning to say good-bye in a healthy way.
Her response might be contrasted to the self-authored theory
of termination presented earlier in being a bit more generalized and
sounding perhaps a bit text-bookish. It is not a fleshed out theory of
what termination means to her.
In Kara's response, at stage 3(4), we find even less of a theory
of termination. As Kara talks about her sadness at terminating with
some clients, we hear a pretty general kind of description and a
concern with doing what needs to be done:
There are clients that I really like and I don't want them to leave,
but that's not good for them and so they do need to leave. I don't
'
want to breed dependency. There are times when I've felt real sad
and didn't want it to end, but knew that was the best thing to do, so
we did.
The ability to articulate a self-authored theory is a benchmark
of stage four development. For Delia, at stage 3/4, termination was
the loss of an opportunity for learning, suggesting that she used
primarily her stage four side to process this experience:
I felt bad because I wondered what I hadn't picked up, okay. And, you
know, a part of me wished I had the opportunity to talk with her to
find that out because probably she would have learned something and
I would have learned something if we would have talked about that.
She would have learned something about how it's okay to take a risk
with somebody, you know, and I don't know. ... I made these
hypotheses, but I don't know. So, it's sad because it's a missed
opportunity to kind of learn something and wondering.
For Joanne, also at stage 3/4, the focus is two-fold. In line
with her split developmental position, she had concerns about "am I
being nice, am I being appropriate, am I setting a limit that is a
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mean limit, am I hurting someone"? On the other hand, she also
expressed these more stage four concerns:
1
wanted to make sure that I was being a good therapist and so mvquestion for myself was- am I being a better therapist by aqreeinq
to see her and doing an update or am I being a better therapist bv
recognizing that I don't work well with this woman and then
referring her elsewhere?
Although Joanne is ultimately able to resolve this issue in
favor of her stage four side, the other part of her response suggests
some ways in which termination may be difficult from a stage three
perspective. It may raise just these kinds of feelings of guilt for
not meeting the client's expectations or wishes. For some
therapists at stage three, these feelings may make it difficult to
terminate the therapy.
Summary
Therapists' responses to this question fell into an interesting
pattern. With one exception, therapists at stage four struggled with
the issue of their own responsibility toward the client in relation to
termination and considered the issue in a more complex way than did
the therapists at the stage three to four transition. Therapists in
the stage three to four transition focused on the loss they
experienced in relation to termination, although this loss was
construed in a number of different ways, as loss of a relationship, of
an opportunity for learning or of the opportunity to witness the
fascinating process of personal change. The stage four therapists
were much more likely to present their ideas in the form of a theory
about termination. Therapists in the stage three to four transition
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had less developed theories than personal reflections about this
issue.
It is interesting that the stage four therapists (with one
exception) described their struggles with the issue of personal
responsibility in relation to their clients. The stage three to four
transitional therapists (also with one exception) did not. This
difference seems to reflect the greater ability, at stage four, to
grapple with more complex issues. In all cases the stage four
therapists were in fact able to appropriately delineate personal
responsibility.
One might wonder how the exceptions can be understood. The
one therapist in the stage four group (Elizabeth) who seemed to
experience her responsibility in relation to clients as more clear cut
seems to be an outlier, in many respects, from this group. Although
her structural abilities are the same, she seems to have less
inclination for the kind of personal reflection which the other
therapists in this group engage in so readily. On the other hand, the
one therapist in the stage three to four transition (Joanne) who did
struggle with the issue of personal responsibility seems especially
interested in and willing to engage in open and honest self-
reflection.
In terms of the responsibility issue, the differences which did
emerge between the stage four group and the stage 3/4 therapist
were as expected. The stage 3/4 therapist did have more difficulty
delineating responsibility and did experience feelings of guilt in
relation to the expectations of the client. Although this therapist
was able to draw upon the stage four side of her meaning making in
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her resolution of the situation, her response illustrates the kinds of
feelings which stage three therapists may experience in relation to
termination, making an already difficult process potentially even
more so.
Dual Relationships
Interview question 3: Can you think about some times in your work
with clients when the issue of dual relationships became
problematic? Can you describe the situation and your reactions?
It is interesting that for this question, there were
commonalties among therapists at different developmental levels
and striking differences between therapists at the same
development level. Based on past experience, four therapists at
varying developmental levels [stage 4, stage 4, stage 4(3), stage
3(4)] said that if they were in doubt now, they would not become
involved in a situation involving a potential dual relationship. The
primary situation described by these therapists was one in which
there was a prior acquaintance or work-related connection between
the therapists and the client, albeit not a friendship. On the other
hand, four other therapists, also at various developmental levels
(two at stage 4, two at stage 3/4) described being able to work
therapeutically in a situation where there is some prior
acquaintance or connection. Five of the twelve therapists
specifically made mention of professional ethical guidelines as a
source to which they refer in their decision-making.
That development was not a factor in the variety of opinions
held is not surprising when one considers that it is the underlying
reasoning rather than the content of a person's theory which is a
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developmental indicator. The complexity of reasoning and the way in
which one holds a theory are of primary importance in developmental
assessment. In this regard, clear differences can be heard among
this sample of therapists. The theories which therapists present
range from more general responses to more complex and self-
authored theories. A continuum of responses will be presented here,
beginning with Kara at stage 3(4). In response to the interviewer's
question as to why she would not get involved in a similar situation
(seeing the daughter of an acquaintance in therapy) again she says:
I felt uncomfortable because it was just too close. You know, I do
see this man and I do have to say hello to him on occasion. It feels
awkward. It's like I know things about him that I'm uncomfortable
knowing. I wouldn't know those things. He's not a close friend and I
wouldn't know what goes on in their home if she hadn't told me some
things, so I don't think I'd do it again.
Kara's response here sounds quite different from the more
stage four responses in that she seems to be speaking from within
the experience rather than speaking about it. She doesn't take a
perspective on her feelings or the situation which would enlarge the
picture she's already presented of feeling uncomfortable, despite the
interviewer's invitation to do so.
Similarly, Arlene's response at stage 3/4 is pretty
generalized:
Oh yeah, that's one we always have to be on our toes about. Dual
relationships with clients and students, grad students; dual
relationships with clients and interns; I mean you just have to be
really very, very vigilant on that one.
What distinguishes Arlene's response from Kara's
developmentally is that Arlene goes on to describe criteria that she
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and her colleagues employ to deal with the potential dual
relationships they experience within a small community.
The use of some explicit criteria for defining these issues can
be heard in Mary's response at stage 4/3:
. . .
somehow the line has been crossed a little bit more in terms of Iknow her more socially and I don't think its good for clients I think
one of the great purposes of therapy is to have someone outside like
an outside consultant, outside your system, to talk with and work
with and for any number of reasons. I can't be a therapist for my
friends, but I can go out to lunch, talk about what's happening you
know, to change it.
At stage four, the criteria are better defined. An example of
this comes from Sarah, an unconventional person with an interest in
alternative therapies. Although the content of her response may be
non-traditional (she could envision having lunch or dinner with a
former client) her reasoning about the issue is clearly stage four.
Her criteria for determining what is appropriate come through in the
following:
I guess because I feel like- forever, when you have been somebody's
therapist, that the majority of people still project on you, you know.
I guess I think the boundaries are the issue in a dual relationship.
. . .
I think for me the dividing line is what's your expectation from the
relationship and- what's theirs and what's yours-- and do you
expect it to be on a light level or do you expect it to be~if you cross
that personal boundary, I think that's where you let yourself in for
difficulties.
[I think] that it's very, very difficult to have an equal relationship
with somebody who has been a client of yours. ... It also may not be
good because, you know, just the same way as having sex with a
client or something like that, and say the relationship breaks up or
something like that, what does that do to the therapy? Well, say
you're friends with somebody and then you kind of drift apart. What
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tZl 'thff ."^^ 'h f""'^^ °^ '^^^ ^^^^^Py relationship? So- Ihink that s kind of what I based that on.
In the excerpts above, Sarah shows that she has consistent and
well-thought out criteria for judgment and evaluates each situation
according to her internal standards. (In essence, she feels that some
"non-therapeutic" activities may be fine as long as the original
therapeutic relationship is not undermined by the subsequent
contact.) She seems clear about her own boundaries in these
situations, and does not use these contacts to meet her own
friendship or other interpersonal needs. Although her criteria for
making judgments in this area may be somewhat different than the
conventional thinking in the field, she is very clear on what she
calls the "sanctity of the therapeutic relationship". She has spelled
this out clearly in her earlier discussion (about termination), that
the client may need to keep the therapist as an intact image
indefinitely, regardless of whether there is ever a subsequent return
to therapy.
in contrast to Sarah's ability to describe how a friendship with
a former client could be problematic, Delia, at stage 3/4, questions
this prohibition:
I mean there's one client that I've had that I thought she would make
a nice friend, okay? (YEAH.) Um, but I didn't act on that. . . .
The issue came up in our class, in our ethics class, someone said,
well you should never try to encourage a friendship even if you'd run
into somebody a couple of years down the road, never have a
friendship because of the fact that if that person needed you again
as a therapist. I thought, well wait a minute, I mean I think we have
to be careful about being too sanctimonious here, you know, too all
powerful. Um, but then I'd be thinking more like a friendship, not a
relationship because I always think that a relationship, but yet I
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can t reaHy kind of quite pin down what the difference is, you know
a friendship versus like a sexual relationship.
I just, I think that^'
would always be somewhat troublesome that hierarchical
differences existed at one point in time to be able to have such anintimate relationship as a sexual one. However, I do think that downthe road a friendship probably would be okay.
LET'S EXPLORE THAT.
You know I haven't quite figured it out yet. Maybe it's because you
know, as a woman, I mean when I first got married I was pretty
dependent on my husband for income and whatever, so you know I
could kind of see power differential there in an intimate sexual
relationship, but a friendship to me, you know, friendships can sort
of come and go, you know. So, maybe it's just harder to cut loose if
the relationship became too domineering. So maybe thinking about
other people being locked into relationships that are sexual in nature
or thinking about how I felt kind of powerless in my marriage, but I
never really felt powerless in a relationship. So, maybe that's it,
I've never felt like, oh gosh, I would like to ditch this friend, but I
don't know how. . . .
In her responses to this question, it is clear that Delia
understands that there is a professional injunction against dual
relationships with clients or former clients. She can understand and
agree with the prohibition against developing a sexual relationship,
but not the concern about developing a friendship. Although she has
heard a rationale for this from a classmate (that the client might
need you in the future) and her statement about termination included
the distinct possibility of clients returning, this does not speak to
her experience. She appears to minimize the power dynamic in the
relationship between therapist and client. As she openly shares her
reasoning about his issue, it is clear that she bases it on her own
experience and how she imagines she would feel in the client's
shoes. This reasoning seems to demonstrate what Benack calls the
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"affective, identifying" component of empathy. If she were to use,
as well, what Benack calls the "cognitive, differentiating"
component of empathy, she might envision other constructions of
meaning for potential clients in which the development of even a
friendship with a former therapist might be problematic.
It would seem that the kind of empathy as identification which
therapist's may be prone to at stage three can be problematic in
terms of dealing with dual relationships. However, the stage four
therapist may be just as likely to have difficulty with this issue,
albeit for different reasons. The stage four quality of being
embedded in one's own theory may lead to a self-sealing logic which
can be quite dangerous. Although at stage four the person has a
fairly complex, self-authored theory, there is no ability to question
the basic premises which underlie the theory. This self-sealing
quality of stage four reasoning allows such a theory to be quite
impermeable to negative feedback or change. And at any stage,
people do not always use the best reasoning of which they are
capable. As a result, we can find a striking contrast between two
people at the same developmental level as they consider the very
same issue. Such is the case with Laura and Elizabeth, stage four
therapists considering the issue of dual relationships. We will hear
first from Elizabeth:
I have thought about whether I would use some of the services
afterwards, like one of the people that I'm just finishing up with
happens to be an optometrist and he owns optical shops in town and
it did occur to me that probably if I went to him I could get glasses
cheaper. And I'm not sure that I would do it. I haven't decided
whether I would or not. I certainly would not while he is a patient.
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Well, m actuality I think that what it comes down to is that if Ithought this was someone who provided a service that I could use Ireally respected their ability, I would probably use them after wewere done and I would not expect a discount. I would probably notturn one down, but that would be, it would have to be when we werequite firmly done. When there was no question about it. so obviously
It would also have to be a case which I felt was moderately
successful.
... I guess part of it is that I haven't had enough
patients who have done things that I've wanted.
.
. . [So] there hasn'tbeen a problem.
Laura's consideration of this issue demonstrates the insight
and complexity of the reasoning process which is possible at stage
four:
Yeah, there is actually a client I'm still thinking about, that I'm
wondering if I should contact as a matter of fact, because I worked
with her the whole six years I was at the clinic. I worked with her
family and she became-- and she changed so much and evolved so
much as a person during that time, not just because of her therapy,
she was a very hard worker and really an amazing person and I felt'
a
commitment to her that went beyond our relationship. ... I did feel
kind of like an alternative mother figure for her of sorts,
mother/sister in a way and felt like that provided- that' she didn't
have anybody like that in her life and that provided a kind of holding
environment for her.
. . And I liked her, I loved her enough to feel
like I could be that for her for a long time even though I had to watch
my boundaries really carefully.
. . .
I think she was so hurt with ... I haven't heard from her again. . . I
didn't really have a chance to terminate. ... I worry about that
because she was always talking to me about the people she thought
were there for her and didn't come through, and she has a lot of
anger about that. I'm sure she has me in that category now. ... So
I've been sort of at war with myself about whether to call her or
write her a card and let her know that I still think about her and I'm
still there for her if she decides ... I never even got to address with
her anger about it. So she may feel like she has to protect me from
that. So that feels really unfinished. And so this is a place where
I'm not sure it's right to hold onto the standard boundaries at all. . . .
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Well, the different sides of that are if i call her, am I teliinq her I'mva. able for something I'm not really available for. Wha amava ab e for her? Because I'm not available for what I used to beava.lab^ for... On the other hand, I still think about her and careabout her and want her to know that. So, would I be feeding intoagain more disappointment and more feelings of abandonment if I did
(Tah^ Th ^'^°^9h when she wanted me o^YEAH) at s one side of it. And the other side of it is if I don'tthen she sees me as somebody she was able to trust for six years
and then that trust was betrayed. And that may be how she's I'm
a little unsure... So there are two sides of it. And I'm really
interested in her and in knowing what happens to her So from a
selfish point of view also... I'd like to know how she's doing I also
feel self-protective in not having a lot of energy that goes beyond a
therapeutic relationship. And yet the relationship feels like it goesbeyond that. ... It feels like it goes beyond that because our
connection has been so long-standing and so multi-dimensional
her developing in ways that were really astounding and moving.
So, I just felt very moved by her and there was a connection there
I mean I, again, got caught between feeling that on some level I did
feel like I was there for her and in that way and in other ways I
wasn't and then I didn't want to give contradictory or confusing
messages about that. But I still feel the loss and feel worried about
the way it was left. ... We were both feeling things that went
beyond a clinical relationship
. . .
I guess the ways in which it went [beyond a clinical relationship]
were really internal in me, that I felt almost like she was a
daughter or a niece or somebody that I would want to be there for
the rest of her life, that I could want to be there in some way for
her. So it wasn't so much in the way I behaved, or in what I did, but
in the feelings I had.
I want her to know that I still hold her in my awareness and in my
caring. On the other hand, I don't want her to be led to think that
there is something there that I can give, that I can't give, and then
make her feel abandoned again.
One more thing I want to say about any ethical dilemma, I think, in
dual relationships and I became aware of this when I started to talk
to my classes about ethics, you know, is that it is really important
for people on the one hand in certain stages to be guided by ethical
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rules and on the other hand to understand the complexity of themand not stay dualistic about it. So it's another area that's reaNy'
complicated and an area of struggle. And needs to be. I mean I'vehad other ethical dilemmas that are simpler, but also dilemmas thathave no answer
. .
So I think ethical dilemmas are dilemmar findthe rules helpful just because if I'm caught in a dilemma and I can'tfigure ,t out on my own, then I can fall back on the simple writtenguidelines Then there are times when they don't feel aood
enough, too simple ... ^
In the excerpts above, Laura demonstrates that she
understands the need for boundaries in the therapeutic relationship
and the importance of remaining in the role of therapist for the
client even after termination. She demonstrates a complex
understanding of the issue of dual relationships, and a sense that
this complexity at times precludes finding simple answers in the
standard rules about therapeutic boundaries. She clearly
understands the importance of not giving mixed messages to the
client, yet in this particular case sees this rule or value in tension
with validating the significance of her connection with and
communicating her deep caring for the client. She recognizes that
her own feelings for this particular client go beyond the bounds of
the traditional therapeutic relationship, although her behavior did
not. Her appreciation of the significance of this is another
indication of her complex understanding of this issue. Finally, she
understands and finds ethical guidelines useful, but does not view
these as the ultimate authority, finding them at times too simple.
Summary
Therapists in this sample interpreted the professional
injunction against dual relationships with clients in a variety of
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ways. Although all twelve therapists expressed a commitment to
ethical practice, the nuances of what constitutes a dual relationship
were interpreted differently by different therapists. There was no
apparent developmental pattern in terms of the therapist's tendency
to interpret dual relationships more or less strictly. Developmental
differences were most clearly seen in the complexity of the
reasoning used to explain one's point of view.
Although there was not a developmental pattem in the content
of therapists' responses in this small sample, two individual
responses seemed illustrative of potentially important
developmental issues as they pertain to dual relationships. Although
both of these therapists appeared to have a commitment to
maintaining the ethical standards of the profession, one can
extrapolate from the reasoning used in these instances to imagine
potentially less benign results in cases involving less ethical
therapists.
In one case, we saw a stage three to four transitional
therapist who had difficulty with the idea that a former client could
not be a friend. This difficulty seemed to stem from her own use of
"empathy as identification", making the assumption that the clients
feelings in the situation would mirror her own. It would seem that
the tendency to use this less differentiated kind of empathy may be
a pitfall for the therapist operating from stage three (or from
within the stage three to four transition), when the ability to take a
perspective on oneself and one's relationships is less developed.
Although this therapist did not act on her inclination to seek
friendship with this former client, a more emotionally needy
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therapist, acting from the same developmental perspective, might
have done so.
In the other case, we saw a stage four therapist embedded in
(i.e., unable to take a perspective on or to question) her own point of
view. This may be the biggest danger in dealing with dual
relationships from a stage four perspective. The ability for complex
reasoning is present, but in the absence of an ability to question
one's thinking, a self-sealing kind of rationalization for unethical
behavior could occur. This example also underscores the important
caveat that one does not always use the most complex reasoning of
which one is capable. Although this therapist most definitely did
not regress, developmentally, to stage two reasoning, she did focus
in large part on her own interests. Although her reasoning was
structurally stage four, we saw by contrast that it was less
complex and less self-reflective than the reasoning demonstrated by
others at the same stage of development. Again, this therapist did
not act on her inclinations (which were, in any case, relatively
benign). However, we might imagine how a therapist inclined, for
instance, toward sexually exploiting a client might use a similar
kind of self-sealing logic.
Challenges of Psychotherapeutic Work
Interview question 4: I'd like to ask you, what is the most difficult
or challenging issue you face in your work as a therapist? I'd like to
ask you to speak to a current challenge in your clinical work, rather
than to one of the problems you've already solved about doing this
work. What are the struggles or the questions you have at this
point?
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This question was designed to evaluate the impact of
developmental level on the therapist's experience of the challenges
of being a therapist. To the extent that therapists focused on the
nature of the work itself, their experience of challenge seems very
much related to developmental level.
A number of challenges less directly related to work with
clients were mentioned by one or more therapists in the sample.
These included dealing with the managed care system, balancing
personal and professional lives, questions about the monetar> value
of therapy, dealing with boredom, keeping current in the field and
self-questioning about the therapist's own competence. Of these,
dealing with managed care was mentioned most often: each of the
other issues was mentioned by just one or two therapists. Although
these are important issues which would be interesting to consider,
they will not be discussed here, since they were not the focus of
this question and were addressed by few research participants.
This discussion will focus on challenges raised by at least
three therapists, from which general themes about development may
be considered. With this criterion, the themes which emerged in
response to this question centered on five different areas: 1)
treatment related questions, both technique-oriented questions and
"larger" questions about the practice of psychotherapy; 2) questions
about limit setting or confrontation; 3) dealing with questions of
values: 4) working with abusers; and 5) dealing with the impact of
the therapist's own issues.
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Treatmen t Related Questions
Most responses to the challenge question focused on
treatment-related concerns, as the question was designed to elicit.
The most striking difference which emerged was the breakdown in
the types of treatment-related concerns which were significant to
therapists at different stages of development. Therapists at the
highest level of development in the sample, i.e., the stage four
therapists, raised what I will call "larger" questions about
psychotherapy. Therapists at lower levels of development focused
more on technique related questions. Although this distinction did
emerge from the interview data, I do not wish to diminish the
importance of questions related to therapeutic technique. These
were also important questions, often with broad ramifications for
the practice of psychotherapy. However, the idea that therapists at
higher levels of development- and not just therapists with more
experience- focus less on therapeutic technique is an interesting
one that also finds support in the final question in this research
interview, on change in the therapist. Four of the six higher level
therapists in the sample reported a lessened focus on technique as
an important change in their own development as psychotherapists.
Therapists in the stage three to four transition were able to be
reflective about their work, albeit often in a more globalized way,
as they described treatment-related challenges. Mary talked about
wanting to help clients "broaden the picture" in terms of their focus
for psychotherapy, as well as learning to give clients what they
want:
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One IS to help, you know, it depends on the person, but lookina at aparticular person, listening to a particular person, or t occurs to^T1ejust now, how to give them what they want, but not necessarilv
what I think they should have. So even this broader pict re thi
'
some people don't want a broader picture
.
. . Sometimes
I th k^of itlately ,n terms of asking the right questions, not that then therapJ
HnlT .TP^"''^'"'^' ' d° have responsibility andhow to ask the right question that gives the key to open a certain
oom. How to be provocative enough. How to not just have clients
like me so they keep coming back and they keep paying me or theirinsurance company does ... but how to be a good therapist.
In this passage, we hear an emerging awareness of the
important distinction between the goals of the client and the
therapist. There is a stage four ability to delineate responsibility,
consistent with Mary's stage 4/3 developmental position. The
globalness or generality of response which is characteristic of
stage three is tempered here by the stage four ability to make some
finer distinctions.
This ability to make a good number of distinctions will also be
heard in Joanne's discussion of therapeutic challenges. At stage
3/4, Joanne discusses a number of issues in a thoughtful and
reflective manner. First, she raises the challenge of finding the
right approach for each client:
Let's see, one thing that comes up for me is the combination of
techniques and beliefs about therapy that I've been taught and not
really knowing how to apply those well to client problems. There
are some problems that are obvious. You immediately know this
would work well with cognitive treatment or this would work well
with an existential approach, but there are a lot of people that it
doesn't really strike me. It's not easy to decide and then I often feel
as though I do some floundering, particularly at the beginning of the
therapy relationship. In the first few sessions I'm trying to find my
footing and where can I get into the system and best help the person.
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The recognition that clients are not best served by one
standard approach presumes a reasonably good ability to
differentiate the needs of different kinds of clients. Joanne also
discusses the challenge of seeing the structure of treatment:
1
do wish that it were easier for me to think in a therapy session ofwhat structure I want to give. I find it very difficult or'at le st i?'svery difficult with some clients to know what's going to come next
and to treat therapy like some people treat a chess game where you
can see the moves unfolding. I don't tend to do that I tend to be
much more of a kind of floating on the same river sort of a person
and seeing where that gets us. And I think it works well for me but
at the same time I wonder if I wouldn't be a better therapist if I
could quote names and say "Well, I'm using so and so's structure for
therapy with this client" and I just don't do that very well.
Joanne demonstrates a high level of self-awareness in terms
of her own skills as a therapist. She seems to speak to her growing
edge here in that the ability to take a greater perspective on her
clinical work, to see it as a "chess game", is the very capacity which
is emerging for her at stage 3/4. Dealing with the question of self-
disclosure also illustrates Joanne's ability to make fine
distinctions, as she reflects on the many permutations of this issue:
I think I'm continually in a place where I'm trying to rework how I
am with clients, you know, what I do, what's important, how much do
I want to disclose and how much not to disclose. That issue of
disclosure has been one that I've made lots of changes on. I think I
felt a lot freer about disclosure earlier in my career and I really
pulled back from that quite a bit.
I have discovered for myself that I prefer being very private about
my personal life with clients and I believe- it used to be that I felt
disclosure was very helpful in the sense of modeling for clients and
I think perhaps it was early on. But as I've continued, I've realized
that I don't really have to do that modeling, that there are other
models, you know, other people, people in the news perhaps, friends
of the client, and we can almost always find some examples for
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them and it doesn't have to be my own examples. I've discovered
I think that part of it has to do with how the client sees themself
if there's a chance or if there's a sense that they are putting me upon a pedestal and therefore they are putting themselves a lot more
closer to the ground, then what I want to do is help them find
examples in their own life and their own experience which will
provide relief for them rather than using my experience because Ihave seen clients who say "Well, it happened that way for her but
she s so.. .whatever, you know, and I'm not like that so it can't happen
that way for me." Another thing that clues me in is how clients deal
with personal information. Do they want a lot of personal
information about me and if they do, I get more cautious because it's
always something to explore. If they're asking for more information
then It gives us an opportunity to take a look at how that miqht be
helpful to them.
Then there's the other type, another type of client who wants a lot
of personal information and that gives me the impression that they
want to own me in a way. They want more from me and that's where
all those boundary questions come in that we talked about before.
And disclosure has a lot to do with those boundaries I've discovered.
I didn't really realize that until I started working with people who
had trouble keeping boundaries, how much disclosure had to do with
that and there's a certain amount of disclosure that people want to
grab onto as a way of kind of making their own boundaries. I've
discovered that some clients who have trouble with these kinds of
boundaries will kind of model themselves after me and if I mention
something that I'm interested in, all of a sudden they're really
interested in that too. With clients like that it makes a lot of sense
for me not to be very disclosing so that they can develop their own
networks. That's a really hard kind of tightrope because at the same
time that I want to be real, I want to be a real person and someone
kind of down-to-earth and honest, but also I want to be not someone
that imposes my views on other people so it's kind of hard to know
exactly how much to say or not to say.
Although at stage 3/4 Joanne has an emerging capacity to be
self-reflective and to reflect on her relationships, her openness to
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this kind of reflection is also a matter of personality style. Her
style seems optimal for fostering the continued development which
will increase this reflective capacity. At present, however, the
level of reflection is still less than it will be when she is fully
Stage four.
The stage four therapists in the sample raised a number of
treatment-related challenges which I characterize as "larger-
questions about the practice of psychotherapy. These were quite
varied. One stage four therapist, Camiile, is questioning the way in
which she practices psychotherapy, and even the utility of therapy
itself:
I think the biggest struggle right now for me is that I am in some
kind of a transition and I'm in the middle ground, I do not know
where it is going, and i know that six months ago, for instance I had
a much firmer grasp of direction. And that is not there right now, so
I'm sitting in therapy with people who are also in transition and I'm
feeling like I don't have direction to give them. So my therapy,
consequently, has gotten extremely process-oriented, but it has also
engendered in me questions about whether I am doing good therapy.
You know, are these people needing some sense of direction that I
could be supplying for them, but I really don't know what the
direction is right now. So, I think that's, by far, the biggest
challenge I'm facing right now.
I use a lot of inner child work and I felt really good about that. ... I
had a sense of where I was going in those deeper levels. I had a
sense of, okay, it's really important to get back to that childhood
stuff and re-integrate those parts of yourself that were
disintegrated early on. . . . Though I still do that, right now it is
feeling like I'm not sure where that's going, I'm not sure that I have
really maybe plumbed those depths in myself to the level that I need
to.
When I bump into places that aren't working, walls, you know blocks,
whatever you want to call them, it becomes very clear to me that
there is some work that I need to do. . . . And I was recognizing that .
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. .
this is part of childhood stuff, but then, you know I'm thinkinnbut I d,d that work, you know, I've done thaLork, how m n; t^'esdo I have to do that work? So, in kind of recycling back into thTseissues, but not really sure yet how to get to them'now ad? think alot of my clients, of course, are in the same place. I'm hoomathat where this transition is leading is to a deeper sen e of ^y'ownprocess and hopefully, therefore, how to help others with theirs 7mhoping that's where it is going. But I'm not there yet.
Another stage four therapist described dealing with her own
countertransferential feelings toward a client:
One patient ... I felt a strong sense of counter-transference with
And for me the issue was that there was something about him that
he could very deftly get in touch with his feelings, which is quite
unusual in a male. He had a really good ability to symbolize and
image and all this kind of stuff. He had a lot of pain and so it was
very easy for me to become affectively connected with him. And at
that time when I was seeing him there were some major- shall we
say, affective gaps in my personal life, you know, which is usually
when the stuff comes up, and so for-- I felt a very, very close
connection with this guy. I would always look forward to seeing him
and, you know, I was needing more from the relationship than it
really could provide in a healthy way. While I was aware of that, I
wasn't willing to not want that. I think because of that, I also
missed some of the level of his pathology- which was- because I
felt that anybody who could get in touch with their feelings like he
was able to do and process their feelings like he was able to do,
would be, you know, just was a much more healthy person than he
turned out to be.
. . . He was a therapist. ... I think just during a
certain period of time my vision was highly clouded.
I think the conflicts were like being aware that I was, to a certain
extent, attracted to him, but not physically attracted to him, more
attracted to his inner world and feeling like, I was very clearly
aware that I needed too much from him and I tried to sort of squelch
that or something, but at the same time it ail comes out in your non-
verbal language, you know. So to whatever extent that I was giving
him cues was probably not good, cues of, you know, this is the most
fascinating thing ever I've heard in my entire life or something like
that. So that's where the conflict is- or was. And also in the sense
of looking forward to a therapy session, more than one should have
probably looked forward to a therapy session.
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Three stage four therapists spoke of the difficulty of dealing
with the "excruciating pain" their clients experience:
Julie reflects on this:
It gets to a point in therapy, particularly with survivors of sexual
abuse which is mainly my clientele, where you do- I don't know if
I could sort of diagram it, where you do the outer layers of work
'
around understanding, making meaning of the abuse, looking at
coping strategies, seeing what behaviors you can change and you
want to change, um, and then there's this core of pain of
excruciating pain and there are people who can't get by that who
can't find a way to contain that and not let it contaminate
particularly their relationships. And I have a really hard time
knowing what to do with that besides sitting and witnessing and
listening. ...
Fiona questions how to work effectively with the depths of her
clients' traumatic experiences:
I suppose that would be in effective work-- not just work, but
effective work in working with dissociative identity disorder
clients and chronic long-term, severe, post-traumatic stress
disorder clients. You know, I keep going to workshops and reading
materials and belonging to a dissociative disorders study group ....
They're in severe pain and how do you effectively help them cope and
improve. You know
. . . when it's chronic, or when it's torture and
repeated, repeated, repeated trauma, you just work and work and
work and there's another memory.
. . . when do you ever get to the
end?
Laura considers the impact of vicarious traumatization for the
therapist:
When I first started doing [this] work ... the most difficult thing for
me was confronting all the pain, awful pain and violence in people's
lives and hearing all these horrendous stories that were really
traumatizing for me and feeling like I couldn't just dump them on
other people in my life either, but I had to really be careful where I
took them, what I did with them, and yet they were affecting me in
very profound ways. So kind of all that literature on vicarious
traumatization.
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Laura also describes the painful challenge of working with the
family of an adolescent in which the therapist is stymied in her
attempts to facilitate change in an abusive (but non-reportable)
situation:
So that work is, you know, work in which there's so little movementand so much pain ... and you see destruction happening all aroundyou and feel powerless to do anything about it.
For Julie, a relationaily-oriented therapist, the most
challenging clients were those who would not allow a therapeutic
alliance to form:
For me those were difficult cases because they were clients who
would not allow me to connect with them. Those were clients that
were so terrified of intimacy and so terrified to feel out of control
at all because they felt so out of control, that they never let me do
my thing. They never let me do what I do to win their trust.
Anytime they felt a glimmer of connection with me, they either shut
down or tried to sort of blow me away with anger and hostility or
blame. Oh, I understood all that as manifestations of their own
abuse histories, but they wouldn't allow me to use my
interpretations, my skills, my empathy, and ultimately they weren't
willing to, oh I shouldn't say weren't willing- weren't able to take
responsibility for their own part in whatever was going on between
us.
For Dana, questions of efficiency raised by the managed care
system have sparked her own questioning about what is of value in
therapy:
I guess one thing that I struggle with is, for lack of a better word, I
guess I would call it efficiency. Um, am I doing the best I possibly
can in the shortest amount of time . . . And, again, now I'm creeping
back into the managed care thing, but I think as more and more
people are paying attention to how long people are coming, I feel
there's more expectation and some of it now is being internalized
that if I'm a good therapist I'm going to be working very efficiently
and using every hour chunk of time, not doing anything extraneous.
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h!;/ H ^ ^'^""^ ""'^ ^'^'^ ^^^'^ ' '^^ed to learn how to do th ubetter and then there's a part of me that says this ,s an ar ,t's oa one to ten. you do this in this order kind of ihuiq. And some th sliat are very helpful about therapy you can't do qu.ckly. And to fto steer it in that direction is being disrespectful to your client ofwhat they want from you in terms of an understanding of who' they
are and a relationship and to not be pushed and I don't really know Idon t really know what I think about that.
. . I guess I'm feelinq less
clear conceptually about the nature of the work. And my personal
values
... I want to do the harder, longer, messier thing. You know'
"
whereas if I'm being efficient maybe I'm saying you must be on an
'
antidepressant, you must go to this parent support group, you need tobe exercising five days a week ... As though you can even say you
know. ^' ^
Related to this, she also questions the medical model
conceptualization of client's experience of pain and the duplicity
inherent in working with the current systems of insurance and
managed care:
Another thing that I grapple with is the whole concept of diagnosis
and the medical model. How we may be pathologizing pain or
suffering or things that could be put in a developmental growth
context, but unless you make it sick you won't get paid for it. . . . You
know, I'll put a number on the insurance sheet so that this person
doesn't have to pay out of pocket, but then how I conceptualize it .
. .
or what I say to the client.
. . But that's sort of duplicitous. I tliink.
I mean, I'm saying to you you're not sick, but I'm saying to your
insurance company you are. I don't care for that particularly.
Finally. Laura describes her own ongoing challenge of balancing
confrontation and empathy:
I'd say that if I were to choose something that stays with me
through ... my clinical work ... [it would be] that struggle with
being, you know, an empathic, supportive kind of person and
balancing that with confrontation and challenging and setting limits,
you know, but that's a life-long challenge for me, that kind of stays,
no matter what I'm doing. ... I am conditioned to be a caretaker and
that's part of why I went into this work, but I really have had to
fight to develop the other parts of the work, to develop myself in
those other ways... It's much more compl.cated.
I quess whit's mostchallenging is the internal work involved, always. amfwh^^eieVissue It's tapping into in me
. .
.
y . u wnai ver
Clearly, at stage four, these therapists have raised a variety
of vital questions about the nature of psychotherapy and their role
as therapists. I have included Julie in this group because her
meaning making, at stage 4(3) is in line with the stage four
therapists. The stage four group, then, includes seven of the twelve
therapists in the sample. Elizabeth, however, is not represented in
the above discussion on treatment related questions because she
was the one therapist in this group who did not raise any of those
kinds of "larger" questions about the practice of psychotherapy. It is
interesting that Elizabeth appears to be an "outlier" again in this
regard. In her responses to a number of the interview questions,
Elizabeth's responses seem to reflect less than she should be
capable of at stage four. This underlines the idea that factors other
than development may contribute a great deal to a therapist's
reflective capacities.
Limit Setting and Confrontation
Among the treatment related concerns, limit setting or dealing
with confrontation was the single issue mentioned most often by
therapists in the sample. It is interesting that this issue was
mentioned by therapists in both the higher and lower developmental
groups. However, the way in which the challenge was experienced
was quite different according to developmental level. The challenge
of limit setting from a stage 3/4 perspective was discussed in
detail in relation to the first question, on client manipulation.
IS6
Joanne's very open reasoning about her difficulty in this regard
provided an excellent illustration of the way in which this challenge
is likely to be experienced at that point in development. Delia, at
stage 3/4, described a similar challenge in response to this
question: "The most challenging thing I think is communicating my
concern and caring while also enforcing limits." She also discusses
the challenge of dealing with her own feelings of anger toward the
client. The similarities to Joanne's process seem sufficient that
further illustrations would seem unnecessary here.
The reasoning at stage 3/4 can be contrasted with stage four
reasoning in a number of ways. At stage 3/4, therapists seem more
embedded in the problem and less able to take a perspective on it.
At stage four, therapists seem to take more responsibility for their
own feelings, to have a higher level of self-understanding and to
view the situation with a greater degree of complexity. Excerpts
from Fiona's and Laura's interviews will illustrate these points.
We can hear how clearly Fiona takes responsibility for her
feelings in response to the client's behavior. She is also able to
understand her own behavior in the context of life-long patterns:
I mean it is a rejection, but it's my problem that I perceive it as a
rejection.
. . . You know, that's just one of my long-term issues in
terms of dealing with the world. You know, I'm inadequate. You
know, I really need to work for their approval and if people don't like
me, all is lost. And of course, that's not accurate, but that's a tape
that runs in my mind. You know, that I have to do some reality
checks, you know, for myself.
We hear a similarly high level of self-knowledge in Laura's
response:
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I'd say that if I were to choose something that stays with me
hZ^ • u ^"^^ • • • be] that'stmggle Withbemg, you know, an empathic, supportive kind of person andbalancing that with confrontation and challenging and setting limitsyou know, but that's a life-long challenge for me that k nd of s Tvsno matter what Tm doing.
... i am conditioned to be a caretaker and
inht't'^H' '
'^'^
'
^^^"y have had tog to develop the other parts of the work, to develop myself inthose other ways... It's much more complicated. I guess what's most
challenging is the internal work involved, always, and whatever
issue It s tapping into in me . . .
That the issue of confrontation and limit setting may be
experienced as a challenge from a number of different developmental
perspectives serves to underline Loevinger's statement that "any
observable behavior can be arrived at by many routes, can be
undertaken or given in to for a variety of reasons" (Loevinger, 1976,
183).
Questions of Values
Dealing with questions of values is another of the issues
raised by three therapists in the sample. Laura, at stage four, and
Kara, at stage 3(4) explicitly discuss this issue as a challenge in
their work. Elizabeth, at stage four, also raises this issue as one
which is important to her. In comparing their different "takes" on
this issue, it will be interesting to see differences across very
different developmental positions as well as between therapists at
the same stage of development.
Kara, at stage 3(4), has described her own experience of the
deepening of her Christian faith and its central importance to her
life. For Kara, the struggle of how to integrate this value into her
clinical work is a central challenge. As she struggles with this
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issue, she is nonetheless conscientious about her training in this
regard: "I mean I've always been taught as a therapist that you don't
talk about your own issues, at least not very much." As she and the
interviewer question what this means for her clinical work, she
again relies on her clinical skill and training in coming back to the
client: "I always follow their lead." The one occasion she describes
in which she brings up the issue of faith directly seems entirely
appropriate clinically and does not seem an imposition of her own
values on the client:
I can remember one time bringing it up directly. An older woman
who was considering suicide and she was getting pretty serious
about It and planning it out and I was concerned and I did all my
appropriate assessment and everything and, but I just had a feeling
this would be important to her. I said to her, what are your religious
convictions? You know, we are talking about suicide here and what
are your moral and religious convictions about that? I brought it up
with her and I asked her. She could have said I have none, but she
had some things. And I said, well I'm concerned about that for you
and I want you to think about that and if you would like to talk with
one of the campus ministers I could certainly give you some names,
cause I think that's an important point here. So I did bring it up
directly to her. I didn't push it on her and she could have rejected it
and it's her choice obviously, but I brought it up because I felt I
would have been remiss not to. So I did.
Elizabeth, in contrast, brings her own values to the forefront
with clients without making the fine distinctions of which she
should be capable at stage four:
One of the nice things I've gone through is that now I am no longer
value free. I am extremely value laden in my treatment. What I do
though, or one of my values is that I also am honest. I will tell
people you may not buy this, but this is the way I believe things and
this is how I operate. And I operate pretty solidly middle class
white American. If you don't like it, you might have to find
somebody else. One of the things I really push for is the fact that
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people need to take responsibility for themselves. I am there to
facilitate, I am there to help them, but they are responsible for their
actions. Lord knows that I make lots of suggestions to my patients
and they choose not to do it. So if they have the right to not listen
to me, they also have the right to take responsibility for their own
actions and not blame me. I will do my best to warn them of things.
So if they make choices, I will do my best to help them, to give them
the insight, to guide them so that they don't go in wrong ways, but
they also have- one responsibility they have is if they're having a
problem with something, they need to tell me, somehow or another.
Later in the interview, Elizabeth continues this theme, stating
that she will usually let clients know when she disagrees with their
values or goals. This stance obviously fails to consider a number of
relevant concerns, such as the power dynamic inherent in a
therapeutic relationship or the value of communicating to the client
an understanding of their experience. Laura's consideration of a
situation in which a client challenges strongly held values for her
provides a striking contrast in terms of the complexity with which
this issue might be addressed at stage four:
I was aware of the fact that it pushed my buttons, because, you
know, it hit spots for me that felt really important. . . . When she
was talking in ways that offended my values, I felt in a double bind,
because I had to be there for her and accept her for who she was . . .
and yet I felt like somehow I was colluding with her holding on to
those ways of thinking about things. ... So that's the dilemma for
me that got the most disturbing. On the one hand, how could I let her
know- I was struggling with how I could let her know that I didn't
agree with the way she was thinking of things, but not so much that
she wouldn't feel free to be herself and explore what was really
going on for her. . . .
I was constantly struggling with it. It just, it never felt resolved,
it always felt like I was walking a tight rope all the time between
giving her the message that I didn't agree with what she was saying,
but on the other hand I could accept her for who she was with it.
And I tried intermittently, to kind of plant the notion, that some of
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Zl^TZ ""'^^^ ' the things that she wasscared of
Interviewer: You know, I hear the dilemma and I'm just wondehnawhat ,t would have been like for you to, you know, you were w Ikmq
I think the productivity, if the work was productive at all, it was inholding both at the same time. And that that's what the work neededto be about.
. . .
That if I had gone on the side of just hearing her out
and not letting her know that I questioned some of her assumptions
or ways of looking at things, it wouldn't have challenged her and it
wouldn t have planted the seeds of ways of thinking of things
differently. Also, I wouldn't have been authentic in our relationship
. .
it would been compromising who I was and I don't believe that
that IS helpful for people either. So, I had to feel authentic in our
relationship
... and if 1 had gone the other way, of just arguing with
her and taking my position, you know, I wouldn't have had a
connection and I wouldn't have been able to work with her. So I think
it was really necessary to hold on to both of those things.
Clearly each of these three therapists has strongly held values.
Kara may hesitate to impose her values because she does not
basically question her training. Elizabeth, at stage four, is more
able to question her training. However, she illustrates a primary
limitation of the stage four way of constructing meaning: She is
embedded in her values and her reflecting about them take on a self-
sealing quality in which she cannot consider how her viewpoint
might be problematic for clients. The contrast with Laura's
multifaceted reflection on the issue is striking. Although Laura's
values are also so important to her that compromising them would
have made her feel inauthentic, she does not hold her values so
rigidly that she needs to assert them at all costs. She is able to
have her values about an issue which is important to her, and at the
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same time include them in a larger context of how to provide a
useful therapeutic environment for the client.
Working with Abusers
Working with abusers in the context of psychotherapy,
particularly men who sexually abused children, was a challenge
discussed by three therapists in the sample. Two of these were
stage four therapists. We can hear the contrast between them and
the stage 4/3 therapist, Mary. Although the emotional response Mary
describes may be similar to that of Sarah, at stage four, her
response is more global and less complex. Mary describes her
feelings as follows:
Can I sit in a room with someone who is bad? This is just what
occurs to me. Early on, several years ago I sat with a family, family
therapy.
. . .
there was a [question] ... as to whether or not the father
was physically, possibly sexually abusing his daughters who were
very young
. . .
innocent, naive. ... I once saw the father ... in the
waiting room- to me abusing his children in the waiting room-- and
I stopped taking the case. I wouldn't and I know that since then I
will not see an abusing man, I can't do it. I won't- or even a
potentially- I won't, I can't, it's too much.
Too much to me means- this is really evil, to abuse your child. This
is too much of an evil force for me to sit in the same room with. Not
that I'm at all saying that as a mother I'm a perfect, never abusive
person, I can certainly blow up and have screamed at my kids and
whatever, but I'm not abusive like these people are by a huge long-
shot. It is too much of a- I'm too prejudiced against it, something
like that. ... in terms of sitting with abusive people, I guess
specifically I'm speaking of abusive males, I can't do it.
Sarah, on the other hand, is better able to define why she feels
as she does, to identify the source of her feelings:
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I was going to give you a values issue.
.
. . somebody who is an abusPperpetrator and I just said I have to refer you to somebody
I ar^tsee you because at that time I was dealing with so many womenwho had been abused in one way or another. I did not feelT hTd"t inme to be empathic to this guy and there was no way I wa going togive him a fair hearing. I wasn't even willing to deal w th the stuff
'iusHpfr' -rH'.' ^'"'k
'^'^ ^'"^^
^° him a fair Tearing
,
H^.f ' . f ' u^""^^ perpetrator, I don't want to deal with him
I don t want to see him. I don't want to look at him. I don't want to"mess with him, so he is much better served by somebody else whoyou know, doesn't have all those buttons flashing. ...
Interviewer: Let me ask you to say more about-- what would youhave had to have dealt with in yourself?
Anger, you know, sort of the collective anger of all my clients you
know, that to a certain extent you stay detached from but for every-
- you know, you kind of make a bridge to your client's experience
and to whatever percentage of that touches your own experience,'
that part would have risen up in me and gone- No way. It was sort
of- that would not- my judgment of him would not have allowed
me to be empathic to him. It would have been like talking to the
fathers, grandfathers, and uncles of these clients and it was like I
wasn't- my allegiance to them was that strong so there was no
way.
. . .
In contrast to Mary, at stage four Sarah is able to identify her
own internal feelings of anger, as well as her loyalties to her
clients as sources of her feelings about working with abuse
perpetrators. Also speaking from a stage four perspective, Laura is
not only able to be highly reflective about her own feelings, but is
also able to see the complexity in the apparent dichotomy between
abuser and abused. Her response seems to recast the problem as one
which implicates her own internal processes:
As time went on, I guess another issue came up around abuse which
was the complexity of the abuser/victim dichotomy, that it's not
necessarily a dichotomy, and that a lot of people have been
victimized who victimize others, and that you can't divide the world
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into victimized people and victimizers. That ifs much more
complicated than that. And I began to be more open to working withsome of the men who were abusive, or I had to in some ways wi^the family work that I did, when I started working with some
offenders, like the one I mentioned earlier. There were a number offathers I ended up working with who had abused their kids To thatbecame another real challenge for me.
On the one hand, you know, 1 knew enough about working with peoplewho had been out of control in those ways to know that they need
somebody who can really set limits and be very firm and
confrontative and then on the other hand, empathic and understand
where their own stuff comes from. So holding those two ways of
being with people is very challenging for me. To be able to be that
tough person who is able to hold that person responsible for what
she or he did
. . .
figuring out how to make a connection with
somebody that I also had to be tough with. It was and is a challenge
for me. ... it's internally challenging because, you know, I'm a
connector. I find that part easy, but to also be confrontative and
really strict about holding people responsible.
I really have to deal with that, my personal response to even sitting
in a room with one of these people. [AND HOW DO YOU DEAL WITH
THAT?] Well, I'm always looking for, I mean, I guess the way I deal
with any client, one of the things I do is try to find the part of that
person that's inspiring or has the potential to be inspiring to me.
And that's just across the board, whoever I'm working with, even if
it's one of these obnoxious men. That there's something in each
person that's vulnerable and has the potential to be something, has
the potential to be somebody wonderful and that is very wounded. So
I'm always looking for something in that person that can move me at
the same time as I'm trying to be gruff and firm and confrontative.
Laura's reasoning here represents a very well-elaborated and
reflective stage four and provides a sharp contrast to Mary's more
global response. It is interesting that Laura's reasoning about this
challenge brings her to reflect on her own internal processes. This
is a response that has been evidenced by a few of the stage four
therapists, in response to various questions. We heard the beginning
of this kind of reflection in Camille's discussion above. In
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questioning the meaning and value of psychotherapy, and her recent
lack of clear direction with her clients, she considers that perhaps
she hasn't "plumbed those depths for myself to the level that I need
to". This understanding of the therapist's own development as
central to the practice of providing therapy to clients is an
important theme which we can see beginning to emerge in these
responses.
Dealing with the Impact nf thp Therapist's Own kc;,,pc:
The way in which a therapist deals with her own issues is
developmentally significant. As we shall see, there are a number of
different ways in which a therapist might understand her own issues
and see their relationship to the practice of therapy. Because this
issue was raised more often in the context of the question on
change, it will be discussed at length in the final section of this
chapter, on "Change in the psychotherapist." However, it is
interesting to note that it is mainly the stage four therapists (four
out of six) who seem to recognize this work as one of the vital
challenges of being a psychotherapist.
Summary
What is most challenging in the work that therapists do does
appear to be quite related to developmental level. Therapists in the
stage three to four transition (the lower half of my sample) were
more challenged by questions related to therapeutic technique.
Therapists at stage four raised "larger" questions about the practice
of psychotherapy, and considered broader implications of their work.
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Although therapists at a variety of developmental levels
discussed concerns about limit setting and confrontation with
clients, these concerns varied according to developmental level. For
therapists in the stage three to four transition, there was much
more concern that the therapist's limit setting might rupture the
interpersonal connection with the client. There was also generally
more difficulty setting limits. (As discussed earlier, however, not
all therapists at this stage will have difficulty setting limits.
Some seem able to rely more on their training or their colleagues
and mentors for a context of interpersonal support which allows
them to set appropriate limits.) The stage four therapists who
talked about the challenges of limit setting and confrontation were
more able to set the necessary limits and were also able to be
reflective about the internal challenges they experienced in doing so.
Other challenges were raised by a smaller number of
therapists in the sample. These included dealing with questions of
values, working with abusers, dealing with managed care, balancing
one's personal and professional life, questions about the therapist's
own competence, dealing with boredom and keeping current in the
field. Therapists' reasoning about these challenges were interesting
developmentally, but the content of these responses did not fit a
particular pattern. It was interesting that a few of the higher stage
therapists expressed an awareness that dealing with their own
issues that arise in the context of doing this work is one of the
central challenges of being a therapist.
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Supervision
Interview question 5: Is your supervisory relationship a context in
which you can address the issues which are most alive for you? Why
or why not? If not in formal supervision, do you have a place where
you can discuss these issues?
In designing this question, I had speculated that developmental
differences might affect therapists' experience of supervision.
Would therapists at stage three, for instance, orient more toward
the personal relationship with the supervisor, and be concerned
about the supervisor's approval and acceptance? Would therapists at
stage four be more independent in their self-evaluation and less
dependent on the supervisor's opinions? What would make
supervision a good place for dealing with one's biggest therapeutic
challenges at different stages of development?
Among this group of experienced practitioners, the norm was
not to have formal supervision. However, each person spoke of
consulting with peers and many had formally organized peer support
groups. In general, these therapists talked about this informal, peer
supervision as something they valued highly. For the two therapists
who currently had some formal supervisory context, this was less
satisfactory. Julie describes her experience as follows:
The level at which I need supervision when I do is [in terms of]
looking at my own issues. ... I might get some good suggestions and
some good new perspectives to look at it from, but I'm not going to
get deeply met in the way that I need when I need supervision.
Fiona defines the inadequacy of the formal meeting time in her
group practice in terms of a lack of trust:
If there is not a great deal of trust in the private practice, that
[staff meeting] time gets basically wasted. ... and what happens is
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hat people
.
talk about are there enough pencils.
.
. . R.ght nowthat s what happening m our practice
. .
. everyone comes no ^e ofwhat Its safe to talk about and goes away saying, my time was
wasted one more time. y ^
vvdb
On the other hand, Laura discusses a very satisfying formal
supervisory relationship. As she describes what made it possible
for her to discuss her deepest concerns about her work, trust and the
capacity to be vulnerable in that context emerge as key dimensions.
In this regard, Laura's statement is fairly representative of the
group as a whole. These two dimensions, along with the non-
evaluative context of peer supervision, are described as important
by most of the sample.
[What was most important was] my connection with my supervisor
and knowing that she appreciates who I am and doesn't see my
confusion or my vulnerability as a weakness. That she has faith and
appreciation for my work.
. . .
Similarly, Sarah says of one supervisor:
We knew each other and we knew we had very similar values and . . .
I knew that she wouldn't be judgmental of me. ... she was just very
empathic
. . she was very open. . .
Although the responses of Laura and Sarah highlight the issue
of trust which emerged in most of the interviews, what
distinguishes their responses is an explicit valuing of supervision as
a context for personal growth. Both therapists ultimately connect
personal growth in the therapist with the capacity to do good
therapy. Laura says:
[That agency] was a place in which my own development . . . became
so important and I think that I really developed as a person when I
was there, not just as a clinician.
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Sarah described her best experience of supervision as one in
which the supervisor was willing and able to work with her on an
intense personal issue:
thl^L'^ZTt^^^
this is something you should deal with inherapy. And it was useful because she had the skills to help me
TnHtl'- ^l"' ' ^^''^y P'^^^ -'th me insidT and I
InH^ h H I
'"^P^^ssed with how open I was willing to be with herand I had made the personal decision- Look, I'm stuck here Ifsomebody s willing to travel with me where I need to go and sheknows what to do with me when I get there, or if she'll keep me
company because I know what to do with myself, I just have to be
there, and that made the difference.
Sarah goes on to describe why she feels that the ability of the
supervisor to do this kind of depth work is crucial for both the
therapist and the client:
I think that in this day and age of people being trained in doing
cognitive behavioral therapy and therapy for HMOs and this kind of
stuff, all too often supervisors are young people who have been
trained in cognitive behavioral therapy and really have not done any
depth work of their own. And so if they haven't done their own work
they don't know how to do it. And I feel very strongly that, you
know, therapeutic work, to do it, you can't take a person deeper than
you've been. Sometimes, you know-- I know people who have worked
with multiples, who haven't been that deep, in a sense, but it's like
if you can get supervision on how to stay that deep with somebody
and deal with all the stuff that comes up in you, that will serve for
it. But, you know, some supervisors really can't take you where you
need to go. Or take you on the journey that the client needs to go. . . .
But [all too often its] patch you up in six sessions or come back next
year when you have a deductible again.
On the other hand, she does make a distinction between the
role of the supervisor and that of a therapist. She clearly sees them
as separate roles, distinguished by the scope rather than the depth
of the work that might be done in that context.
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I think a supervisor is different than a theranic^t amh n • u .
relationship and
.
was pretty clear th^t if' had'o hi' tTto°la,
tn h T P'^^^^ A, B, and C that related to that hit they h d
supervisor
^''^ ^^^'^ ^'^^ ^hlt
'
Another implicit distinction between the work of the
supervisor with the supervisee and that of psychotherapy is that the
ultimate purpose is to allow the therapist to work more effectively
with the client. Thus Sarah brings this same concern with providing
opportunities for the therapist's own growth to her work as a
supervisor:
I've thought about this because I'm supervising now. This is the
first time I've supervised and the student that I have now-- I have
really tried to let her see that I've had my own issues to deal with
as a therapist because I have wanted her to feel comfortable with
me to talk about her own frustrations. And while she'll talk about
some of that, she'll talk a lot more about what we should do with
this client and what I should say here, which I think ultimately in
the training of a therapist is a much less useful intervention.
The capacity to be vulnerable in supervision and a sense of
trust in the supervisor are themes that were heard by virtually all
of this sample of therapists. The flip side of that, the need for self-
protection in even an informal peer supervisory context was voiced
by one therapist. Elizabeth describes her feelings in this regard and
her strategies for self-protection:
I do have to protect myself a little bit. There is a little bit of a
sense of I don't want you to know that I really feel incompetent ... I
mean, I have presented at the staff meeting when we were doing
case studies, I remember I picked one out- and I knew there was no
question in my mind that everybody would sympathize with me on
this one and I could say I was totally incompetent, and everybody
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probably wll not go down to how worried or howTnTo^en^
I fppiand whatever.
I won't get to that feeling level becauL ?here is apart of you that has to protect yourself.
. | want to have a noodimpression w.th others. I don't want to look incompetent don'?want to reveal fully my own doubts.
. . . | only havfa couDle of innnterm cases where I don't always feel very good about In ? ct , kmdof wonder a lot. It's interesting, those are'the cases I don t tall
It is interesting that Elizabeth was the only therapist in the
sample who did not really seem to welcome opportunities for
supervision:
So, and as I said, the supervisory stuff is generally, unfortunately
also maybe five to ten minutes in length. Okay? But, also to be
honest, at this point that's all I need, I think. I don't really I'm not
sure I want to take the time. I don't know, maybe I'd be scared to
take the time to spend one or two hours on a case [AND WHATWOULD BE SCARY?] I don't know, I'm just saying maybe I would be
that just sort of came out. I'm not even sure. Maybe because it
reminds me of graduate school. I don't want to do that again You
know, I don't know, but actually all I really want is enough of a new
perspective to keep me going back.
This difference seems less a developmental one than an issue
of personality style and might be understood in terms of a higher
level of defensiveness and/or less interest in self-reflection.
Summary
Hypothesized developmental differences in the need for
supervisor's approval did not transpire in this sample, perhaps
because the of the absence of formal supervisory relationships.
Given the absence of current formal supervision, the interviewer
would have had to explore previous supervisory relationships in
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depth with each interviewee to assess this potential developmental
difference. Time restraints limited such probing. For this question
.n particular, it seems quite possible that significant developmental
differences were not uncovered due both to the design of the
question (focused on current clinical practice) and due to the
absence of in-depth probing of therapists' meaning making.
A feeling of trust in the supervisor and the capacity to be
vulnerable in this context emerged as key dimensions contributing to
a feeling of high satisfaction in the supervisory relationship. This
was true of therapists across the range of developmental levels in
the sample. Therapists described finding this more often in
informal supervisory contexts, though not exclusively so. Two
therapists also described very satisfying experiences of formal
supervision.
It is interesting that these same two therapists expressed a
feeling for the importance of using supervision as a context of
personal growth, in order to be a more effective therapist. At stage
four, these two therapists were among the highest, developmentally,
in the sample. Certainly at stage four, they have the developmental
capacity for self-reflection which would make it possible to use
supervision in this way, and to see the systemic connections
between their own development and that of the client. However,
other stage four therapists did not hold such a value. These two
therapists also seemed more relationally oriented, which perhaps
enhanced their abilities to both engage and reflect deeply on their
relationships. While these two therapists explicitly express the
value of using supervision to enhance their own development, others
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seem to hold it implicitly. With one exception, all the therapists in
the sample seemed to place a high value on supervision. This
difference seemed related to personality factors rather than to
development.
Change in the Therapist
Interview question 6: If I were to ask you to reflect back nn vnnr
work as a therapist, how would you see yourself L hav^^cha needespecally m relation to any of the issues we've discussed oday' Ifthere are issues which you see differently now, I'd be interested inwhat you can recollect about how you make sense of things at an
earlier point in your own development.
This final question was designed to assess the assumption of
Kegan's model that development is unidirectional. Providing
research participants with the opportunity to reflect back on their
own development, they might implicitly either challenge or support
the assumption of unidirectional change. I wondered if therapists in
the sample would report changes which were in line with the kinds
of developmental changes one might expect or not.
I have grouped the changes reported into two types: changes
largely a result of phasic development and changes related to
structural development, although in fact the two categories are not
altogether distinct. Of the changes related to structural
development, all are in the expected direction of greater
developmental complexity, and will be discussed in depth below.
The phasic developmental changes were predominantly in the area of
increased confidence. This was a change reported by seven of the
twelve therapists in the sample and ranged from reports of greater
self-understanding, improved self-concept and self-acceptance.
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being more forgiving of oneself, having more trust in one's own
judgment and having more confidence in the process of therapy
Although I believe that these changes are largely the result of
increased experience and thus categorizable as phasic changes, they
are not unconnected with structural developmental changes in the
individual therapists.
In particular, Joanne connects her increased self-confidence
with her new ability to raise her questions or concerns in the
therapy session rather than just processing these privately. This
greater ability to reflect on the relationship more spontaneously in
sessions seems also to reflect a further development in her
reflective capacity:
It used to be that I would sit with a client and a lot of times I would
wonder: Am I doing the right thing? Are we getting where we need
to go? And, if not, how do I get them there or even is that the right
place to get them? And I would have a lot of doubts and concerns
about how I was as a therapist and I have in some ways grown out of
that. When I have doubts and concerns like that, which I do, that
becomes the focus of therapy with the client rather than my
thinking- these are my problems, I'm not a smart enough therapist
and if I were smarter I could figure this out. Maybe that's true, but
I'm not smarter, so really the way it works is for me to say "You
know, I'm having these questions are we heading in a place where
we want to go? How do we want to talk about this therapy?"
The other category of changes which might also be seen as
largely a result of experience I will call "tempered omnipotence."
Here again, however, the change may be reflective of developmental
growth as well. One therapist reported: "I'm a lot more humble than
I was coming straight out of graduate school in terms of what I can
do." This sentiment was echoed in two other therapist statements:
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I think earlier on I believed that I could love my clients into he.lrhas they say. And I don't think thafs true anymore i th.nk thathelps If I care deeply about my clients and I have to s y that thetherapies that work well tend to be theraoies whpl i ,
deeply about my client. But ifs no?. th:rp:::.dts"a%'o ^rt""know.
.
think I used to see it more simpl.stically. [Julie stage 4(3)J
I guess whafs different for me now is I no longer feel that I canhelp everybody. And when I first started in therapy e 11 , onlyknew enough, loved enough, etc.. I could help eve^body
.
. [sarat
One therapist reported becoming more cautious. Another
reported becoming more respectful of people's process and having
gained a "vaster appreciation of what people go through." Yet
another therapist reported a greater ability to differentiate when
she can make a significant difference in a client's life. This change,
once again, seems a result of both experience and of the therapist's
own structural development over time:
When I started working at the family clinic, you know, I said, call
me, I'm here, if you need to. But they were people who were
relatively together beforehand, had a major life trauma, which was
throwing them, which was undermining all the stuff inside, and I
could see they were going to come out the other end because they
had the resources. So, it's like throwing your personal weight in
that kind of situation can make enough of a difference that they can
take the momentum or whatever it is from your personal weight
behind something, you know, take a couple big teaspoons of it and
run with it. Rather than you put the whole force of your personality
in something and it ends up at the bottom of a dark hole and you're
left without anything and they don't have it either because they can't
scoop it up. So that's how I make a difference now. It's like in
judging where I'm going to be able to make a difference or not.
I know I protect myself a lot more now and I feel like in my own
personal managing of my emotions, I don't go as deep as I used to.
You know, its sort of like, I will-- There's a well I will dip into,
but I'll go in with a-- ladle and pull out a few emotions rather than
putting on my nose clips and my goggles. You know, so, I think when
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you make a transition like that and come to a balance insideyourself, that's reflected in your external activity. [Sarah stage 4]
Other reported changes which do not clearly fit a
developmental pattern (at least in this small sample) included the
following: 1) a need for new challenges, 2) an increased ability to
voice her own values, 3) less rigid boundaries, 4) becoming less
likely to see people for a nominal fee, 5) becoming less likely to do
abreactive or uncovering work with trauma survivors, 6) changes in
how directive to be with clients and 7) increased comfort in using
therapeutic mistakes constructively. Each of these changes was
reported by just one therapist in the sample. I will discuss the last
two briefly because they seem most interesting in terms of
development.
Joanne, at stage 3/4, talks about her changing view of how
directive to be with clients:
I think there's been a shift in my work from being less directive to
more directive and maybe back, back some. ... I started out being
quite Rogerian with the-- partly by training and partly just by that's
what seemed to work the best for me. And there was a real sense
that the client knows exactly what it is they need to know and
they're where they are for a good reason and really my role is to just
let them hear that feedback so that they can untangle the web and
get out of it themselves, which they will. So, I believed that for
quite a while, but then I also ran across a number of clients that
never went anywhere at all and talked endlessly about stuff that
disturbed them, distressed them, but without any sense that they
could have an effect on that. And my Rogerian skills didn't seem
very helpful with them.
And that was at a point when I started to do more cognitive kinds of
work and then I became a lot more directive. I did some behavioral
interventions, did a lot of psycho-education which seemed to help
quite a bit. I really started setting myself up as more of an expert,
but I went too far in that area because I found myself then being in
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therapy sessions where the client would come in ^t^rt .
about something or another, and already iTas goinq to te 'lL,^
about something
I think is a medical pro'em the Tdo e ommendthat they see a physician.
. . . | found more of a bal nee andZprobably also has to do with trust. So that I trust myself to hear asbest I can when people need more direction and when the direction isms.de themselves and I just need to help them find it. I think thatworks out pretty well.
At first, Joanne relies upon the Rogerian approach of her
training. However, as she meets clients for whom this approach
isn't effective, she becomes more directive. This change might
parallel the emergence of stage four and the capacity to reflect on
the limitations of her training. As she experiments with being more
directive, she finds that she also values the non-directive approach
with which she began her work. As she returns to a less directive
style, she does so with a new relationship (of greater ownership) to
this theoretical approach.
Julie, stage 4(3), has a strong sense of the value of
therapeutic mistakes:
I believe strongly as a therapist that I am going to make mistakes
and those are some of the most precious moments in a therapeutic
relationship for me to look at, and own, and apologize, and make
right. That's a very important experience for a client. I always
learned something from it too and it doesn't destroy my self-
esteem, it doesn't make me doubt myself or my skills. . .
._
I mean if a client comes in and says, you know you made me feel
horrible last week when you said so and so. . . . I might say
something flip that strikes them the wrong way and hurts their
feelings. I really make hay out of that. I mean, I'm not defensive, I
try very hard not to be defensive . . .
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But If someone comes in and says, you know you really hurt mvfeelings when you said such and such. I'll own them beinainsensitive I'll owe them being distracted, I'll Twe them that Iwasn't thmkmg clearly as I should of thought anHhev deservVbetter you know, and that IMI be more careful in t^e f'uture nd bvgod, If I say that, I damn well better be more careful in thl ^ .am and I think that's what makes me a gooTtherant i. thJ
'
Which I am willing to own my own part oHat hap^^^^^^^ nd The'dynamics between us. And mostly I stay very close in the the apv towhat IS happening between us in the room.
. You know and hat's
really the stuff, the richest stuff of the therapy.
...
You know, if I catch myself beating myself up about [a major
mistake] then I get supervision very quickly so I can get some
perspective. I try to make amends. Um, and ultimately, I have tojust give myself permission to not be perfect, you know, and not
pretend to be perfect by a long shot which is what I think a lot of
therapists have a hard time with.
Julie's capacity to be accepting of her own therapeutic
mistakes is a reflection of both development and personality style.
Her stage four development is evidenced in her capacity to
withstand client criticism without calling into question her own
competence or shaking her confidence. In her easy acceptance of
personal fallibility, Julie demonstrates a quality of openness which
would seem to facilitate her learning from her therapeutic work.
Most of the changes therapists reported in themselves are
developmental ones, and fit with the developmental expectations of
Kegan's model. These changes centered on three areas in particular:
1) an increased ability to look at the larger context of therapy, 2)
increased comfort with boundaries, limit setting and client anger
and 3) less orientation toward therapeutic technique and a new
appreciation of the role of the therapist's own development in the
practice of psychotherapy.
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Two stage four therapists described the capacity to see the
larger context of psychotherapy as important changes m the.r own
development. One c.ted adopting a systems perspective. The other
described looking more at the social and political context for
individual problems:
th^.t'i' H ""k
""^'^ ""^ ramifications of this and sothat had a huge impact on how I think about what I do and how I thinkabout problems and whether they're individual or whether they 're
?htl th 'h'^"^'^'^ ''''' ^^^^^ '^^^^^ much more mtherapy than I used to. I want to say to them, given the context-you know, ,t s not just your family context- given your community
context, given your national context. Those are pertinent in terms of
understanding what's going on here. ... I have days when I think amjust allowing people to think that it's their personal problem youknow am I facilitating oppression, you know, by doing what I do and Ihope not, but I think it's easy to fall into that Every time I
encourage somebody to think they are depressed instead of
oppressed
. . . [Dana, stage 4]
That this capacity to take a larger perspective is noted as a
change is likely to reflect the therapist's development to a full
stage four.
By far the most common developmental change described was
the increasing comfort with limit setting, boundaries and dealing
with confrontation or anger. This change was described in a variety
of ways by ten of the twelve therapists in the sample. The
developmental aspect of this change can be heard in their
statements:
I did a whole lot of "dad" work, I would call it "dad" work when I took
the job over at the hospital because I had to confront male authority
on an ongoing basis and stand my ground, learn to stand my ground.
[Camille, stage 4]
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manipulation, but it's not going I make ve y much dif e ence Vn
Xt! TnrtfflaXtfSi^^ ^-^^^r^^^ ^^'^
wanted everyone to lik^
.e,' wh," h wTsVS% e^nt' ?aLt"be
'
eTtherapist • • "'weV'r' '
want you to thi"kTm';:agr ai tnerapi .
. . .
W ll, I'm not worried about whether thpv iii.Ame anymore. You know, sure that's great. I want then to eef thevcan relate to me. I think that is critical. They have to ^eef '
^
comfortable with me. They have to feel like they can talk to me andbe real with me. Interestingly, | would say I'm much moreW
with my clients than I was
. . . I am much more who I am I don't putup with much "bullshit" in myself. I try not to and so I don't put up
with much m my c ients. You know, if I see "bullshit" I name it and Isay, Hey, this looks like a manipulation to me. You know what areyou trying to get here? What's your real desire here? Lei's talk
about what's really under this?" I think before I wouldn't have done
that at all. I would have been way too scared to do that. I wantedpeople to like me, so I'm not looking at how they're manipulating as
much. [Camille, stage 4] ^ ^ y
I shared with you that I don't personally like confrontation.
I reallyhad to learn to deal with confrontation in therapy. You know when
couples are very confrontative, punitive, on the verge of violent with
one another, and sometimes on the verge in my office and actually
doing It outside the door and learning
. . . that was certainly a skill
that I had to learn because I think my first-- my private reaction is
to run. And to learn how to quiet my own personal fears and to be
able to maintain control of the session and to move those couples
forward off that dead center of just attacking one another [Fiona
stage 4]
You know the other one where I really had to learn how to do that,
and I'm not sure I've mastered this yet, you know is very
authoritative men who attempt to use their power and authority.
I think the child in me says, "Oh yeah- you can't do that to me!" And
then you know that's not going to be therapeutic; that stance will
never be therapeutic. You know, but learning how to make that issue
overt and share those concerns- I mean techniques that I use now
are making that issue overt, sharing those concerns with the client,
putting that issue on the table and then saying, how are we going to
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I think probably [earlier] it was tempting to iust hunkpr HnvA,n . m .
people won. ,.^e .e.
,
t.nU've goiTSf ha d e^in't^'^^
'^Tjuknow, I guess moving from getting plowed through to f nding perhansobstructionist ways to stand my ground to being immobiHzed tofinding cooperative ways of dealing with that. I think that's been achange, you know, over time. I stHI don't profess to hand e those
situations accurately or effectively every time. I do it a 7ot better[Fiona, stage 4] u iLer.
I mean there's a few different types that I think of in terms of
somebody being personally challenging | used to see this couple
. . .
and they were like really argumentative, argumentative as hell
and there were times when they would be yelling so loud in my
'
office that the secretary would come and knock on the door and ask
if everybody was okay. What would happen for me was that when theguy would start yelling, I would stop thinking and I would be waiting
for the hole to open up in the floor to swallow me and protect me
and, you know. And all I could do- at that point I would stop being
therapeutic and I would just wait for the session to end. Luckily at
that point I had a really wonderful supervisor.
. . who just did a
bunch of personal work with me about it, like what's going on for
you, what's this triggering for you, what stuff is-- where's he
getting to you, because she recognized that I had to deal with that in
order to be therapeutic with him. And we worked on that a good
deal, doing basically my own personal work within the supervision
to a point where I was not comfortable with him, but he could start
yelling and I wouldn't have to go into outer space or something. I
could hold my turf and say, could you say what you said, but rephrase
it in a way that, you know, that your voice doesn't carry out to the
hall or, you know, or just- I could make some kind of therapeutic
intervention or slow him down or say when you say that like that can
you see from your wife's behavior what she does with that and can
the two of you look at that and see how that might spiral when you
do that at home, you know, which is being able to use the behavior. I
think it was partially from working on stuff like that with him that
I feel like-- I mean I'm not great with super-aggressive types now,
but that I learned the stuff that would enable me now to deal with
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that^
. .
because, you know, clients bring you the kind of issup.. th.tyou have to work on personally. [Sarah, stage 4]
I thmk that probably the most important thing ,s that my conceotsof boundaries and what it means to be well boundaried harreaTvbecome more elaborated and defined over the years and I thmk wasquite naive earlier on.
. . . | assume you know when I say th wh^t
I m talking about is that- having very well defined and'cons.sTenboundaries within which I am totally available and present for my
client emotionally available and caring and empathically eng gTdbut the boundaries are in place. I guess it would be most typmed bymy feeling like I could tell that client that she could call me
anytime of the day or night, never thinking that she really wouldbecause she would be respectful of me and my need to sleep but no
. .
So I guess what I'm saying is that I feel I've leamed how to take
"
better care of myself. [Julie, stage 4(3)]
[Learning] how to set boundaries for clients who don't have very good
boundaries
. . .
made it necessary for me to really look inside and
found out where my boundaries are. I had never really had the
opportunity to figure that out, but now I needed to because I had to
make firm statements and I had to be able to stand behind them and
that was really very tough at first and it still is very tough, but I
have direct experience with not setting boundaries and then having
to suffer the consequences. And it's a lot harder to set boundaries
after you've let someone cross them. It's a lot easier to set them in
advance and I'm getting better at that. The thing that is difficult
still IS figuring out which boundaries to set and which not to.
[Joanne, stage 3/4]
The other significant developmental change described by a
number of therapists in the sample was that of becoming less
technique oriented and more attuned to the impact of the therapist's
own issues on the therapeutic relationship. It is interesting that
this issue was raised by therapists at a variety of developmental
levels, but seemed to be understood in an equally wide variety of
ways.
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At stage 4/3, for instance. Mary talks about putting her own
"trips" out of the way in order to be there for her clients:
[Did we get to] the cutting edge for me in thinking about my work?Yes I thmk so actually. Could be said differently in terms of how toreally be there for my clients and not for myself\ow to put 1trips out of the way. yeah. I think basically yeah. ^
At stage 4/3, Mary has the reflective capacity which allows
her to recognize that her own issues do enter into the work that she
does as a therapist. However, her sense of her own issues seems
more static and less elaborated than those we will hear from at
stage four.
Drawing upon her stage four side, Joanne, at stage 3/4,
discusses in more detail the role her own personal issues have
played in her therapeutic work:
Here's another thing that I have been learning about and realize that
my attitude about it has changed. When I first started being a
therapist, I was very conscious of my own stuff, my own issues that
had to do with things that clients might talk about and sometimes
they would be places where it was painful for me in my own life and
so I could really identify with the clients in that. And there were
times when I didn't think that I was able to be a very good therapist
for certain clients, particularly as a student therapist, partly
because I hadn't fully worked out my relationship with my father or
whatever. And over the past several years I've done a lot of work on
my own issues and so I don't find that occurring nearly as much. But
here is something that I do find occurring-- which is that
sometimes a client will come in and they'll be talking about
something that was also an issue for me before and I've worked out
satisfactorily so I feel okay with it. But my reaction to the client is
to be a little impatient because I want to say, "That doesn't concern
me anymore, so let's go on to something else." (LAUGHTER)
Along with developmental change, there may be an impatience
with the stage concerns one is leaving behind. As Kegan (1994) has
suggested, "there is no order of consciousness that holds less charm
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for us than the one we have only recently moved beyond". Joanne
(speaking from her stage four side) is able to laugh at this feeling in
herself. She is quite willing to reflect candidly on the pull she
experiences to work out some of her own issues vicariously through
her clients. In her self-reflection, she also finds another part of
herself which is drawn to the exciting process of facilitating change
in others:
And recently a friend of mine said, I had met this woman who had
timT1 f'PJ'V'"^ 'i^^ '^^^'"9 that and becoming a full-time artist and she said to me that she no longer needed to dotherapy because she felt that she was healed. And that made a biaimpression on me. I had never thought of it that way, but I can seethat working with clients is also a healing process for therapists tosome degree. And I can understand that there is kind of a pull that
issues of my own create for me to learn about how clients deal withthem And I remember from graduate school days when we all used
to talk about how therapists go into this business so we can learn
something about ourselves-- and there is something to that- but
I've been thinking about this one statement for a couple of weeks
now and I realize that there is more to it for me that even though
there are lots of places in which I feel healed, that there's also an
excitement of watching and helping another person go through that
process. That there is a sense that if I can do some of that in my
own life, then I'm a good guide for someone else rather than a person
who is sort of torn by my own issues and not being able to be there
for them. I can be there for them a lot more fully and also know that
there is light at the end of the tunnel. That's been a challenge that
I've been thinking about quite a bit: How much do my own issues
enter into therapy and how much does curing or, you know, working
on my own issues change the way I'm a therapist.
This ability to reflect on one's own issues in a useful way is a
complex process which is described well by Dana (stage four). She
generates a wonderful analogy suggesting that learning to deal with
countertransferential feelings is like "adding your feet" to the
already complex process of playing the organ:
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[In regard to transference],
I recognize that that's what it is I r.nrecognize I think it's a complicated skill, because you have to do
llTltT^^ '"f • justTnd ofh ve toget the mechanics of what do I need to ask and I have qot comolPtPmformat-on and that kind of stuff and be thinking alo'in youT' e dwhat kind of skills or things do I know how to do that are glq to behelpful to this person. There's also building rapport with ^hToersonhat you're talking with, so there's that level. And he^the re's thelevel of noticing that when certain things happen, you yourself eact
?hink"th.tT' f' ^''^ ^b^^' that Andt ink that level is the last one to come. Because you're just too busvdoing the mechanics of it ^ ^
I'm trying to think of an analogy. The first thing I thought of was
playing the organ
. . .
it's like first you have to know where the notes
are on the keys, then you have to know how to read music then
you're looking from the music to your hands, and then you 'add the
second hand, and then there is interpretation of music, you know andyou can run certain scales without having to look at every note and
then with organ you have to add your feet while you're doing all this
other stuff. And to me being aware of countertransference is like
adding your feet. And it's like that one comes last So I think
probably that would be the biggest way in which I've changed, like
knowing what to do with that constant undercurrent of your own
response to what's going on.
In her discussion, Camille (stage four) makes more explicit the
connection between the therapist's own personal development and
the process of change in clients:
My therapy ... has gotten extremely process-oriented
, but it has
also engendered in me questions about whether I am doing good
therapy. ... I use a lot of inner child work and I felt really good
about that.
. . . [Before] I had a sense of where I was going in those
deeper levels. I had a sense of, okay, it's really important to get
back to that childhood stuff and re-integrate those parts of yourself
that were disintegrated early on. Though 1 still do that, right now it
is feeling like I'm not sure where that's going, I'm not sure that I
have really maybe plumbed those depths in myself to the level that I
need to. . .
.
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It really seemed to be helpful and I think it truly was but I've antseveral clients right now who I've kind of run through that basicapproach with. I mean, it's not like I've done all of if but 've done a
hit th
^""^
'^'^u'"
^^^^gg'i^g- Theyre still not in a placethat they want to be m and ifs real clear to me that more work
rh.M^^' ''"^ ^'^^'"9 here going well, I'm not suTe whatthat work IS. And I'm not sure for myself what that is.
.
.
When I bump into places that aren't working, walls, you know blockswhatever you want to call them, it becomes very clear to m^ thatthere is some work that I need to do. And I was bumping into thoseblocks bumping into feelings of inadequacy and/or guilt that
really weren t appropriate. And I was recognizing that this is
part of childhood stuff, but then, you know, I'm thinking, but I did
that work, you know, I've done that work, how many times do I have
to do that work? So, in kind of recycling back into those issues but
not really sure yet how to get to them now and I think a lot of my
clients, of course, are in the same place.
Sarah (stage four) also describes the awareness of how her
own "unfinished business" gets played out in her work as an
important change. She also makes explicit the connection between
her own development and that of her clients:
I want[ed] there to be somebody out there who can help me as much
as I need to be helped, and there better be somebody there who can
make everything all right, you know. ... So as a therapist you have
.
internal baggage
. . .
there's a certain amount of your needs and your
unfinished business that gets played out in therapy.
. . in how you set
yourself up
. . .
that kind of stuff. So, I think [a greater awareness of
that is] what is different for me.
Probably one of the most interesting things that I noticed about
therapy- is that there were times where I just had an incredible
amount of synchronicity, you know, unusual happenings that were so
closely connected to my inner life of what was going on in therapy
that it would just blow me away at times. This would range from
things like-- I would be seeing a client and I would be saying
something to them, you know, about their situation, and I would keep
talking but it was like in the middle of what I was saying I would
stop dead in my tracks and realize- you're really saying this to
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f^Z t ' ^h' "e^ds to hear ,t even morethan they do and ifs coming out of your mouth. It wou d lust beamazmg. There were some external events gomg o^n my N e and Istarted seeing- there was a stnng of new clients who car^e ,ntome who were manifesting different aspects of the problem th t ?was having and I was starting to see- I mean it could hav^ been asheer coincidence, but it was like, as time progressed and I madeprogress on this particular issue, the people were coming into mewith issues that were reflecting my own personal course
I t wTsjust so eerie. It was like there this light up on top of the buildmg
Iwas working m going- Anybody with this issue is welcome we'rehaving a special on it this week. It was just so eerie about how the
external and internal were reflections of each other.
Finally, we will hear from Laura, who takes not only makes the
explicit connection between her own development and that of her
clients, but describes it as a dynamic, interactive process. This
understanding is quite different from the more static sense heard
earlier of the therapist's own issues. Rather than being seen as an
unfortunate if inevitable obstacle to the process of providing
therapy, the therapist's own development is seen as an essential
component of doing the best therapy one can:
Certainly when I was less experienced ... I was paying much more
attention to technical details of how to work with people. You know,
that I couldn't be fully present... So, I'm much more able now to use
the work for my own internal growth and development, as well as-
and to understand my own development as a person in the room with
a client, and my participation in that, that it really is a reciprocal
process of growth and development, that if I'm not somehow
expanding and changing along with my client, that there's something
not happening that should be happening.
. . .
That's what keeps the work alive for me and I also think that clients
feel it when there's an excitement and appreciation for who they are.
And that excitement and appreciation for who they are often comes
from whether they've inspired me in some way or challenged me in
some way to do my own work also or to learn something from them.
I appreciate something in them that moves me. So, in fact, their
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movement is not so disconnected from my movement c;^ tho9ets^to be .ore and .ore about that. Ra'thrthrabout^fchnra;'
always thinking that they're doing this for other peopt bee 'use
aets oMt'o 'T^K ' understanding what oneg u f It and that's part of developing in this role As I
understand more and more about what I get out of it. All along ifsbeen clear to me that I don't- this work isn't altruistic
I mean thiswork isn't all about meeting somebody else's needs
Summary
Responses to this question support the notion of unidirectional
change in development. Therapists reported a variety of changes in
line with and no changes contrary to developmental expectations.
Most predominant among the changes reported were a cluster of
responses which focus on becoming more comfortable with
boundaries, limit setting and dealing with clients' anger. Therapists
reported changes such as the following: learning to stand her ground;
learning to recognize client manipulations; no longer being driven by
a desire for clients' approval; becoming less anxious about clients'
anger; learning better boundary management; learning to deal with
authoritative men; and becoming more comfortable with limit
setting. Each of these changes in is line with the developmental
movement from stage three to stage four.
Another set of changes, which I have called "tempered
omnipotence", involve developing a greater appreciation for the
limits of therapy. This change, reported in various forms by a
number of therapists in the sample, includes such changes as
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differentiating when she can make a difference to the client and a
tempered sense of the power of the therapeutic relationship. This
change seems to involve seeing the therapeutic process less
simplistically. The ability to see greater complexity in a situation
which was previously seen more globally, and to make finer
distinctions between different kinds of situations is reflective of
this same developmental movement from stage three to stage four.
A final cluster of changes centered on becoming less technique
oriented and more able to understand and process one's own
responses to the therapeutic relationship. This change is also in
line with a developmental progression in the capacity to reflect on
relationships. This was discussed in a number of ways by the stage
four therapists in particular, although not exclusively. One
therapist cited "knowing what to do with that constant undercurrent
of your own response to what's going on" as a key change in her own
development as a therapist. A few of the stage four therapists have
come to see their own development as inextricably connected to that
of their clients, ie., that they would need to work at a sufficient
depth on their own personal issues in order to accompany clients on
that journey. Finally, one therapist saw this connection with the
therapist's own movement as part of what makes the therapy alive
for both parties. She transforms the stereotypical notion of therapy
as "helping others" to that of a reciprocal process which must also
engage the therapist in her own development.
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CHAPTER 5
SIGNIFICANCE AND IMPLICATIONS
Conclusions and SiqnificancP o f the Study
The results of this study suggest that Kegan's model can
illuminate a structural developmental dimension in the ways that
therapists understand their work with clients. Although there were
some surprising results, in general clear developmental differences
could be seen between stages. The most consistent differences
were in the increasing complexity of responses at higher stages of
development.
A secondary question raised by this research was whether the
ways in which therapists see themselves as changing over time fit
the unidirectional progression of Kegan's structural model. In fact,
all of the changes therapists described in themselves were in line
with developmental expectations, lending support to Kegan's notion
of a hierarchical and invariant sequence to development. For
example, the most commonly experienced change, reported by ten out
of twelve therapists in the sample, centered on an increasing ability
to set limits and maintain boundaries. Described in a variety of
ways (i.e., learning to stand her ground, learning to recognize client
manipulations, better boundary management) each of these changes
reflects an aspect of the developmental movement from stage three
to stage four.
This study validates Kegan's model in several other ways as
well. Given that the developmental scores for this sample ranged
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from stage 3(4) to stage four, we are looking at a very narrow range
of development, i.e., all scores were within one full stage score. The
fact that salient differences in meaning construction could be
discerned suggests that even the fine distinctions which the model
makes can be useful in understanding the experience of
psychotherapists.
The distribution of scores confirms what other researchers
using the Kegan methodology have found, i.e., that approximately half
of highly educated adults have not reached stage four. In a
composite sample of "professional highly educated" subjects from
nine dissertation studies (N=207), 47% had reached or exceeded
stage four. In the largest study to date using the Kegan method, Bar-
Yam interviewed 60 subjects, also highly educated. In this sample,
52% had reached or exceeded stage four (Kegan, 1994, p. 191-197).
While the results of this study are in line with the results of
other researchers, they are also surprising, given the nature of my
sample (experienced psychotherapists). One might expect that the
practice of psychotherapy, with its attendant ongoing reflection on
interpersonal interaction and intra-psychic dynamics, wouid~of all
professions-foster development in this domain. Perhaps most
surprising is that no therapists in my sample exceeded stage four,
while 1 0% in the Bar-Yam study did so.
One source of explanation for these differences might be that
the age range for subjects in Bar-Yam's study was broader, from 25-
55. This would explain, to some extent, why the developmental
range was broader on both ends of the spectrum. Looking more
closely at the occupations of participants in the Bar-Yam study also
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suggests a source of explanation. Bar-Yam (1991) interviewed
Americans in military service in Europe and civilians employed by
the military. The females in her sample were primarily in military
service, while the males in her sample were in graduate training
programs in counseling. She was interested not in a representative
sample of men and women, but rather in probing the "innateness or
universality of what have been claimed to be 'feminine' versus
•masculine' personality (1991, p. 255). In choosing men and women
with occupational interests counter to the stereotype for their
gender, she may have influenced the developmental results in an
interesting way.
Normal socialization in contemporary society, Kegan has
suggested, tends to better support men's development to stage four.
On the other hand, socialization tends to hold women in stage three.
Thus, socialization processes may incline men and women in
opposite directions, making the stages favoring autonomy (stages
two & four) more syntonic with men's development and stages
favoring connection (stages three & five) more syntonic with
women's development. Bar-Yam deliberately chose a sample whose
occupational choices might have an effect counter to that of gender
socialization. This would tend to minimize the developmental
"handicap" for both genders, bolstering the overall developmental
level of her sample.
Another noteworthy aspect of the results is that a single stage
score was sufficient to explain structural developmental level for
each of the research participants. Hopefully, this provides an
affirmative answer to Holloway's question as to whether the
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developmental paradigm is even useful, given the lack of parsimony
she critiques in so many so-called developmental models. As
Holloway has suggested, when "any behavioral change is equated
with a developmental change ... the value of the developmental
paradigm has been lost" (1987, 211). Thus, while "developmental
models have become the Zeitgeist of supervision thinking and
research" (Holloway, 1987, 209), there has been a lack of a viable
theoretical model for understanding psychotherapist development.
Kegan's model, which has proven robust in terms of explaining
developmental differences, might fill this need.
This study has also addresses a number of other needs in the
current research. Holloway (1995, 1988) has noted several,
including the need for qualitative studies, for research on counselor
development directly, outside of the context of supervision, and for
research relevant to practitioners of supervision. Both Holloway
(1988) and Borders (1989) have advocated that research in counselor
development not rely on self-report techniques for assessing
development. Borders (1989) also spoke to the need for research
conducted outside of academic settings and with samples other than
counselor trainees.
In designing a qualitative study of experienced practitioners, I
deliberately chose to shift the focus away from counseling trainees.
I chose to focus on the meaning making process of psychotherapists
themselves, rather than on some aspect of their interaction in
supervision. The research was conducted with practitioners in a
variety of clinical settings. I did not use a self-report technique,
but rather a rigorous process of developmental assessment, based on
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the Lahey, et al. (1988) system. Finally, I hope that my results will
be useful to clinical supervisors, and will describe some
implications for practice below.
Implications for Practice
In providing a robust model for understanding psychotherapist
development, Kegan's work has important implications for the
practice of clinical supervision. A major implication is that
training in counseling skills, although important, is insufficient
because it does not address the developmental constraints in the
ways that therapists construct their experience. Instead, the model
offers supervisors a structural developmental framework for
understanding their supervisees. This can help supervisors delineate
what the supervisee is currently capable of, what is at the growing
edge of the supervisee's abilities, and what probably cannot be
taught without developmental transformation preceding new
understanding. An approach to supervision as a form of applied adult
development is thus a natural extension of Kegan's theory.
An understanding of some of the issues and challenges for
therapists at particular stages of development is one component of
such an approach. Although any characterizations of therapists at
particular stages of development must be done with care (given both
the sample size and the uniqueness of human beings) some general
considerations can be suggested. At stage three, the therapist is
embedded in (i.e., unable to take a perspective on) the interpersonal
context, although the source of this context may be different for
different therapists. When the stage three therapist is embedded in
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ais
the interpersonal context of the therapist-client relationship,
number of difficulties may result. In particular, the therapist
likely to have difficulty with boundaries and limit setting, it may
affect a therapist's feelings about and ways of dealing with
termination, which may more likely be experienced as a loss of
relationship.
One mitigating factor may be the therapist's personal style.
These results have raised a question as to whether therapists with a
more boundaried style might more easily set limits, despite stage
three development. (This question was not addressed in the design
of this research, but warrants future study.) Another mitigating
factor seems to be that colleagues and mentors may form the
interpersonal context in which the stage three therapist is
embedded. This is potentially very important information for
clinical supervisors. It allows supervisors who recognize this
developmental challenge for stage three therapists to provide the
crucial support of a countervailing interpersonal context, as well as
the impetus for development toward becoming self-defining and
self-authoring.
The stage three therapist may also be more prone to "empathy
as identification", i.e, may have difficulty recognizing differences
between their own feelings (or imagined feelings) in a situation and
their clients'. Again, this awareness can allow supervisors to work
with supervisees on developing the capacity to make these kinds of
distinctions.
The differences between a more boundaried versus a more
connected personal style may also be important in terms of the
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supervisor's understanding ot the supervisee. (This distinction is
based on Noann's 1985 work. However, these stylistic differences
were not the focus of my research, nor am I awaie of any curienily
available measure for assessing these differences. This discussion
is therefore based on my subjective impressions of stylistic
differences in my research participants.)
My results seemed to suggest that therapists with a more
connected style strugyk^d more with the issues of limits. l)()undaries
and personal responsibility. This seemed to be the case with thiee
therapists in particular: Laura, Susan and Joanne. In assessing their
development, I had to closely examine what were structural versus
content elements of this difficulty. I or the stage four therapists
(Susan and Laura) I louiuJ that their ability lo set limits was
identical to others at the same stage. (I oi Joanne, theie was a more
limited basis of comparison with others at the same stage.) Since
the kind of intense analysis needed to separate structural versus
content differences in this regard is not normally a pan of the
supervision process, this leads me to wonder whether supervisors
might not olten misinterpret these as developmental differences in
their supervisees. What I found in these stage four therapists was a
more complex process of delinmg for themselves what limits and
l)oun(laries to set. Ilowc^ver, to the supervisor. [Uv. need to locus on
this process might be confused with a less developed ability to set
limits.
At stage four, there is more complex reasoning and a greater
ability to mak(? fine distinctions. As a result, there is a
corresponding capacity loi a more (iillei(;nti,iled em[)athy. The
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stage four therapist has the ability to recognize and appreciate the
individuality of the client's feelings in a way which may be more
challenging at stage three. The stage four therapist is self-
authoring and has independent standards of judgement. The capacity
for reflection about oneself and one's relationships is enlarged.
Although at stage three there is certainly an inner psychological life
and a capacity for self-reflection, especially perhaps among
therapists, the quality of that reflection may be qualitatively
different. Kegan (1994) describes this difference:
... it is one thing to have an inner psychological life one can
experience and report as internal (a third order capacity) and
quite another to see oneself as the constructor of that inner
psychological life. If one's inner experiences just "show up"
there, so that the self-conscious self is an audience for its
inner experiencing, then insight turns out to be insight into
why the audience reacts as intensely to the content as it does,
rather than to why or how the author writes the script or
drama as he does (p. 132).
This seems an important distinction in the way that "insight"
may be manifested differently at stage three versus stage four.
Although Kegan was writing about clients at stages three versus
four, the distinction seems quite applicable to psychotherapists.
For the stage four therapist, a greater capacity to take a perspective
on relationships (rather than being embedded in or defined by them)
means a diminished susceptibility to client manipulation. The
ability to set limits and maintain appropriate boundaries is a
hallmark of stage four, and occurs gradually in the process of
development from stage three to stage four.
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The premises of Kegan's model make clear the need for
supervision to facilitate development rather than focusing simply on
teaching skills. As Kegan has suggested, " 'Setting limits' or
'preserving boundaries' taught merely as parenting skills [or
therapeutic skills] without addressing the way reality is being
constructed, amounts to bringing new ideas to an old consciousness.
The old consciousness will make the best use it can of the new ideas
on behalf of the old consciousness! " (Kegan, 1 994, p. 97) This
echoes Benack's sentiment that "attempting to teach client-centered
counseling to students whose epistemology is fundamentally
dualistic may be much like attempting to teach algebra to concrete
operational children: The specific techniques may be imitated, but an
understanding of the whole method depends on an underlying
cognitive structure that is not there" (Benack, 1988, p. 230-231).
Thus Kegan's model can not only help supervisors to understand (and
hopefully avoid) some of the frustrations inherent in a situation
where people's meaning perspectives are quite different, but also
provide a schema for understanding these varied perspectives.
As the theoretical model underlying a developmental approach
to clinical supervision, Kegan's theory can help supervisors tailor
their interventions to the needs of supervisees in developmentally
appropriate ways. They might identify (or construct) situations
with the requisite tension between support and challenge to foster
development. Such "teachable moments" are bound to arise in the
clinical work of the supervisee in the form of the experience of
being stuck or challenged. With a more refined understanding of the
developmental challenge inherent in the experience of being stuck,
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the supervisor is better prepared to help the therapist reflect
usefully on these experiences. If supervisors can recognize those
challenges which are at the growing edge of their supervisees-
development, clinical problems might function much like the black
bead/white bead problem did for the children in transition from the
pre-operational to the concrete operational stage, in that "any real
solution to the crisis must ultimately involve a new way of being in
the world" (Kegan, 1982, p. 41).
The understanding of development provided by Kegan's model
has implications for the field of counselor education as well. This
fundamentally new conception of human development might be a
valuable addition to the curriculum in graduate training programs in
psychology. It can provide a robust model with which to understand
development in one's clients, oneself and one's supervisees. As
graduate programs recognize the importance of formal training in
supervision, Kegan's model can provide an important theoretical
foundation.
Kegan's model would suggest that greater opportunities for
reflecting on relationships and on one's own internal experience
should enhance development. This suggests that supervision can
play a crucial role in fostering the development of psychotherapists.
But if supervision is so important, what comprises good
supervision?
In quoting Schon, Holloway (1995) suggests the following:
Learning all forms of professional artistry depends, at least in
part, on . . . freedom to learn by doing in a setting relatively
low in risk, with access to coaches who initiate students into
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t e radifons of the calling" and help them, by "the right k.nd
of tellmg to see on the.r own behalf and in the.r own way
what they need most to see. (Schon. 1983, p.l7. quoted m
Holloway, 1 995, p. 2).
Each of these components seem essential to an approach to
supervision based on Kegan's model. Recognizing "what they most
need to see" is just one aspect. If supervision based on Kegan's
model focused solely on the identification of supervisees-
developmental limitations, this would be an unfortunate use of the
model, for a number of reasons. First, although structural
developmental level can help us understand much about a person's
experience, it is not defining of the person. Higher levels of
structural development do not make one a better therapist. Other
factors such as personal integrity, depth of compassion and
openness to learning are no less important.
Second, the implicit assumption common to the literature that
the supervisor will be at a higher stage of development than the
supervisee will at times be false. It is important to consider the
implications for the supervision interaction if the supervisee is at a
higher stage of development. In fact, any kind of developmental
mismatch (a high probability occurrence) has important
repercussions on the supervision process. Kegan's model can begin
to illuminate some of these. Although he was not speaking of
supervision, Kegan's words here seem to speak directly to this
problem:
If one position is actually more complex than the other, it
should be able to understand the other's position on the other's
own terms, to extend empathy for the costs involved in
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altering that position, and to provide support for, rather than
dismissal of, the prior position. If the positions are of equal
complexity, each may be able to understand the other but
neither can build the bridge between orders of consciousness
that Its false claim of superiority would imply, if one position
IS actually less complex than the other, it should not even be
able to understand the other on terms that allow the other to
feel that It is being adequately understood. (Keqan 1994 n
334) ' '
Clearly, the ideal expectation for the supervisor is that s/he
will be at a higher stage of development and be able to "build the
bridge" between orders of consciousness, both to facilitate the
supervisor's own understanding of the supervisee as well as foster
the supervisee's development. This kind of understanding of the
therapist is implicitly based on a Rogerian client-centered approach
(1951), with its empathic attunement to the person's meaning
perspective. Kegan's model builds on this foundation in Rogers by
illuminating the different structures of meaning by which people
might understand their experience. In the domain of clinical
supervision, Kegan's model can help supervisors understand the
varied experiences of becoming a psychotherapist, and would
suggest that this kind of understanding is key:
This is the secret of helping others ... In order to help
another effectively I must understand what he understands. If
I do not know that, my greater understanding will be of no help
to him
. . . Instruction begins when you put yourself in his
place so that you may understand what he understands in the
way he understands it. (Kierkegaard, quoted in Kegan, 1994, p.
278).
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Limitations of the Study
Perhaps a major limitation of this study is the degree to which
its assumptions are based on the premises of Kegan's theory, m this
way, the strengths and limitations of Kegan's structural
developmental theory are integral to this study. While its ability to
handle complex data is a strength of Kegan's model, its method for
assessing development seems to be a limitation.
As discussed in the methodology chapter, the qualitative
nature of the assessment method, together with the very fine
distinctions the theory makes, contributes to a potentially high
level of difficulty in establishing reliability in the use of the coding
system. This seems especially true for researchers working
independently, without ongoing contact with the authors of the
system. Although the authors of the coding system make the
important point that the difficulties inherent in using the system
mitigate against its inappropriate use (Lahey et al., 1988, p. 3-5), it
does seem that the system could benefit from becoming more user-
friendly.
One question worth considering is whether the subject-object
interview could be adapted in such a way that a more standardized
coding might be possible, without losing the strengths of the model.
It is interesting to look at Taylor's (1983) "Measure of
Epistemological Reflection" (MER) in this regard. Taylor developed
the MER as a more standardized system for coding in Perry's (1970)
model of intellectual development. Although this system also uses
qualitative data, the coding system includes examples for each stage
which users of the system can then compare with their own
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interview data. Taylor's coding system focuses on six domains
relevant to the Perry system, and asks questions on each of the
following areas: decision-making, the role of the learner, the role
of the instructor, the role of peers in learning, how learning is
evaluated and the person's views of knowledge, truth or reality. The
strength of the MER is that it is able to code complex qualitative
data using a reasonably simple system. If a similar kind of coding
system could be designed which could capture the complexity of
Kegan's theory, it would make the model much more usable,
especially to researchers working at remote locations.
There are some differences between the two theories which
make the development of such a system a greater challenge in the
case of Kegan's model. Perry's theory focuses on a more narrowly
circumscribed domain of intellectual development, making it easier
to create a typology of responses to questions in this domain.
Although Kegan's subject-object interview itself is not completely
open-ended (but consists of ten probes, described earlier), the data
it generates is purely interview data in which a person is talking
about significant issues in his/her life. In order to be able to create
a typology of responses for coding in the Kegan system, one would
need to narrow the domain of consideration substantially.
The easiest way to narrow the focus of the interview would be
using hypothetical situations. However, a strength of the Kegan
system is that is uses real-life situations of significance to the
interviewee. Using hypothetical situations would alter the nature of
what was being measured. However, it might be possible to
determine the most effective domains for scorable material, and
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adapt the subject-object interview to those specific domains. One
area to consider for Kegan's system might be (like Taylor's) a
question about decision-making, especially asking about a difficult
decision. (One could envision this kind of question generating
potentially scorable data in terms of how a person locates the
source of the authority for their decisions, how they understand
their relationships to others, what kinds of values or considerations
are most important, etc.) One could also do a meta-analysis of all
the subject-object interview data to determine the most salient
areas upon which to focus. This might make the development of a
more simplified (and more easily replicable) coding system possible.
The difficulty of the coding and reliability processes in the
Kegan system raise questions about both the reliability and the
usability of the model. Why should we trust the results this study
has generated? Why should we trust the reliability of Kegan's model
in general? Is the model usable, given the complexity and difficulty
involved in its use?
I will comment first on the reliability of my own study. I did
have great difficulty, working at a remote location, aligning my
understanding of the scoring system with that of the experts. In
order to ensure the reliability of my study, then, I had ail twelve
interviews scored by an expert in the subject-object coding system.
Following this, I engaged with the expert scorer in a rigorous
process of understanding and reconciling the scores for each
interview on which we differed. We spent many hours discussing the
finer point of each of the interviews in question, until we both felt
comfortable that the score was accurate. The overall consistency
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of the results of my study with developmental expectations and with
the results of other similar studies also support their validity.
Although the Kegan system is not an easy one to use, it has a
number of strengths that speak to its reliability. Most importantly,
it is able to handle extremely complex interview data about any
subject matter and yield a singe stage score. The system also
makes very refined sub-stage score discriminations. As the results
of my study attest, even these very refined discriminations are
meaningful ones in terms of understanding the data. The overall
interater reliability for the Kegan system has been high compared to
other similar measures, such as Kohlberg's Moral Judgement
Interview and Loevinger's Sentence Completion Test (Lahey, et al.,
1988, p. 356-360). Finally, the results to date of a longitudinal
study conducted by Kegan, Lahey, Souvaine, Popp & Beukema suggest
that development does it fact occur in a very gradual fashion, with
changes in the expected direction of increasing complexity of
reasoning (Kegan, 1994, p.187-188).
The usability of the model is also an important question.
There is no doubt that the subject-object interview is time
consuming to administer and to score, and requires a very high level
of understanding of the theory to score accurately. However, these
limitations do not undermine the value of the model in specific kinds
of situations. Kegan's model is most useful in generating an in-
depth understanding of the developing person. As such, it will be
most useful in situations in which there is an on-going relationship
of some depth, such as a supervisory relationship.
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Kegan's is an important new model for understanding human
development. So, although the level of expertise required in the
theory is high, its usefulness goes beyond the supervisory
relationship. If the framework is a valuable one to the clinician, it
may enhance all aspects of clinical work. It can do so, I believe,
without the clinician ever administering a subject-object interview
to a client or supervisee. In practice, of course, the point is not to
get an accurate stage score, but rather an accurate understanding of
the meaning perspective of the developing person. With an
understanding of Kegan's theory, this can be done in the normal
course of empathic listening and/or questioning in supervision or
psychotherapy.
Another limitation to consider in terms of this study is the
extent to which the model may not fully explain the data. The aspect
of the results which was most surprising and seems to point to data
which the theory does not explain, was the differences which
transpired within a developmental stage. In particular, one stage
four therapist stood out as so strikingly different from the others at
this same stage that I found it difficult to believe that her
interview did in fact reflect this same level of development.
These differences were not only content differences; the
"outlier's" responses were often less complex as well. The
complexity difference was manifested primarily in terms of other
stage four therapists demonstrating a greater degree of self-
reflection and a more sophisticated understanding of others. (Please
see the discussion in chapter 4 on termination and on dual
relationships, in particular, for illustrations of this difference.)
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Since greater complexity is generally an indicator of higher
developmental levels, these differences were confusing: How could
therapists at the same stage of development present responses so
different in complexity? And, do these results undercut the utility
of the developmental model, since they render the complexity
dimension an unreliable index of development?
Consultation with Kegan expert Dr. Nancy Popp helped to
explicate these issues. Dr. Popp suggested that the differences
which I observed in the outlier were not developmental differences,
in the sense that development merely sets the parameters on one's
perspective-taking ability. Other personality factors may determine
how wide a perspective will actually be taken. Popp's (1993) work
elucidates this difference between the boundary distinctions a
person is able to make (the dimension of mental growth) and the
permeability and flexibility of those boundaries (the dimension of
mental health).
It is worth noting that Popp did agree that other stage four
therapists in my sample did demonstrate more complex reasoning
and higher levels of self-understanding. I came to understand the
outlier as not fully utilizing the stage four capacities which she did,
in fact, demonstrate at various points in the interview.
The outlier's results may not undermine Kegan's model so much
as they underscore the limits of any developmental model, i.e., that
development is only one aspect of a person's functioning and cannot
capture all the complexity of behavior in a given domain. These
results also do not undercut the practical utility of the model.
Understanding a psychotherapist like the outlier in terms of Kegan's
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model could actually be quite useful for the clinical supervisor,
suggesting developmentally appropriate interventions.
In addition to considerations related to the use of this
particular model, the study has a number of methodological
limitations. Given the goal of understanding complex phenomena,
sample size was limited to twelve. Therefore, the ability to
generalize from this small sample size is limited. In addition, the
study was limited to Caucasian women. It would be important to
study development in male therapists and in a more ethnically
diverse sample. Since we know that cultural factors influence
development, it would be interesting to discover how the results
might be different (or not) depending on these factors.
The range of developmental levels was narrower than
anticipated for this study. It would be quite interesting to
understand how therapists outside of this developmental range make
meaning of their work. Given that meaningful differences were
found within the stage three to stage four range, differences across
the broad range of development (i.e., stages two to five) should be
quite interesting.
Finally, this is not a longitudinal study. Although the question
on change in the therapist was designed to address the longitudinal
dimension of development, it does so entirely from the perspective
of the research participant.
Directions for Future Research
The limitations of this study suggest a number of directions
for future research, including a study of male therapists and of a
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culturnlly diverse sample of therapists. It would also be very
interesting to do a study w,th psychotherapists which actually
addresses the consistency question, looking for developmental
discrepancies in meaning-making between the domains of personal
and professional life.
Ihe stylistic dimension which emerged in the results section
seems like an important factor which was not addressed in this
study. Ihe issue of a boundaried versus a connected personality
style, which Noam (198b) discussed, might account for much of (he
variability wliich was not explained by stage differences. Measures
are neecied to look at the inlerplay of stylistic factors with
structural stages. Pulling together these two distinct but
mieiconnected factors would contribute to a richer understanding of
the developmental process.
A larger scale study addressing a wider range of development
woukJ also expand upon our current understanding, and perhaps
provide sharper contrasts in the ways in which therapists make
meaning about their work. A larger study with more than one
researcher would also allow for separate developmental and
thematic analyses, although this might be an unnecessary
piec.mtion. given the distinction between structure and content.
Given tfie in-depth nature of research using Kegan's model, .i
study focused on fewer questions but addressed to a larger s.imple
might be l)oth time and cost-effective. Of particul.ir interest to me
would be a focus on therapeutic challenges, as the experience of
challenge seems inherently connected with the cutting edge of one's
developnuMU. Sucfi a study might either be open-ended in its
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definition of therapeutic challenges (letting therapists define these
for themselves in the interview) or might be based on a large-scale
survey of such challenges. The use of such a survey, followed by
qualitative interviews focused on key challenges, would allow for
more systematic developmental comparisons. On the other hand, an
open-ended approach seems more responsive to the individual
challenges faced by psychotherapists who might be "outliers" at
either end of the developmental spectrum.
Studying the process of developmental change among
psychotherapists might also be done using a longitudinal design.
Given that the use of Kegan's model seems fruitful in terms of
understanding psychotherapist development, a longitudinal study
would be a way of the examining the change process in more detail.
Such a study could provide important insights into the components
of or impetus for developmental change, i.e., how do we as
therapists actually move from one stage (or sub-stage) to the next?
A related and perhaps more fundamental question might also be
asked: What propels adult development in general? What kinds of
life experiences are most often related to developmental movement?
Similarly, what kinds of life experiences are found in those rare
individuals who attain the highest levels of development?
Summary
This study has proposed the use of a new, structural model for
understanding the process of development in psychotherapists. In
dialogue with the literature on developmental supervision, it has
suggested that structural models in general and Kegan's model in
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particular are well suited for enhancing our understanding of the
ways that psychotherapists make meaning about their clinical work.
This research has been designed as a qualitative study to address a
number of current research needs, including the need for in-depth
studies of psychotherapist development directly (outside of the
context of supervision), for research with more experienced
clinicians conducted outside of an academic setting, for research
directly relevant to practitioners of clinical supervision and for a
robust theoretical model.
Twelve female psychologists were interviewed using a semi-
structured interview format focused on six areas of clinical practice.
All research participants were between the ages of 40-49 and had at
least five years of clinical experience. Data was analyzed according to
the coding scheme for Kegan's model and through a qualitative analysis
of emergent themes. The range of development represented by this study
[from stage 3(4) to stage 4] is consistent with expectations for highly
educated adults. All therapists in the study were scored within one full-
stage score of each other. Despite this relatively narrow range of
development, meaningful differences could be discerned, validating the
usefulness of the fine distinctions which Kegan's theory is able to make.
Developmental differences were found in terms of four of the
six areas studied. Therapists at stage four were contrasted with
those in the transition from stage three to stage four in the
following areas: responses to manipulative clients, dealing with the
termination of psychotherapy, changes experienced as a therapist
and perceptions of therapeutic challenges. Developmental
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differences were not apparent in therapists' manner of dealing with
dual relationships or in their perceptions about clinical supervision
It is noteworthy that all of the changes therapists described m
themselves were in line with developmental expectations. The most
commonly experienced change, reported by ten out of twelve therapists
in the sample, centered on an increasing ability to set limits and
maintain boundaries. These changes reflect an aspect of the
developmental movement from stage three to stage four. These results
suggest that Kegan's theory is able to capture salient aspects of
psychotherapist development. They also lend support to the idea that
structural development is unidirectional and hierarchical in nature.
In a number of ways, Kegan's theory makes a unique contribution
to our understanding of psychotherapist development. Kegan's model
encompasses the broad range of ego development. It thus offers the field
of developmental supervision a way of understanding psychotherapist
behavior in developmental terms across a range of domains. In contrast
to much of the work on counselor development and supervision, it can do
so without resorting to the caveat that people can be at different stages
for different aspects of their behavior (which undercuts the utility of a
developmental model).
The coding system can handle extremely complex, real-life data,
allowing Kegan's model to address the issues involved in becoming a
psychotherapist in their complexity. In this way, it retains the strength
of the psychodynamic work on psychotherapy supervision, while adding
the crucial component of development. In so doing, it provides an
important context for understanding and normalizing the challenges
inherent in becoming a psychotherapist. Rather than seeing the
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difficulties therapists face as reflections of idiosyncratic personality
issues (as the psychodynamic view has tended to) these issues can be
understood from a developmental perspective. Kegan's model can thus
potentially provide an organized schema for understanding the challenges
which therapists are likely to face at each stage of development.
Kegan's model is most useful in generating an in-depth
understanding of the developing person. Although this research has
focused on an understanding of psychotherapists' development, the
implications of the theory are much broader. Kegan's theory speaks
to a process of meaning construction in which we are all engaged.
What the model can provide, then, is not just a means for
supervisors to understand psychotherapists, but a way for
supervisors and psychotherapists to understand themselves, each
other and their clients. The best use of Kegan's model will be to
deepen not just our understanding but also our empathy for the
developing person, keeping in mind that "the person is always larger
than the theory" (William Perry, quoted in Parks, 1986, p. 52).
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APPENDIX B
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
1. MANIPULATION: We've all dealt with clients who use
manipulation as a regular way of dealing with other people forinstance, the classic borderline client. Can you talk about a timewhen a client's style of manipulation was particularly problematic
kinds of feelings were evoked for you? How did you make sense ofthese feelings?
2 TERMINATION: Can you think about some times in your work with
clients when the issue of termination was in some way
problematic? Is there a particular client or situation which comes
to mind? Can you describe the situation and your reactions?
3. DUAL RELATIONSHIPS: Can you think about some times in your
work with clients when the issue of dual relationships became
problematic? Can you describe the situation and your reactions?
4. CHALLENGE: I'd like to ask you, what is the most difficult or
challenging issue you face in your work as a therapist? I'd like to
ask you to speak to a current challenge in your clinical work, rather
than to one of the problems you've already solved about doing this
work. What are the struggles or the questions you have at this
point?
5. SUPERVISORY RELATIONSHIP: Is your supervisory relationship a
context in which you can address the issues which are most alive for
you? Why or why not? If not in supervision, do you have a place
where you can discuss these issues?
6. CHANGE: If I were to ask you to reflect back on your work as a
therapist, how would you see yourself as having changed, especially
in relation to any of the issues we've discussed today? If there are
issues which you see differently now, I'd be interested in what you
can recollect about how you made sense of things at an earlier point
of your own development.
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